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ABSTRACT 
This thesis critically appraises the disruptive effect of the law and practice 
relating to ML in the US and the UK on money laundering. This thesis 
concludes that the law and practice relating to ML in both jurisdictions do 
not disrupt ML. This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces 
this work. It is this chapter that provides the synopsis of the whole work 
chapter by chapter. Chapter 2 critically analyses the law relating to ML in 
the US, which includes the main ML statutes – BSA 1970, MLCA 1986 and 
the Patriot Act 2001. In addition, chapter 2 also critically analyses other US 
laws that have application in disrupting ML.  
Chapter 3 critically examines the law relevant to ML in the UK. This 
chapter critically appraises the AML law under POCA 2002 and under 
MLR, the proceeds of crime law under POCA 2002, as well as other 
alternative laws that can be used to disrupt ML. The CFA 2017 enacted in 
April amended POCA substantially. Thus, this Chapter also analysis the 
major CFA provisions. The analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 reveals the weak 
links in the main AML statutes and the limits of the other laws regarding 
their application to ML offences.  
Chapter 4 critically analyses the practice relating to ML in the US and UK. 
This chapter focuses on issues relating to AML compliance, which consists 
of a set of AML practices, which the law requires regulated persons to 
establish and maintain for the disruption of ML. Chapter 5 critically 
evaluates the effectiveness of the law and practice in disrupting ML and TF 
in both jurisdictions. Based on the analysis in chapters 2, 3, and 4, and also 
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based   on the views of scholars in this field, Chapter 5 concludes that the 
AML law and practice do not disrupt ML and TF.  
The concluding chapter – Chapter 6 – first explores factors that militate 
against the law and practice relating to ML. It then suggests how (through 
the UWO and whistleblowing) the UK and US AML law could be 
strengthened. The law in both jurisdictions provides protection to whistle-
blowers. However, it is only the UK that has UWOs in its statute book. 
Even in the UK, the UWOs are just introduced by CFA 2017.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Money laundering: a process that bridges the gap between 
criminal world and the rest of the society.  
Michel Sindona, a Corporate tax lawyer and financial expert1  
      
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis critically appraises the law and practice relating to ML in the US and the UK 
in terms of disrupting ML. It concludes that the law and practice relating to ML in both 
jurisdictions do not disrupt ML. This thesis consists of six chapters.  
Chapter 1 introduces this work. It proceeds by giving an overview of the whole work 
chapter by chapter. This is followed by explanation of why and how this research has 
been conducted. It then goes on to explain the concept of ML. Based on selected 
definitions of ML, this chapter describes what ML is, in theory.  
To understand how the law and practice relating to ML in both jurisdictions evolve, this 
chapter seeks to trace the origin of ML and how the two jurisdictions have been tackling 
the problem. This chapter then analyses why people engage in ML. Finally, Chapter 1 
concludes by discussing the three basic stages involved in ML, acknowledging that ML 
scheme can be much more complex. 
Chapter 2 critically analyses the law relating to ML in the US. This chapter proceeds 
with a brief discussion on the Patriot Act 2001. The objective is to highlight the 
amendment the Patriot Act made to the primary ML statutes – Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) 
1970 and Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA) 1986. It then critically analyses the 
                                                
1 Kris Hinterseer, Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative 
Legal Context (Kluwer Law International 2002) 11 quoting Michel Sindona  
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recordkeeping and reporting requirements of BSA 1970, sanctions for failure to comply 
with these requirements, and the challenges faced by the 1970 Act. Chapter 2 then 
critically analyses the substantive ML law, MLCA 1986 and its impact on ML.  
As other laws are also being used to disrupt ML in the US, also, this chapter critically 
analyses general asset forfeiture law, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices 
(RICO) Act 1970, and tax and securities laws relevant to combating ML. Also, this 
chapter discusses state ML laws to demonstrate that the federal authorities are not alone 
in their effort to disrupt ML. The analysis in this chapter reveals the weak links in the 
US AML regime and shows the limits of the other laws about their application to ML. 
Chapter 3 critically examines the law relevant to ML in the UK. This chapter starts with 
highlighting the key developments in the UK AML landscape. The objective is to 
provide a synopsis of how the AML law evolves and where it is now. In particular, 
emphasis is on the substantial amendments the CFA 2017 made to POCA 2002.   
It then discusses the interplay between UK AML law and the EU Directives on ML, to 
demonstrate the interaction between the EU initiatives and the UK’s effort in combating 
ML. This is followed by a critical appraisal of the AML law under the POCA 2002 and 
MLR 2007. Also in the UK, as in the US, there are other laws that can be used to 
disrupt ML.2 The analysis in this chapter reveals the weak links in the main AML 
statutes and shows the limits of the other laws concerning their application to ML. 
Chapter 4 analyses the practice relating to ML in the UK and US. This chapter focuses 
on issues relating to AML compliance programme, which consists of a set of AML 
practices that must be established to disrupt ML. It begins by exploring the regulatory 
                                                
2 For example, the Theft Act 1968 s 22, which criminalises handling the proceeds of crime 
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framework in UK and US, followed by an analysis of the need for an effective AML 
compliance function to disrupt ML effectively.  
This chapter then explores why government shifts the responsibility to disrupt ML onto 
the regulated persons and the implications of that. As the AML compliance comes with 
costs, this chapter also presents a cost-benefit analysis of compliance. This is followed 
by an analyses of the role of the senior management, law enforcement and gatekeepers 
in ensuring effective AML compliance.  
The need for co-operation between the stakeholders for effective disruption of ML is 
then disscussed. As the regulated sector finds itself positioned between the contractual 
duties they owe their clients and their obligations under the AML law, finally, Chapter 4 
critically analyses the tension that arises in practice between AML compliance and 
confidentiality.  
Chapter 5 evaluates the effectiveness of the law and practice in the disruption of ML. 
This chapter concludes that the AML law and practice do not disrupt ML. It first 
examines whether the AML law as it is today, disrupts ML as well as TF. Due to lack of 
space, this thesis omits the discussion of the legal and regulatory provisions that deal 
with TF. However, in evaluating the effectiveness of the AML law and practices, 
terrorist financing cannot be ignored.  
The cost of AML is also discussed, to further support the findings of this thesis that 
AML law and practice do not disrupt money laundering. Having found that AML law 
and practice do not disrupt ML, this chapter further explores where does the problem 
lies between preventive or enforcement aspects of AML.  
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Finally, the concluding chapter examines the factors that militate against the law and 
practice relating to ML in the authorities’ effort to disrupt ML and TF. This chapter 
concludes with analysis of the significance of the UWOs just introduced into the UK 
AML legal framework, and whistleblowing in disrupting ML and TF.  
1.2 THE PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH AND ITS 
METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this research is to provide a holistic assessment of whether the law and 
practice relating to ML does disrupt ML activities in the US and the UK. The thesis is a 
critical analysis, by way of comparison, between the US and UK law. Obviously, 
because of the various international initiatives, virtually every country has relevant law. 
In the main they are very similar to the experience of the US and UK. Thus, this thesis 
does not attempt to look at other jurisdictions – because of lack of space. However, 
where something is particularly relevant such as the new legislation in the UK in 
relation to the UWOs, where there is no background, then it is pertinent to look at the 
experience of  Australia and Ireland – the two countries that already have UWOs in 
their legal system. 
As this study is primarily exploratory research, which is aimed at discovering whether 
the law and practice relating to ML actually disrupt it, this thesis adopts the qualitative 
method and is conducted through the analysis of primary and secondary sources. While 
the AML law may differ among England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the 
analysis of the UK AML law and practice centers on the AML law of England and 
Wales. The reason is, the AML law and practice in England and Wales is similar to that 
in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Secondly, lack of space makes it difficult even to 
highlight the differences between the law and practice relating to ML in those 
jurisdictions. 
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In the course of this research, there is consideration of the AML legislation in the UK 
and the US. This includes the POCA 2002, MLR 2007, MLCA1986, The Patriot Act 
2001, BSA 1970 and its associated Regulations issued by the Treasury. There is also 
consideration of other relevant laws applicable to ML. Equally important are the 
secondary sources. Thus, Hansard, US Congressional reports, and many other reports 
will be consulted. Other secondary sources to be consulted include books, scholarly 
articles, and newspaper articles. Of particular importance is the FAFT mutual evaluation 
reports. 
This thesis is not a gender-specific, thus, where “he” is used it is just for consistency 
purposes and the pronoun refers to all genders.  Also for consistency purposes, the term 
“regulated person” is used throughout this study to refer to “relevant person” and 
“covered person/entities”. As will be seen, the way cases and legislation are cited in UK 
and US differs. With regard to legislation, the US style is complicated as legislations are 
in codes, and mostly a code contains more than one piece of legislation. For example, 
the primary ML statutes, the RICO Act and forfeiture statutes are codified in Title 18 of 
the United States Codes. On the other hand, a legislative provision can be enacted 
across many codes. However, this is not the case in the UK. In this case, nothing can be 
done to ensure consistency. 
1.3 THE CONCEPT OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
 1.3.1 WHAT IS MONEY LAUNDERING? 
ML has been defined in a number of ways. Among the scholars, Professor Barry Rider 
describes ML as ‘A process, which obscures the origin of money and its source…a wide 
approach, which would encompass transactions designed to hide money as well as wash 
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dirty money to clean’.3 At the international level, United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) (Vienna 
Convention), defined ML. Under the Vienna Convention, ML includes conversion or 
transfer of, the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of; the acquisition, possession or use of, 
property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence.4  
Article 6(1) of the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on laundering, search, seizure 
and confiscation of the proceeds of crime defines ML in a similar way.5 Similarly, the 
first EU Directive on ML describes ML almost in the same way. The difference, 
however, is that the Directive brings within its scope aiding, abetting, attempting, 
counselling, and conspiracy to commit ML.6 The FATF defines ML as ‘the processing 
of these criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin’.7  
Statutorily, POCA defines ML as an act which constitutes (a) an offence under section 
327, 328 or 329, (b) an attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit an offence 
specified in (a), (c) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an 
offence specified in paragraph (a), or (d) would constitute an offence specified in (a), 
(b) or (c) if committed in the United Kingdom.8  In the United States, ML is defined by 
the 18 USC 1956. In the simplest terms, laundering means a transaction involving a 
                                                
3 Barry A K Rider, ‘Recovering the Proceeds of Corruption’ [2007] 10(1) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 5, 15. By way of contrast, TF has been described as ‘the process of conducting financial 
transactions with clean money for the purpose of concealing or disguising the future use of that money to 
commit a criminal act (see Stefan D Cassella, ‘Reverse Money Laundering’ [2003] 7 Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 92, 93). The United Nation’s defines TF broadly, in that it classifies assisting terrorist 
with travel documents as terrorism financing (see International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) 1999 Article 1(1). However, TACT 2000 s 14 defines “terrorist 
property” even more broadly (please see Clive Walker, The Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti-Terrorism 
Legislation (3rd edn OUP 2014) 83). TF offences are contained in ss 15 – 18 of the TACT 2000 
4 Article 3(1)(b)(i) and (ii); 3(1)(c)(i) 
5 European Treaty Series - No. 141 1990 
6 Council Directive 91/308//EEC Article 1 
7  FATF, ‘What is Money Laundering’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/#d.en.11223> 
accessed 27 December 2015 
8 POCA 2002 s 340(11) 
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property derived from an unlawful activity.9 The offence of ML is said to be committed 
in the United States if 18 USC section 1956 or 1957 is contravened.  
Despite some differences in the way these definitions were framed, all these definitions 
point to one thing – dealing with criminal assets with the aim of disguising their illicit 
origin. However, according to the 18 USC section 1956 definition, mere dealing in the 
proceeds of crime falls within the definition of ML. 
1.3.2 THE ORIGIN OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
ML is not a new phenomenon.10 The processes that we now describe as ML have been 
used for entirely salutary and legitimate purposes. For example, one of the the rationale 
for bank secrecy has been to protect those who could be victimised by a tyrant regime.11 
Similarly, the phrase “money laundering” itself has a long history – it is said to have 
originated in the 1920s during the prohibition era. 12  However, the term “money 
laundering” is said to have received its first judicial recognition in the US in 1982 in a 
case, United States v $4,255,625.39 551 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Fla. 1982).13 
History is important in understanding how authorities in the US and UK struggle against 
ML. Thus, since the focus of the present research is on the US and UK, tracing the 
                                                
9 18 USC s 1956 (a)(1) (2012) 
10 Barry Rider, ‘The Price of Probity’ [1999] 7(2) Journal of Financial Crime 105, 112 (stating that ML is 
nothing new); Fletcher N. Baldwin Jr., ‘Organized Crime and Money Laundering in the Americas’ [2002] 
14 Florida Journal of International Law 41 (stating that (i) the history of ML goes back at least to the 
Roman Empire when Roman soldiers stationed in France used to hide and “launder” money; and (ii) 
during the crusade, the Knight Templar were masters at hiding and laundering their money); Hinterseer (n 
1) 23 (referring to hawala, Hundi and Chop as some of the oldest systems of laundering); P Kevin 
Carwile and Valerie Hollis, ‘The Mob: From 42nd Street to Wall Street’ [2004] 11(4) Journal of Financial 
Crime 325, 327 (the authors reflected on the history of organized crimes dating back to 1800); Robin T 
Naylor, Wages of crime: Black markets, illegal finance, and the underworld economy (Cornell University 
Press, 2004) 134-137 
11 George J Mascarino and Michael R Shumaker, ‘Beating the Shell Game: Bank Secrecy Laws and Their 
Impact on Civil Recovery in International Fraud Actions’ [1997] 1 Journal of Money Laundering 42 
12 Naylor (n 10) 134 -137 (suggesting that the phrase “money laundering” dates back to the prohibition 
era of 1920s) 
13 Jesse S Morgan, ‘Dirty Names, Dangerous Money: Alleged Unilateralism in US Policy on Money 
Laundering’ [2003] 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 771-76 
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history will help in showing how law and practice in relation to ML evolved in these 
two jurisdictions.  
In the US, the origin of modern-day ML can be traced to the Prohibition era. As the 
Volstead (National Prohibition) Act in 1919 ushered in the Prohibition era,14 criminals 
had to find a means of hiding the illegal profit made from “bootlegging” and “loan 
sharking”. 15  Because bootlegging was an expensive business (characterised by the 
purchase of raw materials for the production of liquor on the one hand, and on the other, 
smuggling liquor into the US from other countries), it necessitated co-operation among 
the various organised crime groups who at the time exercised control over different 
territories in the US.16  
Following the conviction of Al Capone and the explosion in drug dealing, Meyer 
Lansky, whose laundering legacy endures till today, devised more efficient and 
sophisticated ways of laundering the proceeds of crime.17 Similarly, the failure of Al 
Capone, led to the emergence of Salvatore ‘Charlie Lucky’ Luciano as the leading 
United States organised crime figure who together with the duo of Meyer Lansky and 
Michele Sindona orchestrated modern transnational money laundering to sustain 
international narcotics trade.18  
Rather than the Narcotics Control Act 1956 (which imposed up to 40 years 
imprisonment if convicted of drug trafficking offence) to deter organised crime in the 
United States, Luciano, Lansky and Sindona made ML to assume its modern 
                                                
14 Rowan Bosworth-Davies and Graham Saltmarsh, Money Laundering: A Practical Guide to the New 
Legislation (Chapman & Hall 1994) 2  
15 ibid 2-3 
16 Carwile and Hollis (n 10) 325, 328 (Organised crime families that exercised control over territories 
across the US include families of Al Capone, Bugs Moran, Carlo Gambino, Salvatore Lucky Luciano and 
Russell Bufalino) 
17 Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh (n 14) 1 - 3 
18 ibid 3 - 6 
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sophisticated, organised and institutionalised a system of alternative financial 
management. 19  While Luciano was the brain behind international heroin business 
connecting Sicilians with the Americans, Lansky and Sindona were responsible for the 
laundering of heroin money through the so-called ‘Pizza Connection’.20 
Despite the efforts of the United States to address the growing threat of organised 
criminal groups by using criminal as well as fiscal law, these threats continued 
unabated. Consequently, the United States enacted the BSA 1970, RICO 1970 and 
sixteen years later, MLCA 1986, and then following 9/11, Congress enacted The USA 
Patriot Act 2001 – all these in a bid to attack the laundering of the proceeds of crime. 
The Patriot Act made substantial and significant amendments to the BSA 1970 and 
MLCA 1986.  
In the UK too the history of ML is long. Years before the abolition of forfeiture and 
deodand in 1870 and 1846, respectively, wealthy felons laundered their assets before 
their arrest to prevent the Crown from taking it away from them.21 In modern times, 
however, DTOA 1986, which criminalised ML and which also encouraged reporting of 
laundering of proceeds of drug trafficking, is the starting point in discussing the law and 
practice on ML in the UK. 
Certain events led to the DTOA 1986. Starting from Operation Julie, a successful police 
undercover operation, which resulted in the discovery in the UK of a large LSD 
                                                
19 ibid 5 - 6 
20 ibid 5 - 7 
21 Howard League for Penal Reform, Profits of Crime and their Recovery: Report of a Committee chaired 
by Sir Derek Hodgson (Heinemann, 1984) 15-16 (Howard League for Penal Reform) (Deodand was the 
power of the court to seize as deodand any object which caused person’s death, while forfeiture was the 
power of the medieval criminal courts to forfeit all the property of the convicted felon to the crown) 
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manufacturing and distribution network, and arrest and prosecution of the organisation’s 
principal actors.22  
While the defendants were successfully prosecuted and jailed, the forfeiture provision 
then in force, section 27 of the Misuse Drugs Act 1971, proved to be ineffective not 
because the defendants hid away the proceeds of the drug but because of the limits of 
the law.23 As Lord Diplock pointed out in R. v. Cuthbertson, orders of forfeiture under 
section 27 could never have been intended by Parliament to serve as a means of 
stripping the drug traffickers of the total profits of their criminal enterprises.24 
The apparent inability of the Court effectively to deprive an offender of the profits of 
his offending caused substantial public concern.25 It was partly against this backdrop 
that Sir Derek Hodgson’s Committee was set up to review, among other things, the 
forfeiture laws existing at the time, which led to the enactment of the DTOA 1986.26 
Then the Brinks Mat robbery that took place after Operation Julie, but before coming 
into force of DTOA 1986 section 24. For the first time, a UK court convicted the 
defendants of ML.27 That was achieved using the offences of “handling” stolen goods as 
a basis for ML conviction.28 Thus, even if the DTOA 1986 had been in force, the Act 
would not have been of any help since the case was not drug related (because the Act 
was limited to drugs cases). 
                                                
22 ibid 3 
23 R v Kemp and Others [1979] Cr App R 330; R v Cuthbertson [198 1] AC 470 
24 Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh (n 14) 108 
25 Howard League for Penal Reform (n 21) 3 
26 ibid 70 
27 R v Brian Henry Reader and Others (1988) 10 Cr. App. R. (s.) 210 
28 Theft Act 1968 s 22(1) 
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R v Brian Henry Reader29 marked the beginning of judicial intervention in the UK in 
combating ML using handling offences as the basis. In the words of Watkins LJ: 
In our experience, this is the worst case of handling stolen goods 
or conspiring so to do that we have ever encountered. The 
Brinks-Mat robbery, in the view of this Court, was astounding in 
its audaciousness. The handling of the stolen gold is no less 
remarkable for the audacity and skill with which the gold 
disappeared and reappeared upon the legitimate market in the 
form and, further, the dissemination of the proceeds of sale; in 
other words, the laundering of the money so wickedly come 
by.30 
The trial arose out of a robbery involving gold bars weighing approximately three 
tonnes and worth £26 million.31 Due to the large quantity of the gold involved, the 
identity of the stolen gold had to be changed if it were to get into the legitimate 
market.32The defendants successfully laundered the proceeds of their crime by changing 
the identity of the stolen gold bars and then realising their market value. To secure the 
conviction of the defendants for ML, the prosecution used section 22(1) “handling” 
offence of the Theft Act 1968, and that proved successful.33 Section 22(1) provides that: 
a person handles stolen goods if (otherwise than in the course of 
the stealing) knowing or believing them to be stolen goods he 
dishonestly receives the goods, or dishonestly undertakes or 
assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or 
for the benefit of another person, or if he arranges to do so.34 
Like the ML offence, handling stolen goods also carries a maximum jail term of 
fourteen years. 35  Although section 22 is wide-ranging provision and was used 
                                                
29 (1988) 10 Cr. App. R. (s.) 210 
30 ibid 
31 ibid 211 
32 Peter Alldridge, ‘Introduction’ in Barry AK Rider and Chizu Nakajima, Anti Money Laundering Guide 
(Sweet and Maxwell 2005) 1-250 
33 Reader (n 29) 
34 Theft Act 1968 s 22(1) 
35 ibid 22(2) 
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successfully to prosecute the Brinks Mat defendants,36 its limitation in scope is that it 
only applies to cases involving the laundering of stolen property.37 
1.3.3 THE MOTIVE BEHIND MONEY LAUNDERING 
Reasons why people engage in ML obviously differ and Professor Barry Rider has 
provided an analysis of this subject.38 As such, this thesis will not go into details on the 
subject, as it will amount to repeating what has already been discussed. However, this 
section highlights why people engage in ML for the benefit of those who will read this 
thesis but without the privilege of reading Professor Rider’s analysis.  
Having said this, the desire to make proceeds of crime appear legitimate is one of the 
core reasons for ML. As Michel Sindona has rightly observed, ML enables criminals to 
integrate their ill-gotten wealth into the legitimate economy.39 As physical handling of a 
large amount of cash, for example, generated from drugs sales, would expose the dealer 
to so many risks including scrutiny of law enforcement, theft, and robbery, ML allows 
the dealer to avoid these risks and remain below the radar.40   
As money is the lifeblood of criminality, through ML, criminals put their assets beyond 
government’s reach to avoid confiscation.41 Criminals prefer to go to jail rather than 
lose their assets. Overall, the time served by criminals in prison is disproportionately 
low in value to the illicit wealth. Because criminals launder their assets most of the 
                                                
36 Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh (n 14) 108 
37 Nicholas Clark, ‘The Impact of Recent Money Laundering Legislation on Financial Intermediaries’ 
[1995] 3 Journal of Financial Crime 131, 134 
38 Barry A. K. Rider, ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision after 11th September, 2001’ [2003] 10(4) 
Journal of Financial Crime 336, 342-46 
39 Hinterseer (n 1) 11 
40 Jeffrey Simser, ‘The significance of money laundering: The example of the Philippines’ [2006] 9(3) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 293, 294 
41 Barry Rider, ‘The Limits of the law: An Analysis of the Interrelationship of the criminal and civil law 
in the control of money laundering’ [1999] 2(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 209, 217 
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orders made are never met. 42  As laundered assets normally resurface, the UWOs 
introduced by the CFA 2017 section 1 will allow the law enforcement to take away 
illicit profits.  
However, these are not the only motives. A wealthy person or company may resort to 
ML to hide their wealth, to reduce the amount of tax payable or to avoid tax 
altogether.43 Others may launder clean money to further a particular cause, for example, 
funding of terrorism, while they distance themselves from the cause. 44  A migrant 
worker affected by exchange control restrictions may launder his legitimately hard-
earned pay to maintain his family living in his home country.45 At the other end of the 
spectrum, people may launder their legitimate wealth to evade unlawful seizure of their 
assets by a tyrant and oppressive regimes.46 
The distinction has been drawn between “dirty” and “hot” money because the property 
may have a legal source, but the owner may seek to distance himself from it for some 
reasons.47 Professor Barry Rider defined dirty money as money or some other form of 
wealth acquired from crime or other wrongs.48 While dirty money could be regarded as 
hot, the reverse is not necessarily true, yet some monies could be grey due to the 
difference in religious, cultural and societal values.49  
                                                
42 Peter Alldridge, What Went Wrong With Money Laundering Law? (Palgrave 2016) 15-17; Michael levi 
and Lisa Osofsky, ‘Investigating, seizing and confiscating the proceeds of crime’ [1995] Police Research 
Group, Crime Detection & Prevention Series: Paper 61, Home Office Police Department  
43 Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh (n 14) 1 
44 Cassella (n 3) 
45 Hinterseer (n 1) 23 
46 Mascarino and Shumaker (n 11) 
47 Angela Itzikowitz, ‘Nature of Money Laundering’ in Barry AK Rider and Chizu Nakajima, Anti Money 
Laundering Guide (CCH Editions Limited 1999) 5-125 
48 Barry AK Rider, ‘The Control of Money Laundering - a Bridge Too Far?’  European Financial Services 
Law [1988] 5 27, 30 
49 Itzikowitz (n 47) 5-125 – 5-175 
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1.3.4 THE PROCESS OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
ML activities are carried out on a micro and macro scale.50 Irrespective of its scale, ML 
involves three basic stages: placement, layering and integration.51 However, the process 
of ML is not as simple as this. It usually involves a very complex set of transactions that 
may not proceed in that order and may involve more stages. 
Simplistically, placement involves the depositing of the proceeds of crime, mostly in 
cash into the regular or non-regular banking system by converting small denominations 
into larger, or by structuring the transaction to avoid triggering threshold reporting 
requirements. 52  Alternative techniques, such as cash smuggling across a border to 
deposit it in another country, injecting money into smaller businesses or investing a 
huge amount of capital into a well-established large-scale business, exploitation of 
gaming industry, investing in precious metals and artefacts, etc. are also being used to 
place illicit funds into the legitimate economy.53 
On the other hand, layering as the second stage of ML, involves the separation of illegal 
gains from their origin by creating convoluted layers of transactions,54 ‘designed to 
confuse the onlooker and confound the inquirer’.55 The complexity of layering requires 
some parallel transactions, establishing mutual obligations that can be married or 
crossed, often on a contingent basis.56 Layering is often achieved through electronic 
                                                
50 ibid 5-250 
51 Richard W Harms and others, ‘Nature of Money Laundering’ in Barry AK Rider and Chizu Nakajima, 
Anti Money Laundering Guide (CCE Editions Limited) 6-950 
52 Itzikowitz (n 47) 5-300 
53 ibid 5-300 
54 ibid 5-400 
55 Rider (n 3) 9 
56 Itzikowitz (n 47) 5-400 
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funds or wire transfers, converting cash into monetary instruments, setting up 
companies including ‘shell’ or ‘front’ companies in offshore financial systems.57 
Finally, integration is the process of placing back the laundered proceeds into the 
economy in a manner that the proceeds appear as normal and legitimate earnings.58 
Integrating the proceeds of crime can be done in a number of ways, which include: the 
use of real estate; the use of false import/export licence; foreign bank complicity; 
remuneration; and consultancy fee.59 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
As it has been seen in this chapter, ML is not new in the UK and US. Thus, the 
authorities in both jurisdictions have tried to attack ML and the predicate crimes long 
before they enact AML legislation. Consequently, criminals launder their tainted assets. 
They do so, for example, to give an illicit property some sorts of legitimacy or to avoid 
forfeiture, or confiscation in the event the criminals are arrested and prosecuted. In 
theory, the process of ML involves three stages. However, in practice, ML can be very 
complicated process encompassing multiple transactions. 
This chapter has explained the objective of this work and its methodology, the concept 
of ML, the reason why people, especially criminals launder their illicit proceeds, and the 
basic stages involved in the process of ML. It has also traced the history of ML in both 
jurisdictions. Consequently,  The main work now begins. It starts with Chapter 2, which 
evaluates the US AML law. 
                                                
57 ibid 5-400 
58 ibid 5-450 
59 ibid 5-450 
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CHAPTER 2: LAW RELATING TO MONEY 
LAUNDERING IN THE UNITED STATES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the efforts made by the US to fight ML. Such efforts to combat 
ML culminated in the passage of Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act, 
popularly known as BSA 1970.60 Before the enactment of BSA, United States adopted 
some legal measures to combat organised crime. One of these measures was the use of 
tax laws to prosecute the leadership of organised crime.61 Other legislation include 
Trading with the Enemy Act,62 Bretton Woods Agreements Act,63 and RICO Act 1970. 
Despite the broad scope given to RICO by the Courts, and its advantages in fighting 
organised crime, its effectiveness against organised crime has been questioned.64 
The BSA 1970 was enacted to frustrate the use of banks for tax evasion, tax fraud and 
ML and other financial crimes. 65  Rather than relying on their discretion, this Act 
mandates FIs domiciled in the United States to file reports on certain transactions.66 
Congress passed this Act believing it would have ‘high usefulness’ in detecting and 
investigating financial crimes. However, the “detection rationale” of the BSA has been 
challenged.67 
                                                
60 31 USC s 5313-32 
61 The Revenue Act 1918  
62 CH 106-40 Stat 411(1917) now codified as 50 USC ss 1-44 (2012) (This law requires reports of large 
currency transactions. However, enforcement of this law rely on the co-operation and discretion of the 
reporting institutions. Thus, law enforcement find it difficult to trace large cash deposit made into the 
banking system due to the lack of paper trail) 
63 ss 8(a) and 59 Stat. 515, 22 USC s 286(f) confer powers on the Treasury Department to collect 
information regarding international currency holdings and financial transactions 
64 Diane Marie Amann, ‘Spotting Money Launderers: A Better Way to Fight Organised Crime’ [2000] 27 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Communication 199, 203 
65 ibid 208; 
66 Alfred L Schubkegel, ‘Tresury’s Reporting Rules Governing Transfers of Currency’ [1986] 64 The Tax 
Magazine 339, 240-41 
67 Courtney J Linn, ‘Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act: Currency Reporting and Crime of Structuring’ 
[2010] 50 Santa Clara Law Review 407, 409 
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Afterwards, various laws were passed either to amend BSA or create new offences. 
Such laws include Deficit Reduction Act 1984;68  Money Laundering Penalties Act 
1984;69 MLPIA 1988;70 Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act 1992;71 Money 
Laundering Suppression Act 1994;72 Money Laundering and Financial Crime Strategy 
Act 1998;73 and The Patriot Act.74 Although BSA is the first indirect assault against 
ML, MLCA 198675 marked an era of a direct attack on money laundering. The 1986 Act 
criminalised ML. This Act also amended BSA to make structuring of financial 
transactions (to evade reporting requirement) a crime.76  
Asset forfeiture laws and securities laws also contribute significantly to the effort of 
fighting organised crime. Despite criticisms, forfeiture laws expanded both the class of 
the crimes that fall within its ambit and the property subject to forfeiture.77 In addition 
to the reporting requirements imposed on broker-dealers by various laws mentioned 
above, SEC and SROs have adopted different regulations to ensure due diligence in the 
securities industry.78 
This chapter therefore critically appraises the law and practice relating to ML in the US. 
The analysis in this chapter covers BSA 1970, MLCA 1986, RICO Act 1970 and 
forfeiture laws. The Patriot Act amended BSA and MLCA extensively. Reference will 
be made to those amendments as analysis progresses.  
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This chapter consists of ten sections. Section two provides an overview of the Patriot 
Act, with particular emphasis on the amendment to BSA recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements and MLCA 1986. Section three analyses in detail the recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements of the BSA, and section four discusses MLCA 1986. Section 
five reviews the RICO Act and its limitations in combating organised crime.  
Section six analyses the effectiveness and utility of forfeiture laws in fighting ML, TF 
and organised crimes in general. Section seven discusses how the government uses tax 
laws to combat organised crime since the early 20th century. Section eight discusses the 
role of SEC and SROs in fighting financial crimes. Section nine discusses AML efforts 
by the states, followed by discussion of the AML laws adopted by the state of New 
Jersey. Finally, section ten concludes this chapter. 
2.2 THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
After 9/11, Congress enacted a law entitled “Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
2001”, which is popularly known as “The Patriot Act”.79 The Act passed both the 
Senate and the House and enacted within barely six weeks after the Septermber 11 
terrorist attack.80 Although the Patriot Act 2001 provided additional tools to disrupt 
terrorist financing,81 it was really intended to address organised crime.  
Originally, the draft legislation was prepared by the Clinton administration to deal with 
the problems of organised crime, particularly drug trafficking cartels such as Cali and 
Meddellin. However, when President Bush requested a draft legislation from the 
Treasury Department to respond to the September 11 terrorist attack, the already 
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prepared draft legislation became handy. Thus, the Patriot Act was enacted primarily 
not to deal with ML but with TF and terrorist organisations such as the Al Qaeda. 
However, this thesis does not primarily address TF because its discussion of ML 
generally subsumes terrorist financing. 
The Patriot Act consists of ten sections, Title I – X. Title III – International Money 
Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act 2001, which heavily amended 
Bank Secrecy Act 1970 82  and Money Laundering Control Act 1986 83  is the most 
relevant to this thesis.84  The Patriot Act inserted 5318A85 into BSA 1970. Under this 
section, the Secretary of the Treasury is granted powers to mandate FIs or domestic 
agency to take special measures described in subsection (b). 86  To trace and block 
terrorist financing, the Patriot Act granted powers to the Secretary of the Treasury to 
mandate FIs or domestic agency to keep records and file reports of certain transactions 
as the Secretary may determine.87  
The 2001 Act introduced special due diligence for correspondent accounts and private 
banking accounts,88 and prohibited banks in the US from maintaining a correspondent 
account with foreign shell banks.89 The Act encourages and in some cases compels, 
sharing of information among FIs, regulators and law enforcement authorities. 90 
Moreover, Title III amended 18 USC section 1956(b) to give the US a long-arm 
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jurisdiction over foreign money launderers.91 The Act also amended 18 USC section 
1956 to include foreign corruption offences as ML crimes.92 
Furthermore, the Patriot Act section 352 requires FIs to establish AML compliance 
programme.93 However, the requirement to establish AML programme is nothing new 
as the BSA 1970 had already required most FIs to establish similar AML programmes.94 
What Section 352 of the Patriot Act did was to re-adjust and further standardise existing 
AML programmes.95 The Patriot Act amended 31 USC section 5312 to extend the 
definition of FIs to cover institutions hitherto not covered under the BSA 1970.96 
Before the enactment of the Patriot Act, there was concern about the detrimental effect 
that ever-increasing CTR filings was having on the detection effort of the BSA 1970. 
Thus, Money Laundering Suppression Act 199497 was passed to reduce the number of 
CTRs by thirty per cent. Despite the presence of this legislation, while passing the 
Patriot Act Congress still expressed concern over excessive CTR filing and its adverse 
effect on the effectiveness of the AML regime.98 
Instead of reducing the volume of CTR filings the passage of the Patriot Act 2001 
caused a rise in the reports99 because the 2001 Act introduced harsher sanctions for 
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failure to report and also introduced safe harbour for the reporting entities.100 Thus, 
while the Patriot Act was enacted to remove the deficit, the new reporting sanctions of 
the Act undermine the previous legislative effort of reducing the number of CTRs, 
which had made the US AML regime less effective in disrupting ML.101  
Having considered very briefly some of the changes and the adverse effect the Patriot 
Act 2001 brought to the US AML landscape, this thesis now turns to the US primary 
reporting statute. 
2.3 THE BANK SECRECY ACT 1970 
The previous section highlighted the amendments the Patriot Act 2001 had made to the 
BSA 1970. Reference will be made to those amendments while examining the 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the BSA in this section. This section starts 
with a discussion of what prompted Congress to enact the 1970 Act. It then goes on to 
analyse the recordkeeping and reporting requirements. This section argues that the 
detection rationale behind these requirements is faulty considering the volume of reports 
filing, especially the CTR. It also analyses sanctions for BSA violations as well as early 
challenges encountered in the course of the Act’s implementation.  
2.3.1 WHY WAS THE BSA 1970 ENACTED? 
The US Congress enacted BSA 1970 believing that the reports required by the 1970 Act 
are useful in detecting certain economic crimes. The Act stated thus: 
It is the purpose of this subchapter (except section 5315) to 
require certain reports or records where they have a high degree 
of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or 
proceedings.102  
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The Congress restated this notion while enacting the Patriot Act 2001. However, the 
Patriot Act extended the detection rationale of the BSA 1970 to serve as a weapon 
against the financing of terrorism.103 Codified in Chapter 51 Title 31 of the United 
States Code, BSA 1970 requires FIs to keep track of their customers’ financial 
transactions.104 The aim was to use the records and reports of customers’ suspicious and 
large currency transactions to create an “audit trail” to detect and deter ML and the use 
of foreign secret bank accounts to evade tax.105  
In recent years there is a shift from the traditional approach of investigation and 
prosecution in combating organised crime due to practical, legal and evidential 
difficulties to disruption or intervention. However, the law enforcement moved entirely 
to disruption without thinking out exactly what disruption means. While the AML law 
and procedure presupposes that regulated persons are operating within the legal system, 
disruption takes the regulated persons out of the legal system. Disruption simply means 
‘an interruption in the usual way that a system, process, or event works’.106 It’s success 
depends on the effective implementation of the AML compliance measures put in place 
to interrupt ML scheme.  
While disruption of ML begins right at the CDD stage by weeding out suspected 
launderers,107 placement stage is a vulnerable stage in ML scheme.108 It is at this stage 
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that criminal assets are either detected, and the laundering scheme disrupted, or get 
through into the financial system undetected. Although eventually ML scheme can be 
discovered even after the laundering cycle is completed, the BSA 1970 is breached once 
criminal assets successfully enter the financial system.   
If the reporting requirements of the BSA 1970 do not serve as a tool to detect ML at the 
placement stage, it is then difficult to rate the US AML law effective in disrupting ML. 
While successful laundering scheme conceals the criminal source of the asset, it renders 
criminal forfeiture (that serve as another tool for disrupting criminal finance) ineffective 
because the forfeiture process kicks in only when the prosecution can substantiate ML 
charges.  
Since its enactment in 1970, the BSA has undergone continuous amendment to enhance 
its effectiveness in disrupting ML. 109  However, it should be noted that The 
implementation of the BSA (AML) requirements is done through Regulation issued by 
the Secretary of the Treasury. Therefore, in discussing the AML provisions of the BSA 
1970 reference will be made to the Regulation issued by the Treasury Department.110 
The next subsection critically analyses the recordkeeping requirements of BSA 1970. 
2.3.2 RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENT 
The BSA saddles banks and non-banks FIs with recordkeeping requirements. The most 
significant ones are records of cash purchases of monetary instruments and wire 
transfers.111 18 CFR sets out the  recordkeeping requirement.112 FIs are required to 
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retain for at least five years either the original or a microfilm or other copy or 
reproduction of each transaction exceeding USD10,000.113  
Moreover, generally, FIs are required to maintain records of purchase of monetary 
instruments in cash of USD3,000 and above.114 Records of the type of the financial 
instrument purchased, its value, serial number, and the date of purchase are to be 
recorded and retained for at least five years.115 Similarly, non-bank FIs are also required 
to keep records of transactions involving funds transmission of USD3,000 or more.116  
FIs are also required to verify and record the purchaser’s name, address, date of birth 
and other relevant information that will help in tracing the customer.117 Keeping these 
records could be valueless if the person who made the transaction cannot be identified. 
To this end, maintaining records of identifying information about the individual who 
conducted the transaction is vital for investigation and prosecution purposes.118  
While these records could be helpful in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or 
proceedings,119 banks are more concerned about the cost implications of keeping such 
records.120 While it could be argued that guarding against ML is ultimately beneficial to 
the regulated persons, it is also arguable whether keeping these records is worth the 
cost. Despite this however, keeping records of cash and wire transfers is fundamental to 
the successful fight against ML and other crimes, as these records serve as a audit trails 
that could potentially aid the investigation of criminality.  
                                                
113 31USC s 1010.410 (a)-(d) 
114 31 USC s 5325 (2011); 31 CFR s 1010.415 (2012) 
115 31 CFR s 1010.415 (c) 
116 31 USC s 1010.410(e) 
117 31 CFR s 1010.415 (a)(1)(ii) 
118 Linn (n 67) 420 
119 31 CFR s 1010.401 
120 Linn (n 67) 420 
  51 
A successful investigation could lead to the conviction of criminals and confiscation of 
criminal assets and thereby disrupt ML. Lack of records undermines the ML 
investigation.121 Thus, Congress authorised the Secretary of the Treasury to require FIs 
to record and report all cross-border wire transfers.122  
One of the utilities of recordkeeping requirements is that it encourages criminals to 
structure their transactions. 123  Structuring draws the attention of FIs to a potential 
suspicious activity that would necessitate the filing of SARs. Thus, the utility of 
recordkeeping requirement of the BSA is very high because it not only serves as a trail, 
it could also help to trigger an investigation of criminals who try to circumvent the BSA 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements through structuring. 
Having considered the obligation on FIs to keep records of their customers’ 
transactions, and the utility of these requirements in disrupting ML and the underlying 
predicate crimes, the next subsection critically analyses the utility of CTR and SAR to 
the law enforcement agents in detecting ML scheme right from the onset. The 
subsection argues that the high volume of these reports affects the effectiveness of the 
US AML laws in disrupting ML. 
2.3.3 REPORTING REQUIREMENT 
Theoretically, the utility of BSA 1970 revolves around the “detection rationale.” 
Congress finding asserts that currency reporting has “high degree of usefulness” in 
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of 
intelligence or counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against 
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international terrorism. 124  This belief has however been challenged. 125  Indeed, the 
reports being filed by FIs are too many for the government fully and efficiently to utilise 
them.126  
BSA 1970 and the implementing Regulations require filing of certain reports. The 
reports include SAR, CTR, FBAR, Reports of Transactions with Foreign Financial 
Agencies; CMIR, Reports relating to currency in excess of USD10,000 received in a 
trade or business; and Reports relating to currency in excess of USD10,000 received for 
bail by court clerks.127  
For the purpose of this thesis, these reports are broadly grouped under the first five 
headings, with the last two coming under CTR. While the law requires FIs to file CTR 
and SAR on their clients’ transactions, the law requires persons (legal and natural) to 
report their financial transactions through the filing of FBAR, CMIR and Reports of 
Transactions with Foreign Financial Agencies. Although all these reports can be useful 
in disrupting ML, the most significant for the purpose of this thesis are the SAR and 
CTR – because they are the most relevant in disrupting ML.  
2.3.3.1 CURRENCY TRANSACTION REPORT (CTR) 
The BSA 1970 placed obligations on all FIs 128  to file CTR on their customers’ 
transactions exceeding USD10,000.129 Casinos were required to file FinCEN Form 103, 
while other covered FIs are to file FinCEN Form 104.130 However, criminals do engage 
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in structuring, that is, multiple transactions below the threshold of USD10,000 to avoid 
the reporting requirement.131 As we shall see subsequently in this chapter, structuring 
posed a serious challenge to FIs and law enforcement. It enables launderers to 
circumvent the recordkeeping and reporting statute.132  
Certain non-financial trades and businesses such as automobile dealers, real estate 
agents and attorneys are required to file Form 8300 to report currency more than 
USD10,000 as payment for goods or services.133  Until 2001, Form 8300 was codified 
in the Tax Code134 purposely to assist the Internal Revenue Services exclusively to 
identify tax evaders.135 However, Form 8300 was detached from the Tax Code and re-
enacted as part of BSA to assist law enforcement officials who are involved in non-tax 
investigation.136  
A duly filled Form 8300 provides information about the person who conducted the 
transaction, the details of the transaction and parties to the transaction.137 Form 8300 is 
filed as SAR where a suspicious activity is noticed.138  Where a normal transaction that 
exceeds the threshold occurred, Form 8300 is filed as CTR. The CTR provides what is 
known as audit trail through creation of records of transactions that shows the 
movement of the illict proceeds. The audit trails created by CTR allow law enforcement 
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to follow the money and detect the underlying crime.139 Thus, CTR is perceived as a 
useful tool of disrupting ML and the predicate crimes.140  
Furthermore, the success US law enforcement recorded in disrupting criminal finance 
and the predicate crimes as a result of “Operation Greenback” and “Operation El 
Dorado” was attributed partly to the valuable information investigators and law 
enforcement agents extracted from the CTR filed by the BSA compliant FIs.141  
Despite the utility of CTR, a major factor that works against the effectiveness of the 
BSA 1970 reporting statute in disrupting ML is the large volume of reports filed by FIs. 
According to FinCEN, while about 15 million reports were filed as CTR in 2011, the 
total reports combined were over 17 million.142 This large volume of CTR poses a 
setback to the US AML law because as many as seventy-five per cent of those reports 
filed in 2006 are related to innocent business transactions.143  
Similarly, CTR filed each year dwarf all other BSA reports combined.144 While nearly 
15 million CTRs were filed in 2011, only about 1.44 million SARs were filed in the 
same period.145 The latest FinCEN’s SAR statistics covering five years shows a decline 
in the SAR filing. FinCEN SAR Statistics 2012-2016 released March 2017, shows that  
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about 3.9 million SARs were filed by the reporting institutions, with depository 
instutions filing the highest number of reports – about 3.43 million. This is an average 
of nearly 780 thousand SARs yearly. However, the number of SAR filing is on the rise 
again. According to the same statistics, slighty below 1 million reports were filed in 
2016. These huge numbers of SARs require huge time and workforce to be able to sort 
and analyse the reports correctly.146 Otherwise, criminally tainted transactions may hide 
under legitimate commercial transactions. Thus the aim of disrupting ML at its early 
stage could be defeated. 
One thing that adds to the volume of CTRs is the requirement that FIs aggregate 
structured transactions and file CTR once the aggregated value exceeds USD10,000.147 
Ordinarily, those structured transactions would have been reported as SAR since 
structuring leads to suspicion. Thus, filing CTR as well as SAR on the same 
transactions is a duplication that inevitably renders the US AML law less effective in 
disrupting ML because the large volume of reports filed reduces the chances of ML 
detection at the very beginning.148  
Given the large volume of reports filed as CTR, hardly would investigators distill any 
remarkable information that would prompt investigation. 149  This argument sounds 
strong, as an IRS agent has once told American Bankers Association (ABA) that only 
one criminal prosecution was initiated as a result of CTR in his area of operation in five 
years.150  
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Thus, it was argued that at best, CTR deters rather than detects crimes, because it forces 
professional launderers to resort to structuring to evade the reporting requirement of the 
BSA.151 Indeed, bankers have long suspected that law enforcement agents valued CTR 
because they helped detect crime, but not because they deter it. 152  Despite these 
criticisms, CTR remains very useful in influencing criminals’ behaviour towards 
structuring their transactions, which automatically gives rise to suspicion and filing of 
SAR. As we shall see in the next subsection, according to FinCEN data, criminals do 
resort to structuring resulting in SAR filings, which leads to law enforcement action. 
Although law enforcement agents have responded to this criticism by using technology 
to manage the CTR data, that does not support the detection rationale because CTR 
filing remains high. 153  In a bid to make CTR more useful, Congress has once 
contemplated tripling the threshold, but the GAO recommended granting power to the 
FIs to exempt certain customers from the reporting requirements.154 
Since as many as seventy-five per cent of those reports filed in 2006 were related to 
innocent business transactions, exemption remains a viable option to reduce the number 
of innocent transactions that may fall within the ambit of the reporting statute. 155 
Subsequently, banks 156  were allowed to exempt some specified customers from 
complying with the CTR requirements on limited currency transactions recognised by 
law.157  The law requires FIs to file FinCEN DOEP form 110 for each client they 
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exempt, documenting the client’s eligibility, while review and verification of eligibility 
must be carried out at least once each year.158  
However, the lengthy list of “exempt person” (which includes a department or agency 
of the US or any State or any political subdivision of a State) did not draw a clear 
distinction between those that are eligible for exemption and those that are not, leaving 
the exemption clause open to abuse. 159  In one instance, customs officers, bank 
examiners, and even prosecutors helplessly examined exemption list full of ineligible 
customers.160  
United States v First National Bank of Boston161 illustrated that there are guidelines 
governing exemption. However, as demonstrated by Boston, collaboration between 
banks and criminals would undermine governments effort at reducing the volume of 
CTR, which is aimed at making CTR more efficient in disrupting ML.162 On the other 
hand, uncertainty about required documentation and some regulatory requirements, 
concerns of BSA noncompliance, and biennial renewals may unnecessarily discourage 
FIs from granting exemptions to eligible customers. Thus, increasing the volume of 
CTRs, which undermines the effectiveness of the AML law in disrupting ML.163 
This and other examples suggest that the utility of CTR is to provide a trail rather than 
to detect ML scheme from the onset.164 To make the US AML reporting statute more 
effective in detecting and disrupting ML it is submitted that the volume of CTR filing 
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should be reduced significantly. 31 Code of Federal Regulation should be amended to 
remove section 1010.313 that requires FIs to report aggregated multiple transactions as 
CTR. Instead of filing those aggregated transactions as CTR, only SAR, which is more 
of assistance to the law enforcement, should be filed.165  
2.3.3.2 SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING 
A SAR is a piece of information which alerts law enforcement that certain financial 
activity of a client is in some way suspicious and might indicate ML or TF.166 Title 31 
U.S.C. section 5318(g) empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a regulation 
requiring FIs and those acting on their behalf to report any suspicious transaction.   
Consequently, banks, casinos and cards clubs, brokers/dealers in financial securities, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, futures commission merchants and introducing 
brokers in commodities, and loan and finance companies are required to file SAR where 
a transaction involves at least USD5000.167 Furthermore, MSBs have an obligation to 
file SAR on transactions involving at least USD2000.168 At the moment, dealers in 
precious metals, gems and jewels, and operators of credit card system are not required 
to file SAR169 except in a limited circumstances.170 As reliance is put on suspicious 
activity to trigger SAR, proceeds of crime can easily be laundered, as until now, some 
financial transactions that involve proceeds of crime appear normal and legitimate.171 
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A SAR must contain certain informations, such as the contact details of the FI filing the 
report, the subject matter of the report, detailed description of the activity that gave rise 
to the suspicion, and the person who witness the suspicious activity, if any.172 Some 
regulators may require a SAR to contain additional information regarding the 
individuals conducting the transactions, including their names, address, telephone 
numbers, account details, social security number, occupation and date of birth.173 
To reinforce the utility of SAR, BSA provides a safe harbour against civil liability for 
FIs that voluntarily reported a suspicious transaction made by one of its customers.174 
BSA also created a “tipping off” offence to prevent FIs and their employees from 
alerting the person involved of an impending investigation.175 Although the law is silent 
on whether FIs can proceed with suspicious transactions, which they have documented 
and reported,176 continuing with such transactions could amount to a criminal offence of 
knowingly been involved in illicit financial transactions.177  
On the other hand, stopping the transaction alerts the client of an impending 
investigation thereby tipping off the customer. 178  In this situation, while the law 
prohibits tipping off to prevent suspects from interfering with the investigation, the 
unintended consequence of stopping the transaction as a result of SAR, is to tip off a 
client whose suspicious transaction was reported. This is because he will automatically 
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be alerted of impending investigation once he notices that his transaction could not 
proceed.  
Another defect of the reporting statute is that neither 31 USC s 5318 nor 31 CFR 
s1010.320 defined the term “suspicious transaction”. Rather, FIs are advised to hinge 
their suspicion on some red flags.179 Thus, FIs would rather file report on the slightest 
suspicion to avoid sanction.  
Despite these limitations, SAR is the primary weapon in the hands of law 
enforcement.180  FinCEN yearly SAR Activity Reviews indicate how SAR provides 
direct leads for investigators, and evidence against criminals and criminal activities, 
allowing law enforcement agents to disrupt ML.181 Review of these reports shows how 
SARs filed led to an investigation and subsequent charges of ML, convictions, 
imprisonment, seizure, and forfeiture. 
2.3.3.3 CURRENCY AND MONETARY INSTRUMENT REPORT (CMIR) 
The BSA requires persons who physically transport, mail or ship currency or monetary 
instrument of more than USD10,000 within or across the borders of the United States to 
file FinCEN Form 105 with Customs and Border Protection.182 
The person filing FinCEN Form 105 is required to provide information about the 
courier, the person on whose behalf the freighting of the money is conducted, the total 
amount of money or monetary instrument being freighted, and finally, to attest the truth 
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of the information so provided. 183  CMIR differs from other BSA reporting 
requirements, in that the law places a duty on the public as a whole to provide 
information when they are involved in a movement of currency or monetary instruments 
exceeding USD10,000 across US borders.184 
2.3.3.4 GEOGRAPHIC TARGETED ORDERS 
GTOs enable US law enforcement to use BSA reporting mechanisms to squeeze 
criminal activities. The BSA 1970 empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 
GTOs either on his initiative or at the request of law enforcement agency, to impose 
obligations on covered businesses in a targeted area, suspected of high concentration of 
organised crime within the US, to comply with the new threshold requirement on 
covered transactions.185 
As banks become more regulated and therefore less vulnerable to ML, criminals turn to 
institutions that are less regulated and therefore more vulnerable such as MSBs.186 
While turning away from banks, criminals may resort to structuring to evade reporting 
requirements. GTOs normally lower the CTR threshold and impose an obligation on the 
businesses targeted by the Order to report those transactions. Thus, GTOs are necessary 
for disrupting ML.  
For example, in 1996 the Secretary of the Treasury issued GTO that required money 
transmitters along with their agents in New York to report currency transactions 
involving USD750 or more to Columbia.187 That order was issued in response to a 
report from law enforcement suspecting that the money transmitters were laundering 
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vast sums of money for drug cartels to Columbia.188  The effect of that order was 
significant.189  
Money transmission to Columbia dropped significantly as the drug cartel had to shift to 
bulk cash smuggling, resulting in the seizure of USD50 million at various ports of entry 
along the eastern seaboard.190 Furthermore, some targeted remitters stopped remitting 
funds to Columbia all together while the rest are sending amounts significantly lower 
than before.191 The orders also led to high-profile ML prosecutions.192 
Although GTOs can be very effective in disrupting ML, its impact could be temporary. 
This is because the order does not last for a long time as no order could last more than 
180 days unless renewed in accordance with the requirement of 31 USC section 5326(a) 
and CFR section 1010. 370(a). One of the implications of this is that if the criminals lie 
low within the 180 days period, there may be no justification for renewing the targeted 
order as there will be reduced laundering activity. Similarly, criminals might adopt 
other techniques such as resorting to bulk cash smuggling or conducting business 
outside the targeted area to evade the order.  
Although non-disclosure provision operates to prevent tipping off clients of the 
subsisting order, criminals would get to know as law enforcement may not wait until the 
end of the life of the GTO to celebrate their success. Again, if a high-profile arrest is 
made within the period, criminals will get to know about the order, as the law 
enforcement would not be able to keep a suspect beyond the time limit set by the law 
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without charging him to court. Moreover, some businesses may opt to seize business 
altogether, and therefore information flow to the law enforcement agencies will also 
seize. Although this can be viewed as a success, it does not mean that ML activities are 
over in the targeted area, as criminals might just devise ways to circumvent the order.  
However, overall, GTOs remain useful because they provide a real and timely 
intelligence for the disruption of ML and organised crime.193 The underground economy 
is a big issue in the US194 as most of the South American cartels in the US operate 
within the underground economy – the Peso-Dollar exchanges. Underground economy 
encompasses all sort of activities, legal and illegal which go unreported to government 
and consequently avoid being taxed.195 Thus, the importance of the GTOs in providing 
credible intelligence.  
Similarly, where criminals hide behind shell companies, GTOs provides credible 
intelligence of the people behind those companies and their activities. In February 2017, 
FinCEN issued a GTO that temporarily requires US title insurance companies to 
identify the natural persons behind shell companies used to pay “all cash” for a high-
end residential real estate in six major metropolitan areas.196  According to FinCEN 
Acting Director Jamal El-Hindi: 
These GTOs are producing valuable data that is assisting law 
enforcement and is serving to inform our future efforts to 
address money laundering in the real estate sector, the subject of 
money laundering and illicit financial flows involving the real 
estate sector is something that we have been taking on in steps 
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to ensure that we continue to build an efficient and effective 
regulatory approach.197 
 
2.3.4 EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY  
One thing that can undermine the effectiveness of the US AML law is the tension 
between the obligation on the FIs to safeguard confidentiality regarding their clients’ 
financial transactions, and the duty to report their clients’ suspicious transactions. A 
client, whose activity is reported as suspicious to the authorities in compliance with the 
BSA reporting requirements, may view the SAR filing as an invasion of his privacy.198  
While filing SAR can lead to litigation with the attendant consequences of damaging the 
relationship between FIs and their clients,199 failure to file SAR creates a knowledge 
gap that can undermine the effectiveness of AML reporting statute. A safe harbour 
provision was later inserted into the BSA, granting FIs immunity from civil liability.200  
Under 31 U.S.C. section 5318(g)(3), FIs incur no liability (under any federal, state or 
local government law or regulation) to a customer whose suspicious activity is reported, 
or for failure to notify the client of filing such report.201 The Annunzio-Wylie Act 
1992202 extended this immunity. Thus, filing of SAR will not violate any contract or 
other legally enforceable agreement (including arbitration agreement).203  
                                                
197 ibid 
198 Ruce (n 165) 53 
199 ibid 
200 12 USC s 3403(c) (2011) 
201 Tipping up client is an offence, please see 31 USC s 5318(g)(2)(A) (2011); 31 CFR s 1020.320(e)(1)(i) 
(2011); 21 CFR s 21.11(k) (2011) (OCC’s Regulations) 
202 31 USC s 5318(g)(3)(A) (2012) 
203 ibid 
  65 
2.3.5 SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE BSA 
The aim of the sanctions is to punish persons (legal and natural) for the failure of AML 
compliance.204 The sanctions take the form of criminal and civil money penalties, both 
of which can serve as tools for disrupting ML.205  A natural person (such as bank 
employee) convicted of a willful violation of AML may risk fine ranging from 
USD250,000 to USD500,000 or imprisonment ranging from 5 to 10 years, or both fine 
and imprisonment.206  
FIs may be liable to criminal fine up to USD1M for violation of this statute. 207 
Furthermore, violation of BSA or its subsidiary legislations promulgated by Treasury 
Department also attracts civil money penalty, except for violation of 31 USC ss 5314 
and 5315 or a regulation prescribed under these sections.208 Civil money penalties to be 
imposed may depend on the type of violation, the period through which the violation 
continued, and whether it was wilful or negligent.209  A bold step taken to control ML is 
that criminal and civil money penalties are not mutually exclusive.210 Also, a power is 
given to the Secretary of the Treasury to delegate the authority to assess civil money 
penalties to federal banking regulatory agencies.211  
Criminal fines and civil money penalties have been and are still being imposed on 
persons who violate BSA recordkeeping and reporting requirements.212 However, as 
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will be seen in Chapter 5, the penalties do not deter future violations of the US AML 
statutes. Having said this, the BSA criminal and civil penalties are not without side 
effects. Although the sanctions are aimed at strengthening the AML regime, they 
compound the over-reporting problem.213  
As mentioned above, the alleged wrongdoing these sanctions are aimed at punishing is 
failure of compliance – not the offence of ML or TF. Apart from failure of compliance, 
another alleged wrongdoing that attracts sanction is the violation of economic sanctions 
imposed by, for example, the US or UN against certain countries such as Iran.214 
However, there are concern about the proportionality of the sanctions.  
The questions here is who is being punished when a sanction is imposed say for 
example, on a bank for compliance failure or for violation of economic sanction. At first 
sight, it will appear as if the bank bears the brunt. Obviously, sanctions can have so 
many effects on banks, which include confidence crises because the public perception 
could tilt towards believing that the banks are being sanctioned because they facilitate 
ML or TF. An example is where the Guardian reported that “British banks handled vast 
sums of laundered Russian money”.215 
However, the bulk of the effects of the sanctions imposed on FIs could pass to the 
depositors, employees, investors, and the society at large for no fault of their own. The 
depositors could lose their deposit where the sanction is so harsh that it caused the bank 
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to crash. Where the bank survives the sanctions as they often do, the bulk can be passed 
onto depositors for example through charges.  
Similarly, banks could shed their workforce, especially where the sanction bites hard. 
Also, investors may lose out as more often share prices drop as investor-confidence 
reduces on the announcement of sanctions. Finally, sanctions on bank could have direct 
effect on the society. For example, due to the effect of sanctions banks will pay less 
taxes, may close certain lines of business or reduce their operations.  
2.3.6 EARLY CHALLENGES 
The initial challenges BSA 1970 faced demonstrate how ineffective the statute has been 
right from its inception as the major legislative assault against ML. While bankers failed 
to comply with the Act’s requirements from the beginning, professional launderers 
circumvented the BSA recordkeeping and reporting requirements by structuring their 
transactions below the threshold. 
2.3.6.1 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BSA REQUIREMENTS 
Initially, bankers perceived BSA reporting and recordkeeping requirement as 
unconstitutional. In Stark v Connally,216 a bank, its customer, Bank Association, and 
ACLU sought to test the constitutionality of the Act.217 The plaintiffs’ main question to 
the Court was whether domestic reporting requirements of the Act amount to 
unreasonable search, invading the privacy of the defendant and therefore a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. 218  While the District Court held domestic reporting 
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requirements of the Act unconstitutional, it upheld the legitimatimacy of both the 
domestic recordkeeping, and the foreign recordkeeping and reporting requirements.219  
Two years later, part of Stark was overturned by the Supreme Court in California 
Banker Association v Shultz, upholding the constitutionality of the domestic reporting 
requirements, foreclosing any argument that the domestic reporting requirements of the 
BSA 1970 and its associated regulations violate the Fourth Amendment.220 Despite this 
ruling, banks were reluctant to comply with the reporting regime,221 on the belief that 
the main targets of BSA were drug barons. 222  However, this perception changed 
following the guilty plea by the Bank of Boston, resulting in an upsurge in filing of 
BSA reports.223  
Nevertheless, those massive filings of CTRs had detrimental effect on the effectiveness 
of the reporting statute. In one instance, the banking community accused law 
enforcement agencies with not using the data actively due to the large volume of CTR 
filing.224 Similarly, in Stark, although the Court held the recordkeeping requirements 
constitutional, it strongly suggested that, authorities should require fewer documents to 
be kept by banks.225 The Court’s reasoning was based on the premise that too many 
records would obscure the most relevant information, and that can lead to arbitrary 
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application of the Act.226 In the end government enacted a law requiring the Treasury 
Department to take measures to reduce the number of reports by thirty per cent.227 
2.3.6.2 STRUCTURING 
The primary technique that almost rendered BSA AML statute ineffective in disrupting 
ML was structuring. Structuring simply refers to a method adopted by launderers, which 
entails splitting a cash transaction (which if conducted as a single transaction would 
trigger BSA recordkeeping and reporting requirements) into multiple transactions below 
the USD10,000 threshold to avoid recordkeeping and reporting requirements.228 
Structuring is mostly accomplished by distributing illicit funds to several couriers 
popularly known as “smurfs” who then make multiple deposits below the threshold, or 
convert the funds into other forms of negotiable instruments such as money orders or 
travellers’ cheques with a view to avoiding BSA reporting requirements.229 
Structuring can be classified as “perfect” and “imperfect”. Perfect structuring occurs 
where transaction is structured in such a way that it does not place FIs under any 
obligation to file CTR. 230 In contrast, “imperfect structuring” occurs when multiple 
financial transactions below the threshold are conducted at one or more FIs, but 
nevertheless, when aggregated, trigger the duty to file a CTR.231 
Because professional launderers would rather distance themselves from large cash 
transactions, they resort to structuring as a technique to evade the reporting 
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requirements.232 Large cash transactions are legal but failure to comply with the BSA 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements is a crime. 233  Originally, there was no 
provision in the BSA that prohibited structuring and therefore prosecuting offenders 
was difficult for the government to do.234  
In one case the prosecution argued that bank customer was an FI, who then has the duty 
to comply with the BSA requirements.235 In another, the prosecution argued that those 
who structure their transactions defraud government of reports to which it is entitled 
to.236 The more common prosecution theory government used against violators of the 
BSA was that structuring aids and abets an FI to fail to comply with the BSA 
requirements.237 
It was however argued that the third prosecution theory strained the aider and abettor 
liability and thus, it splits the Circuits.238 United States v Tobon-Builes 706 F.2d 1092 
(11th Circuit 1983) and United States v Anzalone 766 F.2d 676 (1st Circuit 1985) are 
the two major cases that caused the split. In Toban-Builes, the Court of Appeal saw 
merit in 18 U.S.C. sections 2 and 1001 and adopted it as a weapon against defendants 
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who through structuring caused or attempted to cause FIs not to comply with the BSA 
requirements where they ought to have.239 
 In contrast, Anzalone line of argument asserted that, stretching sections 2 and 1001 to 
prosecute defendants for structuring means failure to give fair notice to the public what 
the statute forbids.240 The main principle of law Anzalone tries to establish was that, “ a 
defendant cannot be prosecuted for aiding and abetting violation of the CTR reporting 
requirement where in fact the FI owes no duty to file CTR.241  This means that, a 
defendant who conducts only one transaction below the threshold with the purpose of 
avoiding CTR filing, cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting even though he was the 
one who caused the FI not to be under any obligation to file CTR.242  
As the law proves to be ineffective, government responded to these challenge from two 
fronts. While the Secretary of the Treasury issued a regulation to address the problem of 
aggregation, 243  MLCA 1986 enacted 31 USC section 5324 into the BSA 1970 to 
addressed the issue of structuring.244 The government sought to resolve the problem 
posed by “imperfect” structuring by making it an offence to cause or attempt to cause 
non-filing of the report required by the BSA.245  
Secondly, “perfect” structuring was confronted directly by prohibiting structuring 
transactions without regard to whether an individual transaction has, itself, falls under 
the scope of the reporting statute.246 Also, the deliberate misleading of FIs to file the 
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inaccurate report was prohibited.247 A defendant convicted of structuring is liable to a 
fine in accordance with title18 U.S.C., or imprisonment for up to 5 years.248 
Although section 5324 of the BSA was meant to resolve the problem posed by 
structuring, it created fresh problems.249 A major flaw of section 5324 is the uncertainty 
about the mens rea required to prove structuring offence.250 The lack of clarity as to 
what mens rea elements the prosecution must prove to convict the defendant under 
section 5322 for “willful violation” of section 5324 led to split among the circuits.251 
While ten circuits held that knowledge that structuring is illegal was not an element of 
the mens rea requirement,252 the first circuit held that actual knowledge is an element of 
the mens rea and must be proven to secure conviction for structuring.253  
This uncertainty was however laid to rest in United States v Ratzlaf,254 where the 
Supreme Court held that, “willfully” as used in subsection 5324(a), requires proof that 
“defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”255 Ratzlaf did not sit 
well with an established principle of law, which has grown up around a maxim: 
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“ignorance of the law is no excuse”.256 However, the difference is that structuring is a 
regulatory offence, not a traditional criminal offence. Thus, the question is whether in 
establishing the mens rea requirement of the offence, an exception to this rule should 
apply, and therefore the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew that structuring 
is illegal.  
If exceptions to this common law rule apply to a limited number of criminal law 
cases,257 why not to regulatory cases like structuring? It has been remarked that as the 
criminal law is increasingly used to regulate ordinary and unremarkable conduct, the 
danger that criminal law sanctions will apply in an arbitrary manner to un-blameworthy 
people, who have had no notice of possible criminal liability, thus, had no chance to 
conform their behaviours to law increases significantly.258  Accordingly, the general 
assumption that the defendant knew the law is not always fair.259 
Before Ratzlaf there were cases, such as Liparota v. the United States260 and Cheek v. 
the United States. 261  These two cases involve food stamp duty and tax offences 
respectively, which are not strictly historical common law criminal offences. In 
Liparota, the US Supreme Court departed from the principle that ignorance of the law is 
not a defence. In deciding Liparota, the Supreme Court (in what appears to be approving 
a dictum in United States v Yermian 468 U.S. 63 (1984)) was reluctant to construe the 
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Dickinson Law Review 113, 119-20  
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Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond’ [1983] 35 Stanford Law 
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260 471 U.S. 419, 441 (1985) (White, J. dissenting) 
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statute in a manner that would criminalise a broad range of apparently innocent 
conduct.262  
It is not surprising that Ratzlaf followed the direction of these two cases since 
structuring is also a regulatory offence.263 However, unlike tax evasion and food stamp 
duty crimes, structuring with the intention to circumvent BSA 1970 reporting statute is 
a much more serious crime. This is because it facilitates the free flow of proceeds of 
crime, and also causes FIs to fail to file reports that could be useful in disrupting ML. 
An actor who causes another to engage in a criminal conduct should be treated as 
having committed the offence.264 To remedy this deficit, Congress overruled Ratzlaf by 
amending 31 USC sections 5322 and 5324, eliminating the need for the prosecution to 
prove that the defendant knew structuring was a crime.265 
This analysis shows how defective the BSA recordkeeping and reporting statute has 
been in disrupting ML. It also shows how the law was continuously adjusted to remedy 
the defects. However, still, the volume of reports allows ML to continue undetected. 
The FinCEN enforcement actions and the SAR annual reports suggest that the BSA 
reporting statutes do not disrupt ML scheme before it occurs. At best, the BSA reports 
help in the incident investigation following a successful ML scheme.   
Having analysed the BSA recordkeeping and reporting requirements, this thesis will 
now analyse the substantive US AML law. 
                                                
262 Grace (n 258) 1401 
263 Miller and Tuwiner (n 259) 27 (Citing Cheeck v United Sates 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991), the authors 
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as loans or whether he caused employees so to record the transactions in the ordinary course of business); 
for full analysis on causing another to engage in criminal conduct please see Robinson and Grall (n 259) 
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2.4 SUBSTANTIVE MONEY LAUNDERING LAW 
Having analysed the US AML regulatory law in terms of its effiency in disrupting ML, 
the thesis continues with the analysis of the substantive US AML law. MLCA 1986266 
was enacted in response to the ineffectiveness of the BSA 1970 in combating ML.267 
 Before the enactment of the MLCA 1986, BSA was the primary US AML statute. 
However, ML was not a crime under the BSA. Thus, a launderer who complied with 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements committed  no offence. MLCA 1986 brought 
two major changes – it prohibited structuring and it criminalised ML. Structuring has 
already been analysed above. The primary focus of this section is the criminalisation of 
ML. This section starts with a brief overview of 18 USC sections 1956 and 1957. It then 
analyses the elements of ML offence, which must be proven to convict a defendant. 
2.4.1 OVERVIEW OF MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENCES UNDER MLCA 
1986 
18 USC sections 1956 and 1957 are the US premier statutes that criminalised ML.268 
They extended criminal culpability to anyone involved in ML in any of its various 
forms. 269  Furthermore, the statutes apply extra-territorially where a US citizen is 
                                                
266 MLCA 1986, Pub L No 99-570 s (A), 100 Stat 3207, 3207-22 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 USC 
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involved, or where the offence was committed in part in the US.270 However, these 
statutes have been criticised for not providing a statutory defence to the ML offences.271 
18 USC section 1956, which deals with the laundering of monetary instruments, created 
the following three offences: “transaction” ML, “transportation” ML, and “government 
sting operations” ML.272 In contrast, section 1957 created only one offence – engaging 
in a transaction involving property exceeding USD10,000 knowing that the property 
was derived from a SUA.273 However, as will be seen, section 1957 can easily be 
violated, because (unlike section 1956 offences) only “knowledge” rather than “intent” 
is required to satisfy the mens rea requirement of section 1957.  
2.4.1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF SECTIONS 1956 AND 1957 OFFENCES 
As mentioned above, while section 1956 created three offences, section 1957 created 
only one offence. For sections 1956 and 1957 offences, the term “SUA” is wide 
ranging, covering almost all criminal acts through which financial benefit can be 
obtained.274  
2.4.1.1.1	TRANSACTION	MONEY	LAUNDERING		
The transaction ML offence criminalised four types of activity using illegally obtained 
property.275  Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction 
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, commits an offence if he 
                                                
270 18 USC s1956(f) and 1957(d)  
271 United States v Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 764-65 (7th Circuit 1993) the court rejected the challenge that 
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Wieman, Money Laundering’ [2015] 52 American Criminal Law Review 1357, 1379 
272 18 USC s 1956 (2012) 
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conducts a financial transaction with that property with intent to (i) engage in financial 
transactions intended to promote SUA;276  (ii) evade tax;277  (iii) conduct a financial 
transaction designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or 
control of the proceeds of criminal activity;278 and (iv) engage in a transaction with the 
purpose of avoiding a state or federal reporting requirement.279 This offence can be 
committed by simply attempting to commit the offence itself. 
2.4.1.1.2	TRANSPORTATION	MONEY	LAUNDERING		
Whoever becomes involved in the following three activities commits an offence: (i) 
transportation, transmission, or transfer of funds from or into the United States (directly 
or via another country) with the intent to promote the carrying on of a SUA;280 (ii) 
transportation, transmission, or transfer of the proceeds of some form of unlawful 
activities for the purpose of concealing or disguising the nature, location, sources, 
ownership or control of the proceeds of crime;281 and (iii) transportation, transmission, 
or transfer of funds (however obtained) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement 
under a State or Federal law.282 
The wording of section 1956(a)(2) suggests that this offence is also committed where a 
laundering scheme originates from and ends in the US, but the asset was channelled 
through another jurisdiction as a transit. An attempt to violate this section is also a 
crime.  
                                                
276 18 USC s 1956 (a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) 
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2.4.1.1.3	GOVERNMENT	STING	MONEY	LAUNDERING		
The last limb of section 1956 addressed ML transactions that occur as part of 
government sting operation. 283  The aim is to allow law enforcement agents to 
investigate crimes through a sting operation.284 The moment a property is represented to 
be the proceeds of crime, then it becomes unlawful to deal with such assets.285  A 
financial transaction with the intent to do the following is an offence: (i) promote a 
SUA;286 (ii) conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of 
funds;287 or (iii) avoid a state or federal transaction reporting requirement.288  
Like the other two limbs, this offence can be committed by attempting to commit the 
crime. Originally subsection (a)(3) was not part of section 1956. It was inserted 
following the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1988, to allow the government to 
conduct sting operation which was hitherto prevented by the language of subsection 
(a)(1), which requires that the property involved in the transaction must to, “in fact”, be 
a proceed of SUA.289  
2.4.1.1.4	DEALING	IN	CRIMINAL	PROPERTY		
18 USC section 1957 made it a crime, to knowingly engage or attempt to engage in a 
monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than USD10,000 
and is derived from a SUA.290 18 U.S.C. section 1957 differs from section 1956 in many 
respects, but the two major differences are worth mentioning. First, unlike section 1956, 
“intent” is not a mens rea requirement under section 1957.  
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The offence is simply committed once the defendant knew that the property involved in 
the transaction represents the proceeds of some unlawful activity.291 Intention to conceal 
illicit fund or further criminal activity is not an element of section 1957, and it does not 
matter whether the recipient exchanges or launders the funds.292 Because an intention is 
not required to establish section 1957 offence, a person who engages in an apparently 
innocent transaction can be caught by section 1957,293 though that was not the intention 
of the Congress.294 
Secondly, section 1957 was enacted more broadly to criminalise the knowing 
acceptance of illicit property.295 A mere interaction with a criminal is enough to bring 
section 1957 into operation.296 In United States v Johnson,297 the Court of Appeal 
analysed the scope of section 1957. Johnson shows that dealing in property knowing 
that the property represents proceeds of crime triggers section 1957.298 It does not 
matter whether the property is purely the proceeds of crime or it was comingled with 
other properties obtained legally.299   
Despite the advantages of section 1957 over section 1956 in terms of scope and mens 
rea requirement, section 1957 has a significant limitation. Section 1957 comes into 
operation only when the defendant deals in the unlawfully obtained property. This is 
because ML is a conduct that follows ‘in time’ the underlying crime.300 In a fraud case 
for example, where a victim wired money into a defendant’s bank account, section 1957 
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may not apply, unless the defendant deals in that money. Thus, the prosecution may not 
be able to prosecute the defendant under section 1957 despite its broad and easy-to-
prove mens rea.   
2.4.1.1.5	PENALTIES	FOR	VIOLATING	SECTIONS	1956	AND	1957	
Civil and criminal penalties are available for violation of 18 USC sections 1956 and 
1957. However, the quantum of the sanctions differs, depending on which section is 
violated.301 While the maximum criminal penalties for the violation of section 1956 is 
twenty years imprisonment, a fine of USD10,000 or twice the value of the monetary 
instruments or funds laundered (whichever is greater), or both,302 violation of section 
1957 carries a maximum of ten years imprisonment, a fine, or both.303  
The ten years jail term for the violation of section 1957 is a reflection of the fact that it 
is easier to prove section 1957 than 1956 offences, as ‘intent’ is not an element of 
section 1957 offence.304 Civil money penalty of the value of the property, funds, or 
monetary instruments involved in the transaction or USD10,000 is also available for 
sections 1956 and 1957 violations.305  In addition to civil and criminal sanctions, a 
defendant risks forfeiting the property involved in the ML offences contrary to 18 USC 
sections 1956 and 1957.306  
Except imprisonment, these sanctions are very useful tools of disrupting ML. 
Imprisonment may not disrupt crimes because any vacuum left will be filled 
immediately and operation continues. In contrast, criminal fine, civil money penalty and 
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forfeiture remove proceeds of crime from the criminal venture. As ML is the lifeblood 
of criminality, removing the money acquired through illegal activity disrupts ML.307  
2.4.2 ELEMENTS COMMON TO 18 USC SECTIONS 1956 AND 1957 CRIMES 
To establish the above ML offences, the prosecution must prove the following four 
common elements: knowledge; the existence of proceeds derived from a SUA; the 
existence of financial transactions; and intent. An in-depth analysis of these elements 
has already been done.308 Thus, this thesis does not attempt to repeat that exercise. 
However, briefly discussing these four elements would help in appraising the ML 
offences under 18 USC sections 1956 and 1957.  
2.4.2.1 KNOWLEDGE 
The prosecution must prove that the defendant knew the transaction involves either 
illegally derived property309 or a SUA.310 However, this does not mean that prosecution 
must prove that the defendant knew the specific unlawful activity that generated the 
proceeds.311 Rather, it is enough to prove that the defendant knew that the proceeds 
represent a form of unlawful activity.312 Furthermore, the level of knowledge required 
varies with a particular offence. Although ‘actual knowledge’ is required,313 it was held 
that ‘wilful blindness’ could satisfy the knowledge requirement.314  
2.4.2.2 PROCEEDS DERIVED FROM A SPECIFIED ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 
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The 1986 Act prohibits specific financial transactions that involve the SUA.315 The 
SUA or the ML predicate offences comprise both domestic and foreign crimes for the 
purpose of ML prosecution.316 The statute defined SUA using a long list of well over 
two hundred criminal activities, which includes drugs related offences, RICO violations, 
financial frauds, fraudulent bank entries, kidnapping, robbery, extortions, murder, 
destruction of property using explosives, and bribery of foreign officials.317  
Except for 18 USC section 1956(a)(3), the prosecution must prove the source of the 
funds involved, to show that they were derived from a SUA. Thus, the prosecution 
cannot just adduce evidence that the defendant has no known source of legitimate 
income.318 Due to lack of statutory definition, the term ‘proceeds’ became so ambiguous 
that eventually led to split among the Circuits.319  
While the Seventh Circuit construed the term ‘proceeds’ to mean net income,320 the 
Third Circuit held it to mean ‘gross profits’.321 This created uncertainty in determining 
which definition to adopt.322 Four years after, the Supreme Court clarified the issue in 
the United States v Santos,323 by adopting the Seventh Circuit construction of the term 
‘proceeds’ to mean “net income”.324 The reasoning behind Santos was that where there 
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is ambiguity in the criminal statute, the ambiguity is resolved in favour of the 
defendant.325 
After Santos, the Circuits were confronted with increasing ML appeals on the 
interpretation of the term ‘proceeds’. 326  While some followed Santos, some 
distinguished it and yet others remained in-between.327 Finally, Congress while enacting 
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) 2009 defined ‘Proceed’ to mean 
‘gross receipts’ not ‘profit’.328 
2.4.2.3 FINANCIAL TRANSACTION 
The basis for sections 1956 and 1957 violation is the occurrence of financial 
transactions.329 For the purpose of sections 1956 and 1957, the meaning of ‘transaction’ 
and ‘financial transaction’ has been extended very broadly.330 Courts have interpreted 
‘financial transaction’ broadly to accommodate a wide variety of transactions.331 Thus, 
movement of cash by wire or other means,332 exchange of money for cashier’s cheque, 
and purchase of a vehicle with a cheque are considered to be financial transactions.333  
Although the definition of financial transaction is not limited to transactions with the 
bank and non-bank FIs,334 some movement of funds without more, may not qualify as a 
financial transaction. For example, transportation of proceeds of crime without a 
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disposition would not constitute a financial transaction.335 In contrast, transportation and 
delivery of drug proceeds taken together may qualify as a financial transaction.336 To 
prove financial transaction element under section 1956, the elements of ‘interstate 
commerce’ and ‘multiplicity of transaction’ must be established.337 
2.4.2.3.1	INTERSTATE	COMMERCE	
For the prosecution to prove that the transaction affected interstate commerce, they also 
need to satisfy the requirement of ‘financial transaction’ in section 1956.338 Although 
this requirement is necessary to establish federal jurisdiction,339 ‘minimal effects’ on 
interstate commerce suffice.340 Because the interstate element is jurisdictional in nature, 
government burden of proving it is not heavy.341 Thus, use of bank implicates interstate 
commerce.342 However, inability to provide evidence linking the transaction to interstate 
commerce may spell doom to an ML prosecution.343 
2.4.2.3.2	MULTIPLE	TRANSACTION	
The international nature of ML suggests that criminal proceeds may pass through many 
jurisdictions before reaching its destination.344  Thus, professional money launderers 
might resort to multiple transactions, involving many FIs and non-FIs in various 
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countries and ‘states’ (within the US) to evade detection. 345  Consequently, each 
transaction would constitute a separate offence or unit of prosecution.346 
2.4.2.4 INTENT 
Like any serious criminal offence, the prosecution must prove mens rea to secure a 
conviction. While 18 USC section 1956 prescribed intent as an element of ML offence, 
section 1957 requires the prosecution only to prove knowledge that the transaction 
involves the proceeds of criminal activity.347 Section 1956 prescribed four different 
kinds of specified intentions348 - showing any of these may secure a conviction for the 
section 1956 offences.349 While proving any of the intentions may secure a conviction, 
alternative intentions can be alleged in a single indictment for section 1956 offences.350  
In determining intent, and having satisfied all other elements, the Court may consider 
the nature of the transaction as evidence of the defendant’s criminal intent to launder.351 
If the transaction does not involve the techniques commonly deployed by launderers, 
the Court is not likely to find that the defendant intends to disguise or conceal the 
transaction.352 Thus, structuring implies intent to launder. It follows that SAR filed 
against structuring not only helps in detecting ML but also provides evidence of intent 
to launder.  
                                                
345 ibid 
346 United States v Martin 933 F.2d 609 (8th Circuit 1991); United States v Smith 46 F.3d 1223 (1st 
Circuit 1995) 
347  18 USC s 1957 (a) (2012) 
348 ibid s 1956 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012); (i) intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; 
(ii) intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of s 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986; (iii) intent to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control 
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and (iv) intent to avoid a transaction reporting requirement 
under State or Federal law 
349 Sultzer (n 131) 163-64 
350 United States v Navarro 145 F.3d 580, 589-90 (3d Circuit 1998)   
351 Hart (n 273) 1470 
352 United States v Demmitt 706 F.3d 665, 678-79 (5th Circuit 2012) 
  86 
The doctrine of transferred intent has been raised in reference to the intent requirements 
of section 1956.353 This doctrine, which provides a tool for the prosecution to convict on 
the intent of another – a defendant who did not design the scheme – has been challenged 
unsuccessfully. 354  However, some Courts have held that section 1956 does not 
incorporate transferred intent. One aspect of ML that presents problems to Court, in 
formulating ‘intent’ to support a criminal conviction, is “transport sting operation” 
allowed by section 1956 (a)(3)(C).355 Here, it is enough to show that the defendant 
‘believed’ rather than to show that he ‘knew’ the funds were the proceeds of a crime.  
Section 1957 extends the scope of section 1956 to punish a defendant who handles other 
people’s property worth more than USD10,000, which he knows are tainted.356 To 
convict under section 1957 prosecution needs not prove that the transaction was 
executed with the intent to carry on the activity, nor with the intent to conceal the assets, 
nor that the transaction was conducted with the intent to avoid reporting requirements of 
the BSA 1970.357  
Consequently, the four intentions specified under section 1956 are not a requirement for 
the section 1957 prosecution.358 The primary requirement is the proof that the defendant 
“knowingly” engaged or attempted to engage in monetary transactions involving a 
criminal property of the value USD10,000 or more that was derived from the SUA.359 
Lack of the intention requirement made it easier to prove section 1957 offence than any 
of the three offences under section 1956. Thus, section 1957 offence carries a lesser 
criminal punishment of 10 years in prison.    
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2.4.3 THE IMPACT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE AML LAW 
An important step in the US efforts to fight ML is the enactment of 18 USC section 
1956 and 1957. These two statutes criminalise handling of the proceeds of crime to 
render the handler just as liable as the criminal himself. 360  The whole idea of 
criminalising ML was to attack criminal organisations and cripple their finances, 
through proactive investigation, forfeiture and stiffer penalties.361  
As discussed above, while the elements of the offences are not difficult to prove, the 
statutes are designed so broadly to catch offenders in a variety of ways. The statutes’ 
various statutory sanctions – in the form of civil penalties, criminal fine, and forfeiture – 
are necessary tools for disrupting ML.  
These AML statutes are critical in disrupting ML in two significant ways. First, the 
sting operations ML of section 1956 allows law enforcement to investigate suspicion of 
ML proactively and that in most cases lead to law enforcement to the heart of the 
criminal group. In proving the offence of ML under section 1956(a)(3) (sting operation 
ML), the prosecution needs not to prove that the asset represented was derived from one 
of the SUAs.362 The only requirement is that asset has been represented to the offender 
and he reasonably believed that the asset was derived from criminal activities.363  
The codification of section 1956(a)(3) into 18 United States Code, was a deliberate 
attempt to provide a legal basis for investigating organised crime using sting operation, 
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and for prosecuting offenders. 364  However, to establish an ML offence under this 
subsection, the prosecution must prove “intent” as opposed to “knowledge”.365  
Secondly, the offence of “dealing in the proceeds of crime” (18 USC section 1957) is a 
very powerful tool against handlers of other people’s wealth, without whom ML will 
not flourish. As discussed above, the only mens rea requirement for this offence is 
“knowledge” that the asset (more than USD10,000) involved in the transaction is 
derived from a SUA. This is a lower standard compared with the mens rea requirement 
of section 1956, and of course, knowledge is much easier to prove than intention. 
Despite all these advantages, the AML statutes are reactive (just like the BSA reporting 
statute), 366  except 18 USC section 1956(a)(3) which authorises the government to 
investigate crimes through a sting operation. Though the sting operations enable the 
government to take on professional launderers, and to seize millions of dollars, there is 
no evidence to suggest that ML is reducing due to such operations.367  
Such operations make professional launderers more professionals by being more 
cautious. Similarly, while those operations reveal little out of numerous laundering 
scheme involving several billions of dollars,368  assets seizures resulting from those 
operations are minuscule compared to the estimated criminal assets laundered yearly in 
                                                
364 Kacarab (n 268) 35 
365 18 USC s (a)(3) 
366 Sultzer (n 131) 220 
367 The US Senate, Money Laundering Legislation, Hearing of the Committee on Judiciary 99-540 (1985) 
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the US. In fact, an investigation suggests that hundreds of billions of dollars are still 
being laundered.369  
Having analysed the provisions and application of the US substantive AML law, this 
thesis now turns to examine the utility of federal asset forfeiture law in disrupting ML. 
2.5 GENERAL ASSET FORFEITURE LAW  
Simplistically, forfeiture means the loss or giving up something such as a property as a 
penalty for wrongdoing. It is a way of divesting criminals of their property without 
compensation.370 It allows government to disrupt ML and fight against crimes.371 This 
section argues that, forfeiture remains a vital tool that turns the tide against ML, 
terrorism and organised crime. This section starts with a brief history of forfeiture law. 
It then discusses the types of forfeiture, and concludes with the analysis of the utility of 
forfeiture in disrupting ML and other related crimes. 
2.5.1 HISTORY OF FORFEITURE LAWS 
Both criminal and civil forfeiture has a long history.372 Early history shows the crown 
forfeit the inanimate objects (the deodand) irrespective of the guilt of the owner or 
possessor, on the ground that it was the property that committed the crime.373 Laws 
were enacted as far back as late eighteenth century to allow the law enforcement to use 
                                                
369  House of Representative, Federal Government’s Response to Money Laundering’ Committee on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 103-40 (1993) 1 
370  Fletcher N. Baldwin, ‘The Regulation of the Financing of Terrorism’ in Barry Rider, Research 
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371 Owen Sucoff, ‘From the Court House to the Police Station: Combating the dual biases that surround 
Federal Money-Laundering Asset Forfeiture’ [2012] 46 New England Law Review 93, 94 
372 Austin v United States, 509 US 602, 611-13 (1993); Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yatch Leasing Co., 416 
US 663, 680-83 (1974); please also see: Cassella (n 306) 7-8 
373 The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126 (1815) (for breach of war embargo); The Palmyra, 25 US (12 
Wheat.) 1, 8 (1827); Harmony v United States, 43 US (2How.) 233-34; please see Baldwin (n 370) 3 
  90 
civil forfeiture to seize cargos and vessels that violated the US customs laws or involved 
in other forms of criminal offences.374  
The rationale behind pursuing the property instead of the person who violated the law, 
is because most times the property involved in the commission of the crime might be 
found within the US jurisdiction, but the owner or the person in possession of the 
property either lives in another jurisdiction or remains forever unidentified.375 Thus, it is 
only by going against the property that government may be able to recover taxes owed 
on smuggled goods or to prevent the use of the property to commit further criminal 
activities.376  
Forfeiture laws developed in piecemeal over a period of time.377 The first forfeiture 
statute was enacted during the civil war to confiscate properties belonging to the 
Confederate States.378 During the Prohibition era in the 1920s, the reach of forfeiture 
law was extended to enable the government to seize and forfeit properties that facilitate 
the production and sale of illegal liquor.379  The major expansion of forfeiture law, 
however, came through the Organised Crime Control Act 1970,380 to deal with the 
illicit drug trade.381 The Congress continues to expand the reach of existing forfeiture 
                                                
374 Cassella (n 306) 29; Amy M Schalenbrand, ‘The Constitutional and Judicial Limitations of IN REM 
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377 The Act of 3 March 1819; also see ibid 29 (stating that the First Congress, in 1789 enacted statues 
authorising seizure of properties involved in the violation of the federal statute) 
378 Schalenbrand (n 374) 
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legislation to capture as much property as possible.382 These laws are now scattered 
across the Federal Criminal Code.383 
In 1986, the Congress enacted general forfeiture statute that provides for civil and 
criminal forfeiture, which can be used to forfeit assets of those involved in any of a 
range of crime, including ML and TF.384 18 USC sections 981 and 982 were enacted on 
the belief that the most efficient way to combat ML is through forfeiture law.385  By 
1990s the old common law notion of criminal forfeiture resurfaces, applying to a wide 
variety of crimes.386  
The constitutionality of civil forfeiture first arose in Dobbins’s Distillery v United 
States.387 The Supreme Court held that forfeiture of a tainted property used in a crime is 
constitutional, irrespective of the defendant’s innocence at a criminal trial.388 This ruling 
boosted the use of forfeiture law in the US throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.389 However, this expansion raised concerns regarding the lack of adequate 
procedural safeguards to protect the right of property owners.390  Consequently, the 
Congress enacted CAFRA 2002391 to provide some safeguards.  
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The role of asset forfeiture in the 1990s was vital in interdicting criminal assets worth 
hundreds of millions of US dollars.392 Asset forfeiture law is essential in disrupting ML 
in the US for the following reasons:393  
i) Convicted criminals may still retain control over their illegitimate 
activity while serving a prison term if the illicit proceeds remain at their 
disposal. Thus, forfeiture removes proceeds of crime from criminals 
enabling government to prevent criminals from funding further 
criminality; 
ii)  It serves as the most efficient way to recovering funds to compensate 
innocent victims of crime, such as in cases of fraud; 
iii) It deprives criminals of enjoying the fruits of their crimes, to discourage 
others from engaging in crime; 
iv) Forfeiture also sends a strong signal to the society that crime does not 
pay and the expensive criminal lifestyle is not permanent; 
v) Asset forfeiture serves as punishment for using the property 
inappropriately.  
2.5.2 TYPES OF FORFEITURES 
Forfeiture can be classified into administrative, civil and criminal.394 The approach and 
procedure with which each kind of forfeiture is carried out differ, though their impact 
and purpose are similar.395 
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2.5.2.1 ADMINISTRATIVE FORFEITURE 
Forfeitures can be pursued administratively. This means the property is forfeited 
without recourse to court because it was not challenged.396 Very briefly, the process of 
administrative forfeiture involves a seizure (backed by a warrant)  of the property based 
on a “probable cause” to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture.397 Then the 
agency that seized the property must make its intention to forfeit the property known to 
the property owner and the general public, to allow ample time for the property owner 
or anybody else with sufficient interest in the property to contest it.398  
An advantage of administrative forfeiture is that, unless someone files a claim, the 
property remains forfeited and the forfeiture acquires the same legal force and effect as 
if it was judicial.399 Except for real property and personal property (other than cash and 
monetary instruments) that have a value exceeding USD500,000, most properties are 
forfeited administratively.400  
Once someone contests the administrative forfeiture, the agency responsible must return 
the property to the owner, or forfeiture must proceed judicially in the form of either civil 
or criminal forfeiture.401 At this point, regards must be given to the advantages and 
disadvantages of both civil and criminal forfeiture.402  
                                                                                                                                          
394 ibid 9 
395 David Pimentel, ‘Forfeiture Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court’ [2013] 13 
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AS civil and criminal forfeitures are not mutually exclusive, the law enforcement can 
pursue both at the same time.403 While criminal forfeiture is more desirable because of 
its efficiency in depriving criminals of their illicit proceeds, where the prosecution has 
failed to secure a conviction, the government can easily fall back on civil forfeiture.404 
Historically customs law governs the administrative forfeiture.405 However, this law 
was widely perceived to be unfair, because it placed heavy burden on the claimants.406 
CAFRA 2000407 has now addressed the perceived lop-sidedness of the forfeiture law.408 
However, CAFRA 2000 did not repeal and replace the forfeiture law, but it simply 
made some changes to the law, limiting its applications in some situations in which it 
applies before.409  
2.5.2.2 CRIMINAL FORFEITURE 
18 USC section 982 provides the legal basis for criminal forfeiture for the violation of 
ML law and of the law prohibiting unlicensed money transmitting businesses.410 The 
law states: 
The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an 
offence in violation of section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of this title, 
shall order that the person forfeits to the United States any 
property, real or personal, involved in such offence, or any 
property traceable to such property.411  
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Criminal forfeiture also applies to a range of ML predicate crimes, such as fraud,412 and 
violation of AML statute of the BSA 1970.413 The procedure for effecting criminal 
forfeiture for violation of 18 USC sections 1956 and 1957 is governed by 21 USC 
section 853.414 Thus, section 853 empowers the authorities to disrupt ML.  For example, 
once the violation of 18 USC sections 1956 and 1957 has occurred, all rights, titles, and 
interests in such property vest in the US government. This is so, even where the 
defendant has already transferred the property to a third party, unless the transferee 
establishes that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of 
purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to 
forfeiture.415 This and many other provisions of 21 USC section 853 make criminal 
forfeiture a powerful tool of disrupting ML.416 
Although the standard of proof in a criminal trials is beyond a reasonable doubt, in 
criminal forfeiture action the prosecution needs only to prove its case by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture.417 The defendant 
forfeits both the proceeds and the assets that facilitated the crime, and if those assets 
cannot be located, the court may order a forfeiture of a substitute asset.418 The forfeiture 
is not defeated in the event a substitute asset cannot be identified during the trial, as an 
alternative property can always be forfeited whenever identified.419  
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Criminal forfeiture has been less controversial because the procedural standards for 
criminal trials are very high. 420  Although criminal forfeiture forms part of the 
defendant’s criminal sentence, 421  it does not however affect the length of the 
defendant’s prison term, as courts do not depart from the sentencing guidelines to 
favour a defendant who has forfeited property to the government.422 Also, courts do not 
have the discretion to reduce the amount of forfeiture to compensate for the defendant’s 
lengthy prison term.423 
Despite its advantages, criminal forfeiture has its limitations.424 First of all, criminal 
forfeiture is in personam425 that follows a criminal conviction of the property owner.426 
Thus, the defendant’s guilt must be established either at a trial or through a guilty plea, 
otherwise the defendant’s property cannot be forfeited.427 Even if the defendant has to 
be convicted, criminal forfeiture can only proceed if a notice of forfeiture has been 
included in the criminal indictment.428 Also, third party’s property that was used to 
facilitate the crime is forfeitable only when superior ownership cannot be established.429 
Moreover, a forfeiture process can be slow. Besides, failure to prosecute the defendant 
spells doom to criminal forfeiture.430  
Where criminal forfeiture fails; for example, where law enforcement could not secure 
conviction against the defendant, civil forfeiture is the alternative tool available to law 
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enforcement, as it has been held that civil forfeiture is not punitive for the purpose of 
double jeopardy.431 
2.5.2.3 CIVIL FORFEITURE 
18 USC section 981 provides the legal basis for forfeiture of property that is in itself, a 
proceed of crime, or involved in the violation of ML law and of the law prohibiting 
unlicensed money transmitting businesses.432 This statute is enacted widely to enable 
forfeiture of any asset derived from a whole range of offences. The offences include any 
of the SUAs, fraud, and offences against foreign nations. Others include facilitating 
ML, the commission of ML predicate crimes, violation of certain statute, 433  and 
violation of AML statute of the BSA 1970.434 Civil forfeiture action proceeds in rem 
against the property to be forfeited, because it is tainted by its involvement or its mere 
connection with criminal activity. 435  However, the historical notion that in rem 
forfeiture follows the property because the property itself is the guilty party no longer 
holds.436  
18 USC section 983 governs the general rules and procedure for civil forfeiture 
proceedings.437 While the prosecution bears the initial burden of proving a probable 
cause that the property to be forfeited is connected to the predicate offence, 438 
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prosecution needs not to trace the property to a particular offence.439 The proof of 
‘probable cause’ is satisfied by showing “a reasonable ground for belief ... supported by 
less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.”440  
Civil forfeiture procedure allows prosecution to show probable cause at the forfeiture 
proceedings using evidence obtained before, after, or at the time the property was 
seized. 441  Once the prosecution succeeded in establishing probable cause, then the 
burden shifts to the claimant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
property was not in fact, connected to the commission of the predicate crime,442 or that a 
defence to the forfeiture applies.443  
Civil forfeiture is more flexible than criminal forfeiture. Thus, because the innocence of 
the defendant is immaterial, government can circumvent a failed prosecution to forfeit 
property belonging to a defendant whose guilt could not be established.444 Similarly, in 
so far as the property can be identified and seized, the death or whereabouts of a 
wrongdoer will not impede civil forfeiture.445 Furthermore, because it is not subject to 
constitutional safeguards that govern criminal forfeiture, civil forfeiture can be easy, 
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less complicated and quick.446 However, lack of these safeguards made civil forfeiture 
far more controversial.447 
Despite the advantages, civil forfeiture has limitations.448 The major limitation of civil 
forfeiture as a tool of disrupting ML is that prosecution must establish a direct nexus 
between the properties to be forfeited and the criminal activity.449 Unlike in the case of 
criminal forfeiture, a substitute property cannot be forfeited where the actual property is 
no longer available.450 Additionally, the great deal of unnecessary extra work involved 
in filing civil forfeiture action makes it less attractive.451 Thus, civil forfeiture will be a 
desirable tool for disrupting ML in situations such as where the defendant is a fugitive, 
dead, or  incompetent to stand trial.452    
2.5.2.4 INNOCENT OWNER DEFENCE 
Although forfeiture is a powerful tool against ML, IOD serves as a very serious 
limitation on the efficacy of forfeiture in disrupting ML.453 As criminals have used third 
parties’ properties to commit crimes, the IOD has been used successfully to prevent the 
forfeiture of properties that facilitated the commission of the crime.454 
One major controversy about civil forfeiture that has been resonating for over 200 years 
is the power of government to forfeit a property of innocent owner on the basis that the 
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property was involved in the commission of the crime.455 However, putting property 
owners on their toes to guard their properties from being used by criminals to commit 
crimes, is necessary for the disruption of ML.456 
A chain of judicial authority developed this power into near-absolute rule. However, the 
judiciary itself sought to limit the power by creating exemption to the rule. 457  In 
Harmony, while the forfeiture of pirate vessel was upheld regardless of the innocence 
of the owner, it was held that the cargo was not subject to forfeiture since the owner 
neither authorised nor co-operated in committing the crime.458 Similarly, in Peisch v 
Ware,459 the Supreme Court declared forfeiture inappropriate in the circumstances of 
the case. Furthermore, in United Sates v Stowell,460 while the Supreme Court upheld 
the forfeiture of a distillery despite the innocence of the owner, it held that the interest 
of an innocent lienholder is not forfeitable.461 
Despite the attack on forfeiture of properties belonging to innocent owners,462 the Court 
in Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.463 rejected any idea that IOD should 
be read into the statute.  However, the Court acknowledge the appropriateness of the 
defence where the owner had taken measures to prevent the illegal use of his property, 
and emphasised that in certain circumstances disregard to IOD may be unduly 
oppressive.464  Finally, in Bennis v Michigan,465 the court failed to protect the right of 
Mrs Bennis to her car, which was used by her husband in an inappropriate way. 
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Michigan does not have IOD in its statute book. Thus, Michigan Supreme Court had no 
difficulty upholding the forfeiture.466  
This rule was however altered when the Congress enacted “uniform IOD” effectively 
codifying Calero-Toledo dicta into the CAFRA 2002 – conferring on innocent owners, 
a defence in a civil forfeiture action.467 This defence applies to almost all federal cases 
except in traditional custom cases.468 The limitation of this defence is that it does not 
apply to a case brought under a State’s law.469 Thus, this statute would not help innocent 
owners in states like Michigan. Also, the defence does not apply to contrabands such as 
illicit drugs even if the criminal donated them to an innocent third party.470  
Although the IOD is vital to protecting innocent property owners, it is submitted that 
limited application of the IOD is critical to the successful disruption of ML. Non-
collaboration with the criminals and lack of knowledge that the property was being used 
for criminal purpose should not be enough to bring the IOD into operation. It is 
therefore submitted that to prove his innocence the owner must show that he has done 
what is reasonably required to ensure his property is not used for criminal purposes.  
2.5.3 JURISDICTION: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FORFEITURE ORDERS 
Although jurisdiction is an essential element in disrupting ML, this thesis does not 
discuss jurisdiction because the US approach to jurisdiction in transnational crime is 
worthy of a thesis in itself. Thus, certain lines must be drawn. However, two issues are 
worthy of discussion here. These issues are enforcement of US orders overseas and 
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enforceability of overseas orders in the US. Discussion on these two issues is important 
because, due to the transnational nature of ML, jurisdiction is crucial to its disruption. 
The enforcement of both in rem and in personam order made by one District Court for 
the forfeiture of criminal assets located in another district within the US is no longer a 
problem.471  Also, there is a provision in the US law for the forfeiture of criminal 
properties located abroad.472 The major authority in this area is United States v All 
Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts Maintained in the names of Heriberto Castro 
Meza et. al. (Meza) 63 F.3d (2d Circuit 1995) 151.  
In All Funds, the law enforcement sought to forfeit funds on deposit in the UK.473 The 
District Court held that it has jurisdiction over the deposited funds, and granted a 
forfeiture order against the funds. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the District 
Court decision. However, it was held that actual or constructive jurisdiction, i.e., actual 
or constructive control of the res is required for 28 USC section 1355(b) to apply, and 
the District Court has constructive control, therefore had jurisdiction over the funds in 
the UK.474 In a later decision of the Court of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that section 
1355(b) does not require the government to establish constructive control over the 
asset.475  
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Before the amendment of 28 USC section 1355,476 US Courts have no jurisdiction over 
properties located abroad. That was a big problem because criminals use offshore 
facilities to put their assets beyond the reach of the law enforcement. 477  With the 
amendment, Courts have jurisdiction, and can forfeit to the US governement criminal 
propertes irrespective of where the crime is committed or the properties are located.478  
However, the main issue is whether foreign Courts would recognise and enforce US 
orders. For example, where assets subject to the US forfeiture order are located abroad, 
whether such orders will be enforced by the foreign nation where the property is located 
will depend on the law of the nation, bilateral or multilateral arrangements that subsist 
between the US and the nation.  
Taking the UK by way of illustration – in the UK, foreign judgement can be enforced 
where there is MLAT between the UK and foreign nation.479 Also, there are common 
law and statutory provisions under which foreign judgement can be enforced. Although 
the US authorities can seek assistance to repatriate assets stashed offshore through the 
MLAT it had with some countries including the UK,480 the MLAT does not confer 
automatic jurisdiction on the US to forfeit assets located in those countries.481  
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Statutorily, foreign judgement can be enforced under the Administration of Justice Act 
1920 and Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. 482  These two 
legislations provide for reciprocal arrangements under which, a judgement obtained 
from the English Courts can be registered for enforcement in the enforcing country, and 
foreign judgment can be registered for enforcement in England and Wales. Thus, where 
such reciprocity subsists, registered judgments take effect in the country of registration 
as if they were obtained in that country. However, there is no such arrangement between 
the US and UK.483 Therefore, where the property is located in the UK, US in rem and in 
personam forfeiture orders can not be enforced under these two statutes. 
Under the common law, a foreign judgement is enforceable in the UK on meeting 
certain conditions.484 Usually, the judgement is viewed as a foreign debt between the 
parties to it.485 The implication of this is that the party holding the judgement must 
commence a new suit in the UK courts to enforce the recognised debt, which may be 
enforced through a simple summary judgment proceeding. 486  This applies to 
enforcements of US in rem and in personam orders since there are no reciprocal 
agreements between the UK and US. 
However, the UK courts do not recognise and enforce in rem orders under the common 
law. Also, they do not recognise and enforce in personam orders involving taxes, fines 
and penalties. United States of America v  Abacha and others [2015] 1 WLR is an 
appeal case against the High Court freezing order made for the claimant, the US, to 
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freeze assets situated in the UK belonging to the defendants. The Court of Appeal held 
that, a judgement in rem would not be enforceable in England and Wales at common 
law for want of jurisdiction of the US Court on a property located outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the US court.487   
It was also held that a judgement in personam would still not be recognised and 
enforced at common law in England and Wales because it would amount to the 
enforcement of a foreign penal law.488 Accordingly, any judgment obtained at the suit of 
the claimant in the US proceedings would be unenforceable in England and Wales at 
common law.489 Thus, the option open to the US is to bring proceedings under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and Parts 4A and 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
(External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 with its relevant constraints and 
restrictions.490 
Regarding enforcing foreign judgement in the US, US also adopts common law 
approach where like the approach in the UK, the foreign judgment is treated as a 
judgement against a debtor. Hilton v Guyot established the US common law principles 
for the enforcement of foreign nation judgement.491 However, this principle is anchored 
on reciprocity based on the comity of nations.  
Like in the UK, in the US too, a foreign judgement is recognised and enforced under 
statutory provisions such as the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgement Recognition Act 
1962. The current US approach to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is 
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costly, complex and full of uncertainties, which creates many problems for both the US 
and foreign parties.492 
2.5.4 PERCEPTION ON ASSET FORFEITURE 
As a result of the steady expansion of forfeiture law, forfeiture provisions extended the 
law to allow for forfeiture of all property involved in an offence. 493   While this 
expansion would give law enforcement an edge in fighting crimes, the operative 
framework that developed around the forfeiture law is prone to abuse.494  
For example, a broad interpretation given to the “involved in” language, coupled with 
the lack of judicial discretion in forfeiture, low standard of proof required of 
prosecution, and reluctance of the courts to extend Eighth Amendment protection to 
forfeiture paved way for judicial bias towards forfeiture.495 One major source of concern 
was the lack of procedural safeguards in place to enable property owners to defend their 
properties subject to forfeiture.496 All these raise human rights issues.497 
Another source of concern is the way and manner Justice Department places emphasis 
on revenue collection as a driving force behind forfeitures.498 Thus, abuse of the system 
is imminent in as much as the department that is responsible for putting an operational 
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limit on forfeiture amount also has a strong appetite to pursue forfeitures to maximise 
revenue.499 
The development of facilitation theory also rendered asset forfeiture to criticism.500 
Under 18 USC section 981(a)(1)(A), a property that was used to facilitate ML is 
considered to be involved in ML. Thus, under the broad definition of facilitation theory, 
clean money that comingled with tainted ones facilitates ML by making the tainted 
money to appear innocent. 501  Consequently, the untainted money is subject to 
forfeiture.502 In United States v All Monies ($477,048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, 
the court held that the legitimate money concealed the tainted money, facilitating ML 
and therefore subject to forfeiture.503  
Courts have since expanded this theory to include the entire balance in the account even 
if only part of the clean money facilitated the crime.504 However, the court refused to 
extend facilitation theory regarding indirect account and concluded that mere tracing of 
cheques into an indirect account was insufficient to justify forfeiture of the entire 
balance, adding that, probable cause was extremely thin.505 
To address these concerns, Congress enacted CAFRA 2000.506 Because most of the 
concerns were centred on civil forfeiture, the bulk of the reforms were also directed at 
it.507 Before the passage of CAFRA, the burden is on the property owner to prove that 
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the property is not subject to forfeiture, while all that is required of the government is 
just to show a probable cause.508  
CAFRA now placed the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the property is forfeitable.509 The only exception to 
this rule is where the asset subject to forfeiture belongs to terrorists, in which case the 
burden is reversed.510 Thus, all that is required on the part of government is to show a 
probable cause to seize the property and then the claimant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture.511  
CAFRA 2000 also introduced a range of protections for property owners, which include 
appointment of counsel for property owners who could not afford legal representation 
where the forfeiture involved their primary dwelling.512 Others include uniform IOD for 
a bona fide purchaser without notice, hardship provision, and adequate notice to contest 
the forfeiture.513 Another important protection for property owners is the requirement 
that forfeiture involving real estate must be pursued judicially.514 
However, CAFRA appears to be lopsided in placing a lower standard of proof on the 
government, and for failure to provide adequate safeguards in civil forfeiture cases.515 
Despite the seeming lop-sidedness, the utility of forfeiture outweighs the criticisms that 
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trail it because forfeiture law allows law enforcement to attack the economic aspect of 
crimes.516  
One good advantage of forfeiture law is that it has expanded both the class of crimes 
that falls within its ambit and the property that is subject to forfeiture.517 The law has 
developed to reach almost any property involved, including those that facilitate the 
conduct of ML and other crimes.518 Also, the Patriot Act amended 18 USC section 
981(a)(1)(G) to allow forfeiture of all assets of anyone associated with terrorism or 
terrorist organisation.519 Section 981(a)(1)(G) does not require any connection between 
the property and any terrorist act.520 
Furthermore, forfeiture achieves significant goals for criminal justice system.521 Unlike 
a fine, which sets the price for a crime, forfeiture communicates that an activity is 
forbidden.522 The Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo asserted that forfeiture serves as a 
punishment to criminals and deterrence to others.523 Moreover, while administrative 
forfeiture assists government to obtain title to assets efficiently when the owner failed to 
claim it, civil forfeiture serves as a middle ground between no punishment and full entry 
into the criminal justice system.524 Finally, while administrative forfeiture helps law 
enforcement to confiscate property without tying-up resources in the judicial process, 
civil forfeiture allows the government to punish criminals without recourse to the 
criminal justice system. 525 
                                                
516 Sucoff (n 371) 98 
517 18 USC ss 891(a)(1)(G)(i) and 892 (2012) 
518 Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, 416 US 663 (1974) 
519 18 USC 981 (a)(1)(G) 
520 Cassella (n 306) 8 
521 McCaw (n 401) 212 
522 ibid 185 
523 Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, 416 US 663, 686 (1974) 
524 McCaw (n 401) 212 
525 ibid 
  110 
Having analysed the US forfeiture laws, the focus now shifts to RICO Act 1970, which 
is one of the legislations enacted to combat the infiltration of criminal families into 
legitimate businesses to legitimise their illicit gains. 
2.6 RICO ACT 1970 
RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organised Crime Corrupt Organisation Act 
1970 to fight organised crime families in the United States, 526  as they infiltrate 
legitimate business. 527  ML is one of several predicate offences on which RICO is 
charged.528 Thus, prosecutors could charge RICO violations alongside ML.529  
Despite the wider application of RICO,530 this section argues that RICO Act has a 
limitation with regard to fighting ML. This section proceeds with an overview of RICO 
prohibition, followed by discussions of the elements of the offence. This section then 
analyses sanctions for RICO violation and then concludes with an analysis of the 
limitations of RICO.   
2.6.1 OVERVIEW OF RICO PROHIBITIONS 
Pursuant to 18 USC section 1962, it is unlawful to: (a) derive any income from a pattern 
of racketeering activity, or to use such income to engage in an activity which affects 
interstate or foreign commerce;531 (b) acquire interest, through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or collection of debt, in an enterprise which carries out interstate or foreign 
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commerce;532 (c) conduct affairs of an enterprise which carries out interstate commerce 
through racketing activity;533 (d) conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection 
(a), (b), or (c) mentioned above.534 
Nevertheless, defences such as invalidity of one or more predicate acts; statute of 
limitations (four and five years for civil and criminal RICO claims, respectively); 
withdrawal from the conspiracy; horizontal pre-emption (primary jurisdiction); reverse 
vertical pre-emption; and constitutional challenges are available to a RICO defendant.535  
The RICO Act offers some obvious advantages in government’s effort to fight crimes. 
First, showing that the defendant knew predicate offence was illegal easily satisfies the 
mens rea requirement. 536  Secondly, violation of RICO statute carries severe 
sanctions.537 Thus, the government have deployed RICO in a wide variety of criminal 
contexts.538 However, to ensure that RICO is used selectively and uniformly,539 USAM 
requires that prior approval from the criminal division of the DOJ must be obtained 
before the prosecution can proceed with a RICO (civil or criminal) action.540  
2.6.2 ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENCE 
The prosecution must prove four elements to secure a conviction under RICO Act. They 
include two or more predicate offences of racketeering; the pattern of racketeering 
activity; enterprise; and effect on interstate commerce. 
2.6.2.1 TWO OR MORE PREDICATE OFFENCES OF RACKETEERING  
                                                
532 18 USC ibid1962 (b) (2011) 
533 ibid s 1962 (c)  
534 ibid s 1962 (d)  
535 McCarrick and others (n 526) 1626-1636 
536 Bruner Corporation v RA Brunner Company, 133 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir 1998) 
537 18 USC s1963 (2011) 
538 A. Laxmidas Sawkar, ‘From Mafia to Milking Cows: State Rico Act Expansion’ [1999] 41 Arizona 
Law Review 1133, 1135 
539 USAM s 9-110.200 stated the reason behind this policy  
540 ibid s 9-110.101 
  112 
The prosecution must prove two or more predicate acts of racketeering.541 A defendant 
can still be charged with the violation of RICO even if he is acquitted of those predicate 
offences under a different statute.542 The Court has held the racketeering activities listed 
in the RICO Act to mean the predicate offences since they form the basis for liability 
under RICO.543  
2.6.2.2 PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY 
Nine States’ offences and over thirty federal offences can potentially serve as the basis 
for a RICO Action.544 However, a pattern of racketeering activity has to be established. 
To establish the pattern, the prosecution must prove that at least two racketeering 
activities occur in the space of ten years,545 and those activities must not be isolated.546  
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Company,547 the Supreme Court held 
that prosecution must show a relationship between the predicate acts and continuity of 
those acts to prove a pattern of racketeering activity for RICO action.548 
Although the relationship and continuity elements must be separately proved, the 
Supreme Court in H.J. Inc held that evidence on these two prongs often would 
overlap.549 In contrast, Sedima v Imrex Co. 550 held that in a private civil RICO action 
the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant has been previously convicted of the 
predicate offences that constitute the pattern of racketeering. 
2.6.2.3 ENTERPRISE: 
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Proving the element of the enterprise is not an easy task. Accordingly, the prosecution 
must establish the existence of RICO enterprise and whether the evidence adduced is 
sufficient to establish such existence.551 Both legitimate and illegitimate organisations 
fall under the meaning of “enterprise”.552 Section 1961(4) defines the term “enterprise” 
to include individuals, legal entities and association-in-fact.  
While it is easier to establish the existence of an enterprise if it is a legal entity,553 
establishing an association-in-fact (which does not have a legal existence) is not. In 
United States v Turkette554 the Supreme Court defined the term association-in-fact to 
mean, different groups associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a 
course of conduct.555 Because the Supreme Court in Turkette did not specify the level of 
structure needed to qualify association-in-fact enterprise, circuits have held different 
views as to the proof required to establish the existence of an enterprise that is 
sufficiently separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering.556  
2.6.2.4 EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
Finally, the prosecution must prove that the alleged racketeering activities affect 
interstate commerce as required by 18 USC section 1962(a)-(c). Proving this element is 
relatively straightforward. It can be satisfied if the enterprise itself affects interstate 
commerce, 557  or the predicate acts have an impact, however small, on interstate 
commerce,558  or by establishing that, the enterprise’s activities impact on interstate 
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commerce.559 Purchase of raw materials or sourcing workforce from a State, in the US, 
different from where the enterprise is domiciled qualifies as the effect on interstate 
commerce. 560  Even interstate phone call qualifies as the effect on interstate 
commerce.561  
 2.6.3 SANCTION AND COURSES OF ACTION FOR RICO VIOLATION 
A RICO conviction attracts three criminal penalties, which consist of imprisonment, 
fines and forfeiture of property.562 Civil penalties in the form of treble damages and 
attorney fees are also available against a RICO defendant. 563  RICO violations are 
pursued through criminal prosecution and civil action. 
2.6.3.1 CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
In addition to forfeiture of assets associated with the offence, a RICO defendant faces 
twenty years’ imprisonment, (or a life sentence if the racketeering activity is punishable 
by life imprisonment), or fine or both.564 A crucial feature of RICO is its forfeiture 
provisions, which enables the government to attack criminal activities. 565  RICO 
forfeiture allows for forfeiture of property in the form of interests the defendant 
acquired or maintained through racketeering; an interest that provides any source of 
influence over the racketeering enterprise; and proceeds of racketeering activity.566 The 
court in Russello v United States567 has interpreted the word “interest” in 18 USC 
section 1963(a)(1) to include both proceeds and profits. 
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18 USC section 1963 extends the concept of property subject to RICO forfeiture to 
include landed property including things fixed to or found in land, tangible and 
intangible properties, and these, are deemed to have been vested in the government at 
the time violation of section 1962 occurred.568 This is not limited to proceeds personally 
obtained by the defendant as many circuits have held defendants jointly and severally 
liable for all proceeds obtained by co-defendants. 569  The forfeiture can proceed in 
personam or in rem.570 
The concept of in personam and in rem forfeiture has already been discussed. However, 
it is worthy of mention here, that under RICO Act, where the prosecution pursues the 
property itself, a separate civil action must be brought in each district in which the 
property is located.571 RICO Act empowers courts to issue temporary restraining orders 
or injunction to prevent a defendant from depleting forfeitable assets pending the 
conclusion of adjudication.572 However, the right of a third party to property subject to 
forfeiture may be protected if it can be shown that the right predates the RICO 
violation573 or the third party is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.574  
2.6.3.2 CIVIL ACTION 
Both government and private parties can bring a civil action against a defendant. The 
government is empowered to seek civil remedies under section 1964 in addition to 
criminal penalties provided in section 1963. Civil remedies include orders of divestiture, 
restrictions on future activities or investments, and dissolution or reorganisation of the 
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enterprise. 575  However, due process must be observed by the Court in ordering 
dissolution or reorganisation of an enterprise to safeguard the rights of innocent 
persons. 576  Although these penalties may breach citizens’ rights of association as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment, public interest in suppressing organised crime 
takes precedence over such concerns.577 
On the other hand, private parties injured in their businesses or property as a result of a 
violation of section 1962 may sue for damages, to recover threefold the damages they 
sustain, the cost of filing the suit, and a reasonable attorney’s fee. 578  However, 
person/enterprise distinction, standing, and statute of limitation constitute a challenge to 
private parties in pursuing a civil cause of action. 
2.6.4 THE LIMIT OF RICO ACT 
Before RICO, the government had to bring two separate actions – one against the 
property used in the commission of the crime in the district where it was located and the 
other against the defendant in the district where the crime was committed.579 Under 
RICO, law enforcement can pursue both the defendant and the property in one action.580 
The broad scope of RICO had enhanced the powers of federal prosecutors in dealing 
with crime hitherto they were not able to so easily.581  
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However, RICO Act has limitations.582 One of the major limitations of RICO Act is its 
complexity.583 Close examination of the RICO Act reveals its complexity and validates 
the arguments against it. The complex nature of RICO, made it ineffective in combating 
organised crimes against which it was enacted.584 For example, for a defendant to be 
convicted, it has to be established that the defendant committed the predicate 
racketeering activities in a pattern, before even considering whether the defendant’s 
violation of RICO was sufficiently linked to this pattern. 585  Consequently, RICO 
involves protracted investigations that unnecessarily cause confusion in giving 
instructions to the jury and delay trials.586  
Most of the RICO predicate offences are also substantive crimes, which are easier to 
prove than the RICO charges.587 For example, instead of bringing ML charges under 
RICO Act, it is easier to bring them under 18 USC sections 1956 and 1957. Only about 
eight per cent of indictments filed under RICO within its first fifteen years appears to 
have included charges of violations of section 1962(a)-(c) or subsection (d) – conspiracy 
to violate section 1962(a)-(c).588  
As RICO Act allows for private action, instead of attacking organised crimes, the Act 
serves private litigants who resort to RICO in a significant number of cases that were 
not related to the traditional notion of organised crimes.589 For example, in National 
Organisation for Women v Scheidler, the Supreme Court allowed the use of RICO 
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Act to challenge anti-abortion protesters, eventhough they had no intention to acquire an 
economic benefit from their conduct.590 The ever-changing nature of criminal groups, 
from relatively stable crime families to loose and ever-changing amalgamations of 
individuals, exposes the limits of RICO.591 Professor Lynch has argued that RICO is 
nearly a total failure as a weapon against the activity that led to its enactment.592 
Before the enactment of most of the laws discussed above, US government have been 
using fiscal laws to combat crime. As mentioned somewhere above, tax law was used 
where other laws failed to bring down Al Capone. 
2.7 TAXING THE CRIME 
This section analyses government’s response to organised crime – using income tax law 
to convict and imprison leadership of organised crime. The analysis shows that, 
although tremendous success has been recorded in using tax law to attack organised 
crime, the dynamic nature of organised crime means that tax law alone cannot be relied 
upon to control economic crime. 
One of the weapons deployed by the law enforcement in the United States against the 
leadership of organised crime is a charge of tax fraud,593 such as failure to file a tax 
return or keep the proper records.594  Since 1814, the Supreme Court held that goods 
smuggled into the United States were subject to import tax and were forfeitable for non-
payment of tax.595 Though smuggling is illegal, it does not exempt smugglers from 
                                                
590 National Organisation for Women v Scheidler, 510 US 249 (1994) 
591 Amann (n 64) 205 
592 Lynch (n 588) 726 (RICO was enacted address is the infiltration of legitimate business by criminal 
organisations) 
593  President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: 
Organised Crime (1967) 11 
594 26 USC s 7203 (1964) 
595 Hartford v United States, 8 Cranch 109, 3 L Ed 594 (US 1814) 
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appropriate payment of relevant taxes.596 The Court has since affirmed the legality of 
tax collected from unlawful businesses.597   
As prosecuting organised crime (such as drugs dealing, bootlegging or murder) became 
difficult, the government resorted to tax laws to convict leaders of organised crime.598  
One of the earliest culprits caught by the law was Al Capone. Al Capone never 
completed any tax returns, based on the misconception that making a full declaration of 
his illegal gains to the Internal Revenue Service would mean depriving himself of his 
Fifth Amendment Constitutional right against self-incrimination. 599  Contrary to his 
beliefs, the American Supreme Court fined him USD50,000 in addition to an eleven-
year jail term, thereby disabusing his mind and that of his cohorts.600 
In 1996, Tax Act 1913 was amended to allow the government to tax income derived 
from any business whatsoever.601 The US Supreme Court examined the intention of the 
Congress behind this amendment and stated that Congress intended to tax both legal and 
illegal income.602 Thus, there were some cases in which courts held that proceeds of 
crimes fall within the meaning of gross income,603 for the purpose of tax assessment. 
Congress amended BSA 1970 to require the filing of Form 8300 to enhance law 
enforcement’s access to more information about financial transctions involving the 
proceeds of crime. Thus, violation of this requirement attracts stiff sanctions of up to 
                                                
596 Rutkin v United States, 343 US 130 (1952) 
597 The License Tax Cases, 5 Wall 462, 18 L ED 497 (US 1867) 
598 Daniel C Richman and William J Stuntz, ‘AL Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy 
of Pretexual Prosecution’ [2005] 105 Columbia Law Review 583, 584 
599 Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh (n 14) 1 
600 Earl Johnson, ‘Organised Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System’ [1963] 54 Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology and Political Science 1, 18 
601 ch 16, s II B 38 Stat 114, 167 
602 James v United States, 366 US 312, 218 (1961) 
603 United States v Sullivan, 274 US 259 (1927) 
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five years in prison, fine,604 and civil penalties.605 Additionally, US citizen and residents 
are required to declare and pay taxes on their worldwide income.606 Thus, tax evasion 
by persons and businesses may constitute tax crimes.607  
Tax fraud prosecutions continued to be one of the weapons against the leaders of 
organised crime. A survey indicated that sixty per cent of the convictions secured 
against the members of organised crime between 1961 and 1965 were the result of 
investigations conducted by the IRS. 608  This makes IRS one of the important 
enforcement agencies in the US.  
Despite this success, organised crime remains viable because as one leader is convicted 
and imprisoned, another one emerges.609 Moreover, the ever-increasing complexity of 
the internal structure and flow of finances within organised crime made it increasingly 
difficult to prosecute tax fraud successfully.610 Besides, organised crime has resisted the 
attack on its leaders by infiltrating legitimate business to secure their financial base.611  
2.8 SECURITIES LAWS 
Securities Act 1933612 and Securities Exchange Act 1934613 are the two primary pieces 
of legislations that govern the national securities market in the US.614 Securities Act 
1933615 was modelled after a New York’s anti-fraud Statute616 and an English Act617 
                                                
604 18 USC s 3571 (2012); IRC s 6050I; see 2.4.2.1 Currency Transaction Reporting for discussion on 
Form 8300  
605 IRC s 6721(a) 
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608 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (n 597) 
609 Johnson (n 600) 21-23 
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611 Earl Johnson, ‘Organised Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System’ [1962] 53 Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology and Political Science 339, 403-07 
612 15 USC s 77a – 77bbbb 
613 ibid s 78a – 78pp (2012)  
614 Thomas C Newkirk, ‘The Advantages of a Dual System of Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the US 
Securities Laws’ [1999] 3(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 176, 181 
615 15 USC ss 77a-77aa (2012) 
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existing at the time. The Securities Act 1933 requires a full disclosure of information 
about company’s plan, operations, and financial condition before a company can 
register for and start an initial public offer of its securities to the public.  
On the other hand, Securities Exchange Act 1934 created SEC to administer federal 
securities laws to regulate the securities market and its actors, and the trading of 
securities on the stock exchanges, while also requiring every stock listed on the market 
to be registered with the SEC.618 Under the Securities Act 1933 and the Securities and 
Exchange Act 1934, SEC is authorised to take administrative and civil action against 
erring broker/dealers, and also to report criminal violations of laws and rules to criminal 
authorities such as the FBI for prosecutions.619  
While these two  Acts are subject to violation, monies made from such violations are 
typically laundered to obscure their origins. Under BSA 1970, brokers in securities and 
commodities markets are subject to the AML requirements of the BSA 1970620 and that 
of MLCA 1986.621 Brokers are required to file CTR, SAR, and CMIR, and maintain 
records of wire transfer.622 The rule that requires FIs to keep records of transactions 
involving cheque, bank draft, cashier cheque, money order or traveller’s cheque worth 
USD3000 and over,623 also applies to brokers even though most broker/dealers do not 
conduct cash transactions and do not sell the above mentioned monetary instruments.624  
                                                                                                                                          
616 NY General Business Law Article 23-A 
617 Companies Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5 
618 ibid ss 78a-78pp (2012) 
619 ibid ss 77h-1, 77t and 78u – 78u-3, 78ff (2012); please see Newkirk (n 589) 182-85 
620 31 USC s 5312(a)(2)(G)-(H) (2011) 
621 18 USC ss 1956 and 1957 (2012) 
622 31 USC s 5316 (2011); 31 CFR ss 103.22(b)(1)-(c)(1); 103.19 and 103.33(f) 
623 31 CFR 103.29 
624 Cozzolino (n 78) 65-66 
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Pursuant to section 352 of the USA Patriot Act 2001, which amended 31 USC section 
5318(h), broker-dealers are required to establish and maintain AML compliance 
programme, which must include at the minimum (a) development of internal policies, 
procedures, and controls; (b) designation of a compliance officer; (c) provision of on-
going employee training programmes; and (d) performance of independent audits to test 
the programme. 625  Broker/dealers who breached these provisions committed an 
offence.626  
Consequently, SEC is empowered to sanction broker-dealers found in violation of the 
BSA requirements, which include seize and desist orders, debarment, disgorgement 
(given up of profits and interest), and civil money penalties.627 Additionally, OFAC is  
empowered to sanction broker/dealers who trade with the identified enemies of the US 
such as terrorist groups.628  
On the other hand, money launderers exploit the securities industry to launder proceeds 
of crime.629 In United States v Gray,630 to convict Gray for ML, prosecution adduced 
evidence that he purchased stocks and bonds to launder over USD1million of proceeds 
of illicit drugs trade.  
While SEC has adopted various regulations requiring the reporting of securities 
violations to ensure the safety and soundness of securities firms, with regards to the 
                                                
625 The Patriot Act 2001 s 352(b) 
626 31 USC s 5324(d) 
627 Nancy Morris, ‘Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Release Nos. 2679-2681’ [2008] 92 SEC Docket 
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630 47 F.3d 1359 (5th Circuit 1995); other cases that illustrates how stock markets are being exploited by 
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commodities market, Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) 1974 631  did not expressly 
adopt the concept of due diligence.632  
However, the NYSE, NASD NFA through the application of KYC programme, have 
over the years ensure due diligence in the securities industries.633 Although this concept 
developed in the security industry mainly to satisfy customer’s specific needs, such as 
identifying which securities meet a particular client’s need, the concept now has 
application as a tool to combat ML in the industry.634 
Although the Patriot Act and FinCEN Regulations require US securities firms to 
maintain AML compliance programme to prevent launderers and terrorist from gaining 
access to the market,635 the commission-incentive-based nature of the securities market 
could still be exploited to raise fund for terrorist organisations.636  
However, the extension of protection afforded to a whistle-blower and the introduction 
of lucrative monetary incentive for a whistle-blower would help in exposing violations 
of security laws and ML in the sector.637 Thus, the role of whistle-blower in exposing 
shady deals in the securities industry is very relevant in policing the stock market.638 
This incentive acquires additional attractive character with the passage of 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act 2012, 639  which allow another 
                                                
631 Commodity Exchange Act of 1974, 7 USC s 1a 
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whistleblower, whose report comes in the ordinary course of his duties to receive the 
reward though he is not the first to report the violation.640 
2.9 STATE ML LAWS 
This section provides an overview of State ML laws in general and then discusses ML 
Law adopted by the State of New Jersey, being once a safe-haven for organised and 
white-collar criminals.641  
2.9.1 OVERVIEW OF STATES AML LAWS 
So far about 36 States have adopted AML laws to combat ML and organised crime.642 
Arizona is the first state to adopt AML law.643 States laws were to some extent designed 
after the following four models:644   
(a) the Federal Statute (18 USC sections 1956 and 1957) adopted particularly by New 
York; 
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 (b) the President’s Commission on Model State Drugs Law (1993), including ML, 
money transmitting, asset forfeiture, and related provisions;  
(c) the Money Transmitter Regulators Association, State regulator group and publisher 
of a model statute; and  
(d) the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws, model statute. 
These laws vary from state to state, with predicate offences ranging from SUAs, such as 
racketeering or fraudulent activities, corruption and crime for profit, to any felony. 
Transaction involving a statutorily defined unlawful activity is the basis of culpability 
across States.645 Like the provision of MLCA 1986, most states AML laws require the 
prosecution to prove the following elements: Transactions involving criminal proceeds; 
intent to conceal the source of the property involved; and knowledge.646 While some 
States’ laws require the transaction to have taken place in a bank, other State laws 
require any transaction. Similarly, while some States criminalise movement of proceeds 
without an intervening transaction, others do not. 
However, while there may be a clash of jurisdiction between state and federal 
government in prosecuting ML offences, the federal government has jurisdiction once 
the financial transaction affects interstates commerce,647 no matter how minimal.648 
Thus, inability to link transactions to interstate commerce may spell doom to the federal 
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ML prosecution. 649  Following the enactment of the USA Patriot Act, some States 
adopted a new AML legislation or amended the existing one to regulate the money 
transmitter industry to prohibit TF.650 
2.9.2 NEW JERSEY’S AML LAW 
New Jersey is one of the states that have enacted AML law to prosecute criminals and 
forfeit proceeds of crime. New Jersey’s AML statute is codified at Title 2C, Chapter 21, 
sections 23 through 28 of the New Jersey Criminal Code.651 Like the federal AML 
statute,652 the New Jersey Criminal Code broadened the traditional meaning of ML to 
include a range of other activities.653 A charge of ML can be brought under any of the 
following three prongs: (a) transportation/possession prong [2C: 21-25(a)]; (b) 
transactional prongs [2C: 21-25(b) and 2C: 21-25(e)]; and (c) director/organiser prong 
[2C: 21-25(c)].654 
Like the federal law, a conviction for ML under New Jersey’s law attracts significant 
criminal and civil sanctions.655 While the crime attracts fine and forfeiture, if convicted, 
a defendant faces a mandatory consecutive prison sentence for both the ML and the 
predicate offence.656  
The Superior Court Appellate Division of New Jersey had the opportunity to examine 
the ML statute in State v Harris.657 In 2001, Ms Harris along with others were charged 
with mortgage fraud; ML; conspiracy; theft by deception; and misapplication of 
entrusted funds. She was convicted on all counts and was sentenced to an 18 year jail 
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term. On appeal, the Court rejected the defence argument that a defendant can only be 
convicted of ML if the transaction was conducted to conceal or hide the nature of the 
illicit money. The defence that specific crime must underlie the ML offence was also 
rejected, asserting that ML and the underlying offence must not be independent of each 
other.658 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
As we have seen, agencies of the US government have been struggling to be ahead of 
criminals in thier effort to combat ML, TF and other organised crime. To combat ML 
and other crimes, US enacted AML law on an incremental basis. The modern-day fight 
against ML started with Bank Secrecy Act 1970 which require banks to report and keep 
records of financial transactions. Before BSA 1970, authorities in the US have tried 
other legal measures such as Tax Act 1913 to combat organised crime. As launderers 
continue to circumvent the law, government continue to expand the reach of AML law. 
MLCA 1986, the Patriot Act, to name a few were enacted at different times to close one 
loophole or another. Meanwhile, Courts were also kept busy with prosecutions, 
forfeiture proceedings and appeals. While law enforcement won in some cases, they fail 
in some.  
The conclusion is that not all is rosy. The analysis in this chapter reveals the strength 
and the weakness in the US AML and other relevant laws. BSA 1970 requires FIs, 
including non-banks FIs to record and report their customer’s financial transactions 
above a certain threshold. It also requires the filing of SAR on suspicious transactions. 
These requirements were enacted to create an audit trail and help detect ML at the 
placement stage. However, the volume of CTR renders those reports ineffective. One 
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thing that compounds this problem is that, a large percentage of these reports involve 
innocent transactions that hide the criminal transactions - making it difficult for law 
enforcement to distill any meaningful information. 
Tax fraud charges, which were successfully used against the leadership of organised 
crime in the early 1900s, became less effective due to the dynamic nature of crime and 
criminals. Similarly, the RICO Act which was passed to prevent infiltration of 
legitimate businesses by organised criminal families failed to serve that purpose well 
because of the complexity and other factors associated with RICO investigations and 
prosecutions. 
The passage of MLCA 1986 criminalised ML, and unlike the BSA, it extends 
culpability to those who handles people’s wealth. However, to secure conviction the 
prosecution needs to surmount the hurdle of proving four elements of the crime. A 
charge of ML can fail if the prosecution fails to prove that the transaction affects 
interstate commerce.  
Forfeiture law remains a vital tool in disrupting ML because it takes away not only the 
proceeds of crime but also any assets associated with it. Preventing criminals from 
enjoying their illicit gains removes the incentive for engaging in crime. Without money, 
criminals would not be able to fund their operations and in the long run, the illegal 
activity may either reduce drastically or stop altogether. In contrast, imprisonment alone 
does not harm criminals as much as forfeiture does because criminals consider keeping 
their assets more important, as they can still control business while in prison. 
Before putting the final full stop on this chapter, it is pertinent to note the likely 
consequence of President Donald Trump coming to power, on the global war against 
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financial crime. For example, the stance of the US President on Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act is not encouraging.659 As Trump is known to be a man of his word,660 it is 
not clear whether the US will continue to take its leading role or even cooperate with the 
rest of the world in fighting the global menace of financial crime.  
Although the US law enforcement agencies are independent, war on financial crime 
requires political will. While the agencies can operate without direct interference, 
budget cuts can affect their effective functioning. Having appraised the law and practice 
relating to ML in the USA, the focus in this thesis now shifts to the UK. The next 
chapter appraises the law relating to ML in the UK.   
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CHAPTER 3: LAW RELATING TO MONEY 
LAUNDERING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM  
There are clear advantages in pursuing the facilitators of 
transactions who are often relatively well funded, more 
susceptible in practical terms to the jurisdiction of the court, and 
often because they are regulated or at least subject to some kind 
of professional supervision, bound to keep and maintain records. 
In other words, they are easy targets who are almost certainly 
not going to adopt the tactics of a ‘real’ fraudster. 
     Professor Barry A.K. Rider.661  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The above quotation explains the essence of placing AML obligations on 
intermediaries. ML can only occur with the deliberate or inadvertent involvement of the 
financial intermediaries and professional advisers.662 Of course, there would not be so 
many thieves if there were no receivers.663 The law relating to ML in the UK developed 
incrementally, starting from DTOA 1986 to POCA 2002, and now CFA 2017. 
Similarly, regulating ML through MLRs developed incrementally, beginning from the 
1991 Regulations to the current one, MLR 2007. By June 2017 another MLR is 
expected to come into effect. 
DTOA 1986 was enacted as a response to the outcome of Operation Julie Case, which 
had shown the ineffectiveness of the UK confiscation regime. DTOA 1986 was then 
passed to criminalise the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking and to allow for 
the confiscation of proceeds associated with drug trafficking. CJA 1988 was later 
enacted to extend the confiscation law to the proceeds of all crimes. Both the DTOA 
1986 and the CJA 1988 were amended by the CJA 1993.  
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While the CJA 1993 amended CJA 1988 to create all crime ML, a dichotomy was 
created between drug-ML and all crime ML. This dichotomy posed challenges for the 
prosecution, as they were required to prove which criminal conduct generated the 
proceeds. While the CJA 1988 continue to exist after the amendment, Drug Trafficking 
Act (DTA) 1994 replaced the DTOA 1986.  
The ML provisions of DTA 1994 and the CJA 1993 were later revoked and replaced by 
POCA 2002, thereby removing the dichotomy. POCA 2002 was severally amended to 
bring the ML provisions up to date. CFA 2017 has made a substantial amendment to 
POCA 2002, introducing UWO for the first time in the UK. The Act also give 
additional powers to law enforcement to combat ML and the proceeds of crime. The 
introduction of the UWO in the UK is novel as it will help law enforcement deal with 
the resurfacing of illicit funds – ranging from proceeds of corruption to drugs, and to the 
proceeds of all sort of crimes.664  
Since the enactment of the DTOA 1986 a body of case law developed which helped in 
clarifying the ambiguity in the law. In addition to the main AML primary and secondary 
legislation, the Theft Act 1968 and tax laws were used and can still be used to disrupt 
ML. In fact, Theft Act 1968 (section 22) was used succesfully to prosecute ML case, 
when there was no statutory AML provision. 
The EU initiatives in combating ML and organised crime in general have had a 
significant impact on the UK AML landscape. However, the UK is well ahead of the 
EU in the fight against ML and other organised crime. Thus, the UK hardly amends its 
laws in a significant way to give effect to the EU Directives. The current legislations 
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might undergo minor amendments when the fourth Directive (2015/849) is finally 
transposed into the UK law on 26th June 2017. FATF has subjected UK, just like other 
countries, to its periodic evaluation to determine the UK’s level of compliance with its 
recommendations. The next round of FATF evaluation of UK is scheduled for 2018. 
This chapter focuses mainly on the following. First, the current AML law contained in 
the POCA 2002, which consolidated the CJA 1993 and the DTA 1994. The substantive 
AML law contained in sections 327, 328, and 329 of POCA 2002 Act applies to any 
person, regardless of whether they work within a regulated sector.665 Secondly, the 
secondary legislation - MLR 2007. Thirdly, the alternative means of combating ML - 
handling offences and tax laws. The analysis in this chapter centres on the law 
applicable to England and Wales. This is because the applicable law in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland are to some extent similar to the law in England and Wales. Moreover, 
some laws have geographical spread across England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
This chapter consists of eight sections. Section 2 highlights the key development in this 
area of law, as well as the interplay between the EU Directives on ML and TF. While 
section 3 analyses the primary AML legislation, section 4 discusses the AML subsidiary 
legislation. Section 5 discusses the means of recovering the proceeds of crime under 
POCA 2002, and section 6 critically analyses the alternative means of tackling ML. 
Section 7 explores the impact FATF recommendations, and mutual evaluations have 
had on the UK AML landscape. Finally, section 8 concludes this chapter. 
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3.2. THE KEY DEVELOPMENTS  
AML law in the UK developed incrementally creating laundering offences and 
empowering courts to deprive criminals of their ill-gotten gains. 666  Before the 
codification of ML offences into the statute book in the UK, an incidence of ML, as 
illustrated by the Brinks Mat case, could only be prosecuted with the aid of the offence 
of ‘handling’, under section 22 of the Theft Act 1986.667 This section highlights the 
developments of AML law in the UK. The objective is to provide a list of the AML 
legislations, both repealed and current, to show in brief how and when the modern war 
against ML in the UK started and where we are now. 
Before the Brinks Mat, an attempt by the government to confiscate criminal proceeds in 
the hands of ‘Operation Julie’ case defendants exposed the inadequacy of the existing 
laws – section 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and section 43 of the Powers of 
Criminal Courts Act 1973 – in dealing with drug trafficking.668 In response to this 
problem, the government established the Hodgson Committee to look into the issue.669 
Following the committee’s recommendations, DTOA 1986 was enacted criminalising 
ML, and allowing the government to confiscate proceeds of drug trafficking.670 CJA 
1988 later extended the confiscation power to cover the proceeds of other crimes. 
The DTA 1994 repealed and replaced almost every provision of DTOA 1986.671 But 
before that, DTOA 1986 was amended by CJA 1988 and the Criminal Justice 
(International Co-oporation) Act 1990. The UK further enacted CJA 1993, which 
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amended its earlier version, the CJA 1988. POCA 2002 now harmonised and replaced 
ML provisions of the DTA 1994 and CJA 1988, which ends the previous problem of 
having to deal with the statutory dichotomy.672  
The subsidiary legislations pass through similar developments as series of MLRs were 
enacted to complement the primary AML legislations. The MLRs includes MLRs 1993, 
2001 (SI 2001/3641), 2003 (SI 2003/3075), and 2007 (SI 2007/2157). The MLR 2007 
was sequel to the 2005 Directive, which implemented the recommendations issued by 
FATF to include FT within the ambit of ML provisions.673 Meanwhile, MLR 2017 is 
expected on 26th June 2017. 
Since its enactment, POCA has been amended by SOCA 2005, SOCPA 2005, SCA 
2007, PCA 2009, CCA 2013, and SCA 2015.674 Section 45 of SCA 2015 introduced for 
the first time in the UK the offence of joining organised crime group. This is a novel 
approach in the fight against organised criminal groups who commit crimes such as 
ML, drug trafficking, and human trafficking to say the least.675 The aim is to allow law 
enforcement to prosecute the leadership of the organised crime groups as well as the 
professionals, haulage companies, and corrupt officials who facilitate organised 
crime.676  These are people who are difficult to prosecute using conspiracy or joint 
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enterprises statute because it is hard to find agreement to commit, or participation in, for 
example drug trafficking.677  
As stated earlier, the law in this area developed incrementally culminating into POCA 
2002, thereby consolidating and harmonising previous legislation into a single statute. 
This, made the law simpler and more effective in providing for a generic offence of 
ML. 678  CFA 2017 has amended POCA 2002 substantially. Thus, the important 
provisions of CFA 2017 enacted to augument the fight against financial crime merit 
attention here to highlight the major changes CFA 2017 made to POCA 2002. 
3.2.1 CRIMINAL FINANCES ACT 2017 
CFA 2017 is the most important piece of legislation on AML and unexplained wealth 
that the UK has ever had. The Act, which received Royal Assent on 27th April 2017 
which brings some of its provisions partially into effect, seeks to strengthen the law on 
recovering the proceeds of crime, tackle ML, tax evasion, corruption, and counter TF. 
Thus, the synopsis of the four parts of the Act needs to be provided here. 
Among other range of powers, Part 1 of the Act introduces for the first time in the UK 
the concept of UWO.679 UWO is an investigatory power given to law enforcement to 
compel a person suspected of criminal activity to explain the provenance of the wealth 
he seems to have acquired overnight and which is disproportionate to his known 
income. Failure to respond to the order triggers the presumption that the property 
represents the proceeds of crime.  
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Under POCA 2002, law enforcement are unable to confiscate the proceeds of crime due 
to difficulty in obtaining evidence, especially where the evidence is located abroad. 
CFA 2017 (section 1) inserts into POCA 2002 section 362A-362I to aid the recovery 
process under POCA 2002. The Minister stated that:  
Unexplained wealth orders will flush out evidence to enable 
enforcement agencies to take forward recovery action under 
POCA. Such an order will require a person to provide 
information that shows that they obtained identified property 
legitimately. If they do so, agencies can then decide whether to 
investigate further, take civil recovery action or take no further 
action. If the person does not comply with the order, the 
property identified in the order is presumed to be recoverable 
under any subsequent civil recovery proceedings. 680 
Section 1 is aimed at tackling foreign kleptocrats and corruption inside the UK.681  
Although this thesis does not discuss corruption in greater detail due lack of space, it is 
worthy of mention that corruption is a real issue in UK for several reasons. First, it is 
the failure to have anti-corruption law that led the FATF and the OECD to be critical on 
the UK’s commitment to prevent corruption.682 Secondly, corruption is a stumbling 
block in enforcing AML law because evidence tends to suggest that organised crime 
groups do corrupt and penetrate institutions.683 Thus, there is a symbiotic relationship 
between corruption and ML.684  
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Following the BAE-Al Yamamah defence contract scandal and the resultant 
international pressure, especially from outside the UK, government presented a bill 
which culminated into the enactment of the Bribery Act 2010. Section 7 created an 
offence of corporate failure to prevent corruption. Under section 7(1), a relevant 
commercial organisation is guilty of an offence if a person associated with it bribes 
another person intending to obtain or retain business for the commercial organisation, or 
to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for commercial organisation. 
Thus, to avoid criminal liability a company must establish and maintain adequate 
measures to prevent its officers and agents from breaching section 7(1). The SFO 
secured a conviction against a UK company, Sweett Group Plc, for failure to prevent 
corruption offence in 2016.685  
This statute is aimed at preventing corruption. However, what happened to the proceeds 
obtained in breach of section 7, or stolen assets associated with foreign PEP, or the 
proceeds of drug trafficking? Since corruption and other crimes cannot be eradicated 
completely, another mechanism is needed to attack the criminal proceeds whenever they 
resurfaced. Although, Sweett was ordered to pay £2.35 million, this amount is not the 
actual bribe paid. The bribe money remained in the hands of the persons to whom it was 
paid.  
If the person to whom the bribe was paid, laundered the money into the UK, for 
example, by buying a property and there is no sufficient evidence to link the person to 
the bribe money, the law enforcement may find it difficult to recover that money. A 
research conducted by TI identified a total of £4.2 billion properties in London that have 
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been bought by individuals with suspected wealth.686 UWO provides a mechanism to 
investigate the source of assets suspected of being the proceed of crime, especially 
because illicit proceeds are normally laundered before finally resurfacing as clean 
assets. 
Although corruption is also a big issue in the US, discussion on corruption in the States 
is excluded to remain within this thesis’ word limit. However, it worthy to mention that 
following the Watergate scandal 1977, US enacted FCPA 1977 to prohibit corporate 
entities from bribing foreign officials.687  Since then, many multinational companies 
have robust FCPA compliance programs, and lawyers who specialize in international 
white-collar crime are already intimately familiar with the FCPA structures.688  
Chapter 3 of the CFA strengthens the POCA civil recovery regime giving new powers 
to the law enforcement to tackle ML, TF and organised crime through asset forfeiture. 
First, gaming vouchers, fixed-value casino tokens, and betting receipts are now included 
in the list of items that are regarded as cash.689 Secondly, law enforcement is now 
empowered to forfeit certain personal (or moveable) properties,690 and money held in 
bank and building society accounts worth £1,000 and above – there is no upper limit.691  
Most importantly, the law ushered in administrative forfeiture into the UK AML 
regime, but applies only to money in the account of a bank or building society.692 
However, despite the decision of the court in R (Bunnvale Limited and others) v. 
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Central Criminal Court [2017] EWHC 747 (Admin), that possession of a substantial 
quantity of cash inherently gives rise to suspicion, making the processes of forfeiting 
such cash easier and less rigorous, potential difficulties remain especially regarding the 
forfeiture of money held in a bank account.693  
The CFA 2017 also changes the way SAR is handled. CFA 2017 s 10 amended Part 7 of 
POCA 2002 to allow for the 31 day moratorium period to be extended successively up 
to six times (186 days in total) beginning from the day after the end of the initial 31 
days. During the moratorium period, the reporting person is prohibited from dealing 
with the asset. Thus, the asset is effectively frozen albeit temporarily. The essence is to 
allow investigators more time to collect evidence for further action such as applying to 
court for a restraining order. Before this amendment, the moratorium period cannot be 
extended beyond 31 days, which is not enough time for the law enforcement to conduct 
proper investigation especially where evidence is located abroad.  
However, for the moratorium period to be extended an application must be made to the 
relevant court before the end of an existing moratorium period, and the court may only 
grant an extension where it is satisfied that: an investigation is being conducted 
diligently and expeditiously; further time is required; and the extension is reasonable.694  
It is interesting to note that, following complaint from the banks the government 
promised to reform consent regime to allow the regulated person to carry on with a 
suspicious transaction after filing SAR if discontinuing the transaction will alert the 
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client of an impending investigation.695  Instead, the law extends the period by six 
months.  
During the debate, the minister for security, Mr Ben Wallace, explained that 31 days is 
not enough to conduct ML investigation properly, to the end, especially where evidence 
is located abroad or where the case involves grand foreign corruption or other serious 
crime.696 The minister also explains that extending the moratorium period will protect 
the proceeds of crime from being dissipated when there is a suspicion that ML activity 
has taken place and when the law enforcement agency has not had the opportunity to 
complete its inquiries.697 This is a positive development. However, it remains to be seen 
how the requirement for the extension of the order will be met. 
Another important feature in CFA 2017 is the new provision allowing voluntary sharing 
of information between bodies in the regulated sector and between those bodies and the 
police or the NCA, in connection with suspicions of ML.698  Also, TACT 2000 is 
amended in a similar way for countering terrorism and TF.699 Part 2 of CFA 2017 brings 
the fight against TF in line with the fight against ML, reflecting existing provisions 
relating to financial crime. 700  It does so by making the tools available for TF 
investigations and the powers available to seize terrorist cash and property as 
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comprehensive as those available for dealing with other financial crime or, in some 
cases, more robust.701 
The CFA 2017 also expands the investigative power of the law enforcement such as the 
SFO in relation to ML. S 7 extends the disclosure order in confiscation proceedings 
involving cases, such as ML and fraud. Disclosure orders empower law enforcement to 
require anyone that they believe has relevant information to an investigation, to answer 
questions, provide information or to produce documents.702  
CFA 2017 part 3 creates offences of corporate failure to prevent the criminal facilitation 
of tax evasion.703 A corporate body will be vicariously liable for failure to prevent the 
criminal facilitation of the UK and foreign tax evasion, where the corporate body has 
not put in place necessary measures to prevent its employees or agents from facilitating 
tax evasion.704 However, these offences are not offences of corporate failure to prevent 
itself from evading tax, and do not create a legal obligation for corporations to prevent 
their client’s tax evasion.705 Having reasonable prevention procedures in place serve as 
a defense to a charge of failure to facilitate.706  
This offence mirrors section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010, which criminalised failure of 
corporate bodies to prevent corruption. Like section 7 BA 2010, it appears that 
Parliament intended section 45 to have extraterritorial effect, to allow law enforcement 
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to go after those who encourage people to evade UK tax wherever they are domiciled in 
the world.707  
However, the new tax offences has gone one step further. Unlike section 7 offence, 
sections 45 and 46 offences are not premised on the associated person himself evading 
tax.708 However, this could lead to due process deficit because in its present form, the 
tax model appears to permit a court finding that an individual has committed a tax 
evasion facilitation offence, even if he has never had the opportunity to defend himself 
against the accusation of criminal conduct.709 While this could help in fighting tax 
evasion, it remains to be seen whether the HMRC will optimally utilise the new powers, 
as powers previously given were under-utilised.710  
The Act, however, fell short of creating the offence of corporate failure to prevent ML. 
The designers of the CFA 2017 are very ambitious as the Act expands the powers of the 
law enforcement in relation to combating financial crimes and TF. Whether the Act will 
in practice operate optimally to achieve the purpose it was designed for remains to be 
seen.711 Discussing CFA 2017 in it its entirety would exceed this thesis’ word limit. 
However, analysis in this thesis will take into account the changes the CFA 2017 made 
to the AML landscape. 
Now, this thesis shifts to the assessment of the impact the EU AML law on the UK 
AML landscape. Also, the next section will seek to examine the future of the AML 
regime after the completion of the Brexit negotiations.  
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3.2.2 INTERPLAY BETWEEN UK AML LAW AND THE EU DIRECTIVES 
Although the UK has been giving effect to the EU law, as it is obliged to do, in terms of 
combating ML and other financial crimes the UK has always been ahead of the 
European initiatives.712 As the UK has been leading the debate on financial crime both 
at the EU and global stage, rarely does the UK change its laws to accommodate 
European Directives on ML.  
For example, UK enacted DTOA 1986 and CJA 1988, years before the 1991 Council 
Directive 91/308/EEC on Prevention of the use of the Financial System for the purpose 
of ML.713 As it is obliged to comply with the EU Directives, the UK simply fulfiled its 
obligation under Article 9 of the Directive, by enacting the DTA 1994 and CJA 1993, 
which amended its earlier version, CJA 1988.714 The remaining obligations under 1991 
Directive were implemented through the MLR 1993 (SI 1993/1933). This marked the 
first interplay between the EU law and the UK domestic law with regards to ML. 
MLR 1993 required those carrying on relevant businesses to among other things ensure 
customer identity checks, recordkeeping, maintaining a procedure for filing SAR, 
training of employees to enable them to understand the law and to recognise 
transactions involving the proceeds of crime. 715  The Regulations also require the 
establishment of internal reporting procedure to prevent their businesses from abuse.716 
Failure to comply with the requirements of the 1993 Regulations attracts severe 
sanction,717 even if ML has not taken place. 
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As criminals seek an alternative means to conceal their illicit profits, the European 
Parliament and the Council issued Directive 2001/97/EC amending Council Directive 
91/308/EEC. The UK gave effect to the second Directive through the POCA 2002 and 
MLR 2001 (SI 2001/3641). 718  The 2001 Regulations tightened-up the 1993 
Regulations.719  The 2001 Regulations were issued to bring bureaux de change and 
MSBs within the scope of the AML regime.720 This shift was necessitated by the 9/11 
attacks.721 The 1993 and 2001 Regulations were revoked and replaced by the MLR 
2003 (SI 2003/3075). The MLR 2003 introduced greater duties and responsibilities to 
businesses, such as requirements that MLRO be appointed from within the organisation, 
and proper recordkeeping.722 
 The 2003 Regulations imposed additional AML administrative requirements on 
regulated persons to assist in the detection, prosecution, and prevention of financial 
crime.723  Besides, the Regulation required Bureaux de change, MSBs, and dealers in 
high-value goods, and professionals, such as lawyers, auditors and accountants who 
were not explicitly captured within the confines of the 1993 and 2001 to comply with 
the UK AML regime.724 The MLR 2003 has since been repealed and replaced by the 
MLR 2007.725 
The Third Directive, Directive 2005/60/EE of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
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laundering and terrorist financing was transposed into the UK law through the POCA 
2002, the TACT 2000 and the MLR 2007 (SI 2007/2157). 726  The MLR 2007 
implemented the main preventative measure of the 2005 Directive by instituting CDD, 
requiring firms to identify the beneficial owners of customers that are legal entities or 
trust, allowing firms to rely on other firms in meeting their CDD obligations, and 
ensuring supervised compliance with the Regulations.727 
On 20th May 2015 the Fourth Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council was issued, repealing the third Directive 2005/60/EC effective 26th June 
2015.728 EU Member States have till 26th June 2017 to transpose the provisions of the 
Fourth Directive into their national laws.729 One of the changes the Fourth Directive 
made is that, it reduces the threshold amount from Euro15,000 to 10,000.730 Changes to 
the UK ML law are envisaged when the 2015 Directive is finally given effect on the 
26th June 2017. Some of the changes to be expected are in the areas of CDD, application 
of CDD on local PEPs, and transparency on beneficial ownership. 
As the UK has voted to leave the EU, the question is, what is the future of fighting ML 
in the UK when the UK finally pulls out of the EU on completion of the Brexit 
negotiations. Going by the leading role the UK has been playing in the fight against ML 
in particular, and organised crime in general, it is easier to say with near certainty that 
UK will remain committed to fighting financial crime.731 As mentioned above, the UK 
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has been ahead of the EU in this regard, and that UK has been giving effect to the EU 
AML Directives as a mere formality because Member States are obliged to do so. 
Meanwhile, the EU AML Directives already domesticated into the UK law will not be 
affected by Brexit – the law remains.732 
With its membership of intergovernmental bodies, such as the OECD, UN and FATF, 
UK will not take a back seat in the fight against ML and organised crime. It is worthy to 
mention that some of the EU AML laws and policies reflect the policies already rolled 
out by these organisations.  
So far, the UK has demonstrated commitment and political will towards having a global 
coalition against financial crime. Last year the UK hosted a global summit against 
corruption, which is the first of its kind, bringing together world leaders, business and 
civil society to agree to a package of practical steps to expose corruption, punish the 
perpetrators, support those affected by corruption, and drive out the culture of 
corruption wherever it exists. 733  As mentioned above, there is a nexus between 
corruption and organised crime. Thus, any fight against corruption is a fight against 
organised crime, including ML.  
At home, there is a clear sign that fight against financial crime continues. In its 
manifestos, the conservative party reassured the nation of its commitment to fighting 
financial crime. It says:  
We will strengthen Britain’s response to white collar crime by 
incorporating the Serious Fraud Office into the National Crime 
Agency, improving intelligence sharing and bolstering the 
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investigation of serious fraud, money laundering and financial 
crime. 734   
With Theresa May elected as the Prime Minister, there is a clear signal that the UK will 
not relent in its effort to fight financial crime. However, whether enough resources 
would be deployed to fight financial crime remains to be seen. Also, whether those 
commitments would make the AML effective remain to be seen.  
Having discussed the starting point of the modern-day war against ML and the current 
position of the law as well as the recent changes made to the POCA 2002, the thesis 
focuses on the substantive AML law. 
3.3 THE PRIMARY AML LEGISLATION 
While the AML law in the United Kingdom developed incrementally, the POCA 2002 
marked a significant overhaul of the whole regime by introducing several important 
changes to the old regime.735 POCA replaced all earlier ML legislations (except the 
terrorism legislation) and extended the scope of ML provisions from drug trafficking, 
terrorism and serious crimes, to all crimes committed on or after the date POCA came 
into force.736 
However, all offences committed prior to the coming into force of POCA will still be 
handled in accordance with the previous legislations that POCA replaced.737 POCA has 
been described as an extensive piece of legislation that primarily suppressed the use of 
the commercial and banking system for ML.738 Among other things, POCA abolished 
the dichotomy between the “drug” and “all crime” ML created by DTOA 1986 and CJA 
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1988 respectively. 739  It also created mandatory universal reporting marking the 
departure from the reporting regime restricted only to cases of drug-related ML.740 
This section examines the offences created by POCA Part 7, which has geographical 
extent covering England and Wales. First, this section briefly highlights the most 
relevant amendments to the ML law under POCA 2002. It then discusses the primary 
offences under sections 327-329 and then followed by the disclosure offences under 
sections 330-332. It then discusses tipping off offences, MLR 2007, and finally, the 
extraterritorial effect of POCA 2002. 
3.3.1 PRIMARY OFFENCES 
POCA 2002 created three main laundering offences. Therefore, this sub-section focuses 
on these offences and the conspiracy to commit them. The basis upon which these 
offences are created is the concepts of “criminal property” and “criminal conduct”.741 
This sub-section focuses more on the current law under POCA 2002. Therefore, the 
equivalent offences under the CJA 1988 and the DTA 1994 will not be discussed in 
detail. Before analysing the primary ML offences, some concepts common to all the 
offences will be discussed first. 
3.3.1.1 THE COMMON CONCEPTS 
Some concepts such as property and criminal conduct are common to all the three main 
ML offences. The penalties for the offences are also the same. Having an idea about 
these concepts from the onset is key to the understanding of the AML offences. Also, 
discussing the concepts and the penalties from the very beginning means unnecessary 
repetition is avoided, and space is saved.  
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3.3.1.1.1	PROPERTY		
Is defined as all property wherever situated. This includes: money; all forms of 
property, real or personal, heritable or moveable; things in action and other intangible or 
incorporeal property.742  And person obtains property if he obtains an interest in it, 
including equitable interest or power in relation to land or properties other than land.743 
3.3.1.1.2	CRIMINAL	PROPERTY	
The property is criminal if it constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal conduct or if it 
represents such a benefit (in whole or in part and whether directly or indirectly), and the 
alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit.744 By 
this definition, the mens rea required to establish an offence for the purpose of section 
327, 328 and 329 offences is knowledge or suspicion. Thus, to secure a conviction for 
ML prosecution must prove that a person deals with criminal property knowing or 
suspecting it was derived from crime.745  
In R v Gabriel,746  the Court of Appeal held that failure to declare income from a 
legitimate trade while under state benefit does not taint the profit, and that profit could 
not be said to constitute criminal benefit within the meaning of POCA section 340. 
Where prosecution alleges that property is a criminal property, particulars should be 
given in advance to set out facts upon which the Crown relies and the inference that jury 
will be invited.747 Obtaining pecuniary advantage by cheating the public revenue will 
amount to ‘criminal property’ within the meaning of section 340(5).748 For the purpose 
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of section 327, the property needs to be criminal property at the time of the transaction 
not as a result of the transaction.749  
3.3.1.1.3	CRIMINAL	CONDUCT	
 Section 340(2) POCA 2002 defines criminal conduct as a conduct that constitutes an 
offence in any part of the UK or would constitute an offence in any part of the UK if it 
occurred there.750 This definition of criminal conduct is similar to that in section 76 
POCA 2002.751 The problem that prosecution must prove the commission of a predicate 
offence in an ML prosecution, which originated from the dichotomy created by the 
DTA 1994 and CJA 1988,752 continues post-POCA 2002, though the provisions of the 
two pieces of legislations have been harmonised.753  
Because of this dichotomy, the prosecution has found it difficult in securing convictions 
against professionals who handle other people’s wealth because the prosecution must 
link the proceeds of crime to a particular class of criminal conduct.754 However, the 
decisions of the courts in R v Anwoir755 and R v F756 remedied this defect in the then 
AML law. It is out of this difficulty that the law in this area developed.757 The Court of 
Appeal in R v F has certified a point of law of general public importance in the 
following terms: 
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Whether in a prosecution under sections 327 or 328 of POCA 
2002, section 340 requires the prosecution to prove at least the 
class or type of criminal conduct that it is alleged to have 
generated the crime.758 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Anwoir and F changed the law. In Anwoir 
Latham LJ reviewed R v W (N) in some detail and concluded that that decision does not 
mean that in every case the Crown must show specific kind of predicate offence from 
which the property was derived.759 In F the Crown could not point to a particular 
predicate offence as being the source of the money.760 At the close of the prosecution 
case, the court of first instance acceded to the defence submission of no case to answer, 
because at that time the decision in Craig, as it relates to the point before F was obiter, 
and Anwoir was not yet decided. The Crown appealed, and on 17th July 2008, Latham 
LJ following his own decision in Anwoir allowed the appeal and directed a retrial.761 
3.3.1.1.4	PENALTIES	FOR	OFFENCES	UNDER	SECTIONS	327-329	
Penalties applicable to offences committed under sections 327, 328 and 329 are the 
same, and they are contained in section 334. A person guilty of an offence under these 
sections is liable on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six 
months or a fine not exceeding the statutory minimum or to both. On conviction on 
indictment, to imprisonment, for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine or both.762 
3.3.1.1.5	PROFESSIONALS:	LIABILITY	UNDER	PRIMARY	OFFENCES	
Like banks and other FIs, handlers of other people’s wealth, such as accountants, tax 
consultants and lawyers could be liable for failure to comply with the provisions of 
section 327, 328 and 329. Thus, handlers of other people’s wealth need to have a sound 
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working knowledge and understanding of the law and their respective professional 
guidelines.763  
In contrast, the situation as it relates to lawyers in the US is different.764 MLR 2007 
requires professionals who handle client’s account to comply with the AML law by 
adopting appropriate compliance procedures and training of their staff.765 The need for 
professionals to comply with the provisions of Part 7 of POCA 2002 was emphasised in 
P v P [2005] EWCA Civ 226 and in Bowman v Fels [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 19. In the 
light of section 329, in addition to being liable for not disclosing their knowledge or 
suspicion, professionals’ fees could be classified as tainted if paid from clients’ tainted 
money.766 
Having discussed the common concepts, this thesis turns on the primary offences. We 
begin with section 327 offences - concealing criminal property. 
3.3.1.2 CONCEALING CRIMINAL PROPERTY (S. 327) 
POCA section 327 replaced CJA 1993 (section 93C) and DTA 1994 (section 49). Under 
section 327, a person commits an offence if he conceals, disguises, converts, transfers, 
or removes criminal property from England and Wales or Scotland or Northern 
Ireland.767 The scope of section 327 is very broad, as offences can be committed in five 
different ways. The definition of “concealing or disguising criminal property” makes it, 
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even more broader, as it applies to those involved in criminal activity as well as to those 
who merely receive criminal property.768  
Merely moving criminal property from one jurisdiction to another within the UK, 
irrespective of who committed the predicate crime, can violate section 327(3). 769 
Because of its wide scope, section 327 will catch not only those who engage in ML 
(typically concealing and disguising criminal property) but also financial 
intermediaries.770 However, section 327(2)(c) exempts law enforcement from liability 
where they facilitate handling of a criminal property in a manner that will contravene 
section 327, either pending an investigation or in a sting operation as part of a further 
investigation. 
Despite the wider scope of section 327, to secure a conviction the prosecution must 
establish that the property in question is a criminal property derived from a criminal 
conduct and the defendant knew or suspected it to be so.771 Thus, securing a conviction 
against a defendant depends on whether he had knowledge or suspicion that the 
property presented was a criminal property.772  
Unlike section 93C, which require the prosecution to prove an objective element of 
“reasonable grounds for knowledge or suspicion” and a purposive element of “avoiding 
prosecutions or enforcement of confiscation orders”, section 327 offence is committed 
entirely through the actual concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing 
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property from the United Kingdom.773 However, the mens rea element to be proved is 
that the defendant knew or suspected that the property is criminal.774 
One major development is the provision of statutory defences, which were not available 
under CJA 1988 section 93C. It is now a defence to show that: (i) a person made 
authorised disclosure;775 (ii) a person intended to make disclosure but has a reasonable 
excuse for failing to do so;776 (iii) appropriate consent has been obtained;777 and (iii) 
where the act is done in fulfilment of a function he has relating to any negative 
provision concerning criminal conduct or benefit from it. 778  However, the second 
defence remained the subject of criticism.779 It has been described as a good defence if 
the defendant can prove the “excuse” for not reporting his knowledge or suspicion is a 
“reasonable” one,780 because hardly will a court accept that defence, considering the 
importance placed upon such disclosures.781 
Other defences available to the defendant include “below the threshold defence” and the 
“overseas defence”. Once the “overseas defence” is raised, it is for the prosecution to 
show that this defence does not apply.782 The court has ruled in R. v O’Mahony783 that 
this defence will not be available to a person who mistakenly believes that his acts were 
committed in a foreign jurisdiction where the act is legal, but where in actual fact the act 
was done in the United Kingdom. 
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The intention behind section 327 of POCA 2002 is to simplify and replace section 49 of 
the DTA 1994 and section 93C of the CJA 1988.784 POCA no longer distinguishes 
between the proceeds of drug trafficking and the proceeds of other crimes.785 Under 
DTA 1994, section 49 criminalised laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking.  
The offence can be committed by the drug trafficker himself or another person acting 
for and on behalf of the trafficker knowing or having reasonable ground to suspect that 
the property, in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, another person’s 
proceeds of drug trafficking.786 In addition to knowledge or suspicion, there was a 
requirement in both situations that the defendant committed the laundering act 
purposely to avoid prosecution or avoid a confiscation order.787  In Causey,788 it was 
held that provided the defendant had such a purpose, it was immaterial that he acted for 
innocent purposes as well. 
The equivalent of section 49 under CJA 1988 is section 93C. Section 93C was inserted 
by section 31 of CJA 1993 to create the offence of  “concealing or transferring the 
proceeds of non-drug-related criminal conduct.789 This provision intended to punish 
anyone who assisted in hiding property from the English courts, or removing it from the 
jurisdiction, 790  for the purpose of avoiding prosecution, or avoiding a confiscation 
order.791 A significant development is that no such conditions appear in the POCA 
2002, making the offence simpler to establish. 
3.3.1.3 ENTERING INTO AN ARRANGEMENT (S. 328) 
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POCA section 328 mirrors DTA 1994 section 50 and CJA 1988 section 93A both of 
which criminalised assisting another person to retain the proceeds of crime.792 Like the 
previous legislation, section 328 was drafted very widely to afford prosecutors wide 
latitude to articulate their case against offenders.793 One of the implications of this is, 
once a person becomes concerned with “an arrangement to facilitate ML” section 328 is 
potentially violated, as there is no need to have any direct link with the ML.794 
A person is said to have violated section 328 if he enters into, or becomes concerned in 
an arrangement, which he knows, or suspects facilitates the acquisitions, retention, use 
or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person.795 The objective is to 
capture a person who entered into an arrangement without the need for such a person to 
have to deal with property, which in part or in whole represents the proceeds of criminal 
conduct.796 
As decided in R. v Geary,797 for section 328(1) laundering offence, the property in 
question must be criminal. Geary is now a settled law in this area having disapproved 
Izekor798 and having been followed in subsequent cases.799 However, the recent decision 
of the Supreme Court in R v GH800 has altered the landscape a bit. Where a property is 
obtained by fraud, the original property remains clean. But once the property is paid 
into the defendant’s account, its character changed to that of criminal property.801 
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Like the CJA 1988 section 93A where the inclusion of the word “otherwise” was 
thought to indicate that the violation of section 93A could be facilitated in “limitless” 
ways, the words “by whatever means” in section 328 points to the same thing.802 
Involvement in a preparatory stage is however not enough to render the defendant guilty 
of an offence under section 328.803 
While knowledge and suspicion are the relevant mental elements required to establish 
guilt, the two mental elements are to be evaluated subjectively.804 If the subjective test 
is not satisfied, the court may convict the defendant of a lesser offence for which the 
prosecution needs only to prove these elements using an objective test, to the ordinary 
standard of proof, to avoid placing the burden of proof on the defendant.805 
However, no offence will be committed for subsequent dealing with the criminal 
property, if a disclosure pursuant to section 338 has been made and consent obtained, or 
if intended to be made but there was reasonable excuse for failing to do so, or if the act 
was done in carrying out a function the person has relating to the enforcement of the 
act.806 “Below the threshold” and “overseas defence” are also available as defences 
available to the defendant.     
Notwithstanding, an offence may be committed if a bank proceeds with a suspicious 
transaction without obtaining consent. It was held in Squirrell Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank Plc 807  that, once a suspicion arose that a customer’s account 
contained the proceeds of crime, the bank is obliged to report that suspicion to the 
relevant authority and desist from carrying out any transaction in relation to that account 
                                                
802 Strokes and Arora (n 747) 343 
803 Dare v The CPS [2012] EWHC 2074 
804 Rees and others (n 674) 138 
805 ex Parte Kebeline [1999] 4 All ER 801 HL 
806 POCA 2002 s 328(3) 
807 [2006] 1 W.L.R. 637, 642 
  158 
until consent is given, or the relevant time limit under section 335 has expired. Thus, in 
Squirrel, Laddie J said NatWest did precisely what this legislation intended it to do. To 
do otherwise would be to require it to commit a criminal offence.808  
Further, it was held in K Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc809 that, a bank facilitates 
ML contrary to POCA section 328 if it dealt with a customer’s property knowing or 
suspecting it to be criminal property, without making a disclosure or without consent. It 
would be no defence to a charge under section 328 that the bank was contractually 
obliged to obey its customer’s instructions. K Ltd can be contrasted with Shah v 
HSBC810 where the moratorium period has passed, and the bank still refused to carry 
out the customer’s instructions. 
Section 328 is to a certain extent a reflection of section 50 of the DTA 1994 and section 
93A of CJA 1988.811 The definition of ‘proceeds of criminal conduct’ under section 328 
includes property, which in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, represents benefits 
from criminal conduct.812 Under section 93A(2), knowledge or suspicion of engagement 
in criminal activity is required in addition to the knowledge that the property represents 
the A’s proceeds of crime.  
Under section 328, the property needs not to be the product of A’s criminal conduct, it 
is enough for the property to be the product of another person’s criminal conduct.813 
Thus, an intermediary who handles client’s proceeds of crime can be convicted of 
section 328 offence if the prosecution can prove the requisite mens rea. 
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3.3.1.4 ACQUISITION, USE AND POSSESSION OF CRIMINAL PROPERTY 
(S. 329) 
Section 329 of POCA 2002 replaced both the DTA 1994 section 51 and CJA 1988 
section 93B to deal with those who acquired, used, or possessed criminal property.814 
The mens rea required for this section is knowledge or suspicion as to the provenance of 
the property concerned, which is to be determined subjectively. Thus, a person is not 
guilty of an offence under section 329 if he possessed a criminal property without the 
requisite knowledge because arguably the property itself is not criminal.815 There are 
some difficulties with this offence, as the concept of knowledge may be subject to 
different interpretation.816 However, according to R v Harris,817 knowledge is to be 
given its ordinary English meaning.  
A person who possesses proceeds of crime knowing or suspecting it to be so, potentially 
violates section 329 as well as section 22 of the Theft Act 1968. Thus, the discretion lies 
with the prosecution to charge the defendant with any of the two offences. This issue 
arose in Wilkinson [2006] EWHC 3012, and the court held that it is ultimately a matter 
for the CPS and their internal guidance to decide which charge to bring. The issue of 
giving preference to section 329 of POCA over section 22 of the Theft Act 1968 was 
returned in CPS Nottinghamshire v Rose,818 and the court found nothing wrong with 
that.819  
The burden of proof rest with the prosecution unless the defendant raised a defence of 
lack of knowledge or suspicion, in which case the onus rests with the defendant to prove 
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the defence on the balance of probabilities.820 This principle was subsequently approved 
by the Privy Council in A-G of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-Kut [1993] AC 951.821 
Liability can be avoided if an authorised disclosure under section 338 is made and 
appropriate consent has been obtained.822 The ‘overseas defence’, as well as ‘threshold 
defence’, also apply.823 Acquiring or using or possessing the property for an adequate 
consideration is a defence where the consideration is adequate, as the consideration has 
to be evaluated in accordance with section 329(3).824 If any of these defences are raised, 
it is for the prosecution to prove that they do not apply.825  
The situation is different under the old law. The Court in R v Gibson826 concluded that 
under CJA 93B(2), it is for the defence to prove adequate consideration if it was 
advanced as a defence. The reason is that, a defendant is in a position to know whether 
he had given adequate consideration, and as such it would be easy for the defendant to 
deal with the issue but usually impossible for the prosecution.  
However, under POCA 2002 the opposite is the case. In Mark Hogan v The DPP,827 
their Lordships were asked to decide on whose shoulders the burden of proof rests. It 
was held that once the defence of adequate condideration is raised, it is for the 
prosecution to prove that the consideration was inadequate.828 The court observed that 
once the defendant proves that the consideration was adequate, then no offence is made 
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out under the 2002 Act, even if the defendant who has acquired the property knows that 
it was stolen.829  
In view of this observation, uncertainty remains as to whether an offence of handling 
stolen goods could have been committed instead. If a defence of adequate consideration 
operates to protect a defendant who purchased property knowing or suspecting it to be 
tainted, then the limitation of section 329 in terms of disrupting ML is very clear.  
3.3.1.5 CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT OFFENCE UNDER SECTIONS 327-329 
As per ML definition under POCA 2002 (section 340(11)(b)), it is an offence to 
conspire to commit any of the laundering offence under any of sections 327, 328 and 
329. Also by virtue of section 415(2) conspiracy is an ML offence. A considerable 
number of appellate cases that emerged around conspiracy to commit ML were mostly 
decided under the CJA 1988 and DTA 1994. 
R v El Kurd830 and R v Suchedina831 demonstrated that, in cases involving conspiracy 
to launder, there must be an agreement to launder the proceeds of either drug trafficking 
or other crimes. However, the prosecution need not adduce evidence that the property 
was the proceeds of either drug trafficking or other crimes. Since the mens rea 
requirement for the section 327-329 offences is ‘knowledge or suspicion’, the question 
arose whether conspiracy to launder can be established on the basis of mere 
suspicion.832 The Court of Appeal decided in a number of cases that a person who 
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agreed with others to deal with a property, knowing or suspecting that it was proceeds 
of crime, was guilty of criminal conspiracy to launder.833 
However, considering the provision of section 1(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1977, 
conspiracy cannot be committed unless at least two conspirators intend or know that the 
fact or circumstance shall or will exist at the time when the conduct constituting the 
offence took place. In the light of R v Montila [2004], 1 WLR 3141 and of section 
1(1)(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1977, the Court of Appeal in R v Liaquat834 decided 
that the person could not be guilty of criminal conspiracy to launder on the basis of 
mere suspicion. Therefore, while knowledge is appropriate where the property exist at 
the time of the parties agreeing to conspire, an intention that the property would be the 
proceeds of crime must be established where the property does not exist.835  
This principle has been considered in Suchedina and R v K, S, R & X [2007] EWCA 
Crim 1888. This principle was also considered in R v Pace and Rogers836 where, in the 
light of section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, the Court of Appeal disagreed 
with the trial judge’s position that in an attempted ML offence, the mental element was 
not knowledge but suspicion.  
Therefore, in the light of section 1(2) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 and the above 
decisions of the courts, mere suspicion is not enough to establish the guilt of conspiracy. 
The defendant must know that the source of the property was criminal. Alternatively, he 
must intend the future property to be so.  
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Independent of the substantive POCA ML offences discussed above, there exist failure-
to-disclose ML offences as enacted under sections 330-332 POCA 2002. The main 
difference between the substantive offences and section 330-332 offences is that the 
substantive offences are a reactive way of confronting ML.837  The violation must occur 
or at least there must be a conspiracy to violate the AML law. In contrast, section 330-
332 offences are proactive, in that the law requires certain steps to be taken to prevent 
ML. Additionally, while anybody can commit the substantive offence, sections 330, 331 
and 332 place obligations on a limited class of people. 
Having discussed the primary offences and the conspiracy to commit them, next is the 
discussion on the failure-to-disclose offences that can be committed by omission if a 
third party (who is not involved in the laundering) failed to disclose knowledge or 
suspicion of ML that came to him in the cause of employment.  
3.3.2 SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT (SAR) 
As we have seen, POCA 2002 criminalises ML in the UK.838 While banking, other 
businesses and professions within the regulated sector require secrecy to ensure client 
confidentiality, that secrecy provides a conducive atmosphere for ML to thrive. ML by 
its very nature requires secrecy, and professional launderers normally conduct their 
affairs in manner that their transactions look as genuine as possible. Thus, POCA 2002 
require those who handle other people’s wealth to look out for, and report, suspicious 
transactions.839  
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The standard response to the risk of offence being committed has been for anyone (who 
has a duty to report) with suspicion of ML to make disclosure.840 Disclosure is made in 
the form of SAR, which is basically a statement that the property is a ‘criminal 
property’ or it is suspected to be so. 841  The requirement that FIs should make a 
disclosure to the authorities of transactions that they consider unusual and suspicious is 
the most proactive approach to fighting ML,842 and is the government’s main weapon in 
the battle against ML and other financial crimes.843  
The preferred mode of filing SAR is electronically, though forms are available in a 
hardcopy format.844 In return for their cooperation, FIs are afforded protection from 
civil and criminal liability for breach of confidentiality provided they act in good 
faith.845 
3.3.2.1 TYPE OF DISCLOSURE 
There are three types of disclosure viz: Authorised Disclosure; Protected Disclosure; 
and Required Disclosure.  
3.3.2.1.1	AUTHORISED	DISCLOSURE	(S.	338)	
A disclosure is termed authorised if the disclosure is made before the prohibited activity 
is undertaken and an ‘appropriate consent’846 is given to proceed, or it was made after 
the prohibited activity is done but provided there was a good reason for failing to make 
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the disclosure before the act was done, and the disclosure was made on the defendant’s 
own initiative, and was made as soon as it was practicable for him to do so.847  
However, to avoid the risk of incurring criminal liability, it is important for the 
defendant to keep records to help to explain his state of mind at the time he formed the 
suspicion and the reason for not making the disclosure before the transaction was 
carried out.848 The essence of authorised disclosure is to obtain the consent from the 
NCA to carry on with a suspicious transaction already reported. This has the effect of 
avoiding criminal liability if it is later discovered that the reported transaction for which 
consent was given actually involved the proceeds of crime. 
The issue of consent under CJA 1988 (sections 93A and 93B) and DTA 1994 (section 
52) was not very clear, as sometimes the constable may decline to give appropriate 
consent. To avoid committing ‘tipping off’, as illustrated by Bank of Scotland v A 
Ltd, 849  C v S, 850 and Amalgamated Metal Trading Ltd v City of London Police 
Financial Investigation Unit,851 banks usually approach the court for guidance on how 
to proceed.  
POCA section 335(2)-(4) procedure has resolved this problem to a certain extent. The 
procedure stipulates that where appropriate consent to proceed is neither given nor 
refused, and after the statutory notice period of seven working days passes, then the 
person may undertake the ‘prohibited act’. Similarly, if the consent is refused within 
seven working days and thereafter the 31 days statutory moratorium passes and the 
relevant authorities have not taken further action against the suspected property, the 
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person may carry out the prohibited activity.852 In these two situations, the person is 
deemed to have appropriate consent to carry out the prohibited act, and a person may 
incur civil liability if he refused to carry out customer’s instruction.853  
The logic behind the moratorium period of 31 days is to allow for further investigations 
and to obtain a restraining order.854 The 31 days period is now considered inadequate 
for the law enforcement to gather evidence (especially where evidence is located 
abroad) and to conduct a proper investigation.855 Prior to CFA 2017 the moratorium 
period cannot be extended. CFA 2017 has now amended POCA 2002 to allow law 
enforcement to seek a successive extension of the initial 31 days moratorium period up 
to 186 days starting after the day the initial moratorium period ends.856  
The intention of Parliament behind the extension of the moratorium period is to allow 
the law enforcement to gather evidence (especially where evidence is located abroad) 
and to conduct a proper investigation, as well as to prevent the dissipation of proceeds 
of crime while investigation into the alleged ML activity has not been completed.857 
However, the person who made the disclosure may find it difficult to keep the customer 
uninformed throughout the moratorium period to avoid tipping off,858 especially now 
that the period can be extended by about six months. As persons working in a regulated 
or non-regulated sector may need to complete a transaction, which they know, or 
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suspect involves a criminal property, section 338 gives them a basis for obtaining 
authorisation required to complete the transaction without any criminal liability.859  
3.3.2.1.2	PROTECTED	DISCLOSURE	(S.	337)	
While making a disclosure, and obtaining consent, protect the discloser from criminal 
liability, a client may sue the discloser for breach of confidentiality or contract, 
especially where consent was not given, and therefore the transaction could not proceed. 
Consequently, section 337 gives immunity from legal action for example for breach of 
contract or confidentiality for making a disclosure.860 
By its nature, suspicion does not always turn out to be founded. Where transaction is 
delayed due to the SAR the reporting person might incur civil liability. The SCA 2015 
takes this protection further. Section 37 inserted subsection 4A into section 338 of 
POCA 2002 to protect the discloser from civil liability in respect of the disclosure made 
in good faith. SCA section 37 gives effect to Article 26 of the Third AML Directive to 
protect disclosers who made disclosure in good faith from liability of any kind. 
This protection is needed in the light of the long battle between HSBC and its client Mr 
Jayesh Shah and Shaleetha Mahabeer.861 In Shah v HSBC862 Supperstone J found for 
the defendant bank on the basis of an implied term in the contract which permitted the 
defendant bank to refuse to carry out the payment instruction, without an appropriate 
consent under section 335 of POCA, where it suspected a transaction involves proceeds 
of crime.  
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It was also held that an implied term exists in the contract that permitted the bank to 
refuse to provide the customer with information that would lead to tipping off contrary 
to section 333 of POCA 2002. However, whether the court will imply a term into a 
contract will depend on judicial discretion and the fact of each case.863 However, in Iraj 
Parvizi v Barclays Bank Plc the court accepted that a claim by a customer, that its 
bank has failed to carry out instruction will be usually a strong claim in contract.864 
Thus, section 337 removes the uncertainty that legal immunity would not apply as the 
SAR was not based on a genuine suspicion.865 Suspicion is subjective, which does not 
need to be reasonably held, and can be proven even where evidence of suspicion is not 
coherent.866  As SAR is one of the weapon against ML, both the extension of the 
moratorium period and the statutory protection against liability of any kind, would 
bolster the position of the law enforcement in their effort to disrupt ML. 
3.3.3. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE: REGULATED SECTOR (S. 330) 
Section 330 POCA criminalised failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of ML. 
Employees in a regulated sector (as defined in Schedule 9 of POCA 2002 for the 
purpose of laundering offences under POCA Part 7) are required to disclose knowledge 
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or suspicion of ML to MLRO. An offence of failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion 
of ML is committed if each of the following four conditions is satisfied:867  
i) The person carries on specified activity within a ‘regulated sector’; 
i) The person knows or has reasonable ground to suspect that another is engaged in 
money laundering;  
ii) That the person can identify the other person or the whereabouts of any of the 
laundered property, or that he believes, or it is reasonable to expect him to believe, 
that the information will or may assist in identifying that other person or the 
whereabouts of any of the laundered property; and 
iii)  The person fails to make disclosure as soon as is practicable after the information 
came to him. 
Due to the broad meaning of ‘criminal conduct’,868 offences committed abroad can 
violate section 330 subject to the ‘overseas conduct defence’. Pursuant to sections 
340(11) and 415(2), a conspiracy constitutes an offence under this section.869 Upon 
summary conviction, a defendant risks up to six months in prison or fine not exceeding 
statutory minimum or both; and upon indictment, the maximum prison term is five 
years, or fine, or both.870  
The mens rea required is knowledge or suspicion, which can be subjective or objective, 
and can be met if the defendant ‘knows’ or ‘suspects’ or ‘has reasonable grounds for 
knowing or suspecting’ that another is engaged in ML. Concern has been raised about 
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the broad nature of the test. However, section 330(6)(c) and (7) appears to have 
alleviated this concern.871 
The relevant test for knowledge or suspicion is both subjective and objective.872 In order 
not to fail this test, regulated persons must take into consideration the FCA and JMLSG 
guidance notes, issued to help them in identify conduct and transactions of suspicious 
nature. 873  Consequently, in deciding whether a person has committed section 330 
offence the court is required to consider whether the person followed any approved 
relevant guidance, which was at the time issued by a supervisory authority or other 
appropriate bodies, and which was published in a manner appropriate enough to bring 
the guidance to the attention of the affected person.874 
Exceptions under section 330(6), (7A) and (7B) serve as a defence, and where they 
apply no offence will be committed. Section 102 SOCPA 2005 amended section 330 to 
provide for ‘overseas defence’. Pursuant to 330(7), a defendant may escape ML charges 
if he can establish that he does not know or suspect that another is engaged in ML; or if 
his employer has not provided him with training as required by the MLR 2007. 
However, if the employee is properly trained to the required standard, the defence of 
lack of training may not stand.875 
3.3.3.1 DEFENCE OF PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE  
As it has been under the earlier legislation, LPP is a defence under POCA. An 
individual does not commit an offence under section 330 if he is a professional legal 
adviser or relevant professional adviser and the information came to him in privileged 
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circumstances.876 The information came to the professional adviser if it came to him in 
accordance with the provision of subsection 10, on condition that it is not 
communicated or given with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose.877  
In Bowman v Fels878 the Court of Appeal held that absent clear and unambiguous 
language, Parliament could not have intended to override important and well-
established principles underlying professional privilege. Until this decision, the court in 
P v P 879  rendered LPP and duty of confidentiality secondary to the POCA 2002 
disclosure requirement. Under P v P a lawyer may violate POCA section 328 if failed to 
make a disclosure of a suspected criminal activity.  
However, following Bowman v Fels, in carrying out his duties to his client, a legal 
advisor would not be prosecuted even where he informs his client or his opponent of 
any disclosure that he considered appropriate to make for a purpose connected with the 
proper representation of his client.880 However, LPP does not protect information or 
other matter from disclosure if there was a criminal motive behind it.881  
The defence of lack of training under section 330(7) and (7B), and ‘reasonable excuse’ 
remain available to professional advisers.882 Pursuant to section 330(9)(A), the LPP 
remains even where the professional adviser discusses matters with their nominated 
officer in their firm, even if the nominated officer is himself a professional legal 
adviser.883 This provision allows professional legal advisers and relevant professional 
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advisers to consult their nominated officers, without formal disclosure made to the 
nominated officer, giving some comfort to both the professional and the client.884  
Section 330 was amended to extend this privilege to other professional advisers.885 It 
includes an accountant, auditor or tax adviser who is a member of a professional body, 
which is established for accountants, auditors, or tax advisers.886 The amendment also 
provides an exemption to employees and partners of professional advisers.887 
3.3.4 FAILURE TO DISCLOSE: NOMINATED PERSON IN THE REGULATED 
SECTOR (S. 331) 
Pursuant to section 331 a nominated officer (i.e. MLRO) is required to make a 
disclosure, as soon as practicable, to the authorities of information regarding ML 
activities he received pursuant to section 330 disclosure made to him by employees. 
This section, therefore, criminalises conduct where the MLRO receives a report under 
section 330 which causes him to know or suspect, or gives reasonable grounds for 
knowing or suspecting, that ML is taking place, and the MLRO does not make a 
disclosure as soon as practicable after the report comes to him.888  
In determining whether the defendant has a requisite knowledge or suspicion, the 
objective and subjective test that applies to section 330, also applies to 331.889  In 
deciding whether a person has committed an offence under this section, the court must 
have regard to whether he has followed any relevant guidance.890  
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An offence committed under section 331 is triable either way: upon summary 
conviction by a Magistrates’ Court the penalty is up to six months imprisonment or of 
fine not exceeding statutory minimum or both, and on conviction on indictment in the 
Crown Court, a maximum of five years in prison or fine or both.891  The ‘reasonable 
excuse’ and ‘overseas conduct’ defences also applies to section 331 offence. 892 
However, the term ‘reasonable excuse’ is undesirably vague, because what one 
considers reasonable, another person may not.893   
This provision is a replica of section 330 but with specific application to MLROs within 
the regulated sector. 894  Curiously, unlike in section 330, the defence of “lack of 
training” is not available to the section 331 offences. This appears to be harsh 
considering the main function of MLROs is to decide whether to make disclosure to 
NCA. Thus, to be able to make an informed decision based on the information he 
received from within the organisation, the MLRO needs to be well trained, because not 
every suspicion will turn out to be a true money-laundering scheme.895 
However, considering the pivotal role MLROs play in preventing their organisations 
from being used as ML conduit, even absent proper training, it is expected that they 
exercise due care and diligence in discharging their duties, otherwise, they could be 
liable for negligence.896  
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3.3.5 FAILURE TO DISCLOSE: OTHER NOMINATED OFFICERS (S. 332) 
Section 332 is worded almost the same way with section 331.897 However, this section 
applies to nominated persons in a non-regulated sector who have received internal 
reports, which make them suspect that another person is engaged in ML activities.898 
This section, therefore, criminalises conduct where the MLRO receives a report made 
under section 330, which causes him to know or suspect, or gives him reasonable 
grounds for knowing or suspecting, that ML is taking place, and the MLRO does not 
make a disclosure as soon as practicable after the report came to him.899  
It has been suggested that the term “other nominated officers” includes within its 
meaning constables and customs officers.900 Going by the title of this section, the term 
“other nominated officers” also actually includes nominated officers in the regulated 
sector, though the provisions of section 332 are less onerous than that of section 331.901 
For the offence to be committed four conditions as specified in section 332(1)-(4) has to 
be met. The test for the mens rea elements of this offence (knowledge or suspicion) is a 
combined subjective and objective test.902 
3.3.6 TIPPING OFF  
Initially, section 333 governs tipping off offence. This section has been repealed and 
replaced by 333A-333E. Though the old offence under section 333 is repealed, it will 
continue to govern offences committed before the coming into force of section 333A-
333E.  
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3.3.6.1 OFFENCES UNDER S. 333 
Section 333 replaced tipping off provisions of sections 53 and 58 of DTA 1994 and 
section 93D(1) CJA 1988. However, section 333 has also been repealed by the TACT 
2000 and POCA 2002 (Amendment) Regulations 2007. Schedule 2 of the Regulations 
omitted section 333 and in its place inserted sections 333A-333E to correspond with the 
new sections 21D to 21H of the TACT 2000. As there is no transition period, section 
333 would continue to apply in relation to allegations of tipping off that occurred before 
the coming into force of the new provisions.903  
According to the old law, a person commits a tipping off offence under section 333 if he 
knows or suspects that a disclosure falling within section 337 or 338 has been made, 
and he makes a disclosure, which is likely to prejudice any investigation, which might 
be conducted following the disclosure. Section 333(2) provides defences to tipping off 
offences. 
The operation of section 333 has been occasioned by some practical difficulties 
especially for the banks and legal professionals. 904   Thus, the Law Society issued 
guidance to help solicitors comply with their AML obligations without tipping off their 
clients. 905 Expiriencing difficulties in this area is nothing new. The Court had to 
intervene to resolve those difficulties that had arose under the CJA 1988 (section 93D). 
 In Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland v A Ltd,906 the bank found itself in 
a difficulty as to whether to comply with the police request not to allow the payment to 
go through and not inform A Ltd about the impending investigation (in order not to tip 
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them off), or risked being sued as a constructive trustee by A Ltd for not allowing the 
payment to go through.  
Consequently, the bank applied without notice in private to a judge to seek directions.907 
The Court of Appeal held that, where the bank found itself in such difficulty, it is 
appropriate for the bank to apply for interim declaratory relief under Civil Procedure 
Rules – CPR r 25.1(1)(b) – naming the SFO as the defendant, not the customer.908 In C 
v S909 the Court of Appeal provided 8-point guidance for courts to follow when they are 
approached for directions to provide protection for the institution and the party seeking 
disclosure without prejudicing the investigations.  
In Squirrell Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc (Customs and Excise 
Commissioners intervening),910 a case brought under POCA 2002, the bank argued 
that, for it to warn or explain the situation to Squirrell would amount to tipping off 
while allowing the transaction to proceed would contravene section 328 of POCA 2002. 
Although Laddie J agreed with the bank’s view, he highlighted the grave injustice the 
interrelation of section 328 and 333 causes.911   
In Shah v HSBC912 Supperstone J found for the defendant bank on the basis of an 
implied term in the contract which permitted the defendant bank to refuse to carry out 
the payment instruction without an appropriate consent under section 335 of POCA, 
where it suspected a transaction involves proceeds of crime. It was also held that an 
implied term exists in the contract that permitted the bank to refuse to provide the 
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customer with information that would lead to tipping off contrary to section 333 of 
POCA 2002. 
3.3.6.2 OFFENCES UNDER S. 333A AND S. 333B-333D EXCEPTIONS 
 As mentioned above sections 333A - 333E were inserted into POCA 2002 by TACT 
2000 and POCA 2002 (Amendment) Regulations 2007.913 The amendment gave effect 
to Article 28.1 of the Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing. 
Section 333A offence can be committed in two ways.914 A defendant will be liable on 
summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or to a fine 
not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both. On conviction on indictment, the 
defendant is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to a fine, or 
to both.915 However, a two-year prison term may not deter a determined criminal from 
tipping off clients in exchange for a handsome reward. 
Pursuant to section 333B-333D, section 333A offence will not be committed if the 
disclosure was made: within entities in the same group;916 or between credit or financial 
institutions, if disclosure relates to a customer and the disclosure is in the context of a 
transaction involving both institutions; 917  or to the person’s own supervisory 
authority.918 The explicit defences available to legal advisers as contained in 333(2)(c) 
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and (3) are no longer available under section 333A, thus, how court will interpret the 
new provisions will be of great importance.919  
Having discussed the primary and the secondary UK ML offences under POCA 2002, 
we now analyse the extent of the extraterritorial effect of sections 327-329. 
3.3.7 EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF SS.327-329  
Another major development in the United Kingdom’s AML regime is the extra-
territorial effect of POCA 2002 sections 327, 328 and 329. Traditionally, except in 
certain limited circumstances, the jurisdiction of English criminal law has been limited 
locally, and it is not concerned with the crimes committed abroad.920 There is also a 
presumption that in English law, unless legislation expressly provides otherwise the 
general rules of private international law will apply to that legislation.921 
One rule of private international law is that, ordinarily, the criminal jurisdiction does not 
extend to the conduct which occurs abroad and to the conduct of foreign national 
abroad. As decided by the House of Lords in Cox v Army Council, it is well settled, 
unless contrary intention appears, subject to the general rules of private international 
law, that an Act of Parliament is not intended to apply to Britons (including 
corporations) outside the territory of the United Kingdom.922  
This principle was also followed in Arab Bank Plc v Mercantile Holding Ltd, in 
which Millett J declined to give a literal construction to the prohibition on financial 
assistance under Companies Act 1985 section 151, as having an extra-territorial effect 
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on a foreign subsidiary of UK’s company abroad.923 This reasoning sits well with the 
traditional view that the criminal jurisdiction is an emanation of sovereign power, 
closely tied to the sovereign territory, therefore derogation is apt to infringe the 
principles of comity.924 
However, the transnational nature of certain crimes makes derogation a necessary evil. 
Exception to this general rule can apply to certain criminal acts such as payment of 
bribe to a foreign official or failure of commercial organisation to prevent payment of 
bribe;925 and where a materially false or misleading statement is made in order to induce 
another person to enter into or refrain from entering into a relevant agreement.926 
 Before POCA, the most notable legislation in this regard is CJA 1993, which 
introduced an extraterritorial jurisdiction for inchoate offences of conspiracy and 
incitement in relation to theft and fraud, but subject to the requirement that the offence 
must have some connection with the United Kingdom.927 
POCA has very significant extraterritorial consequences for conduct which takes place 
abroad and which is deemed under the definitional provisions of the POCA section 340, 
to be criminal conduct from which criminal property is derived.928 By these provisions, 
a person may be criminally liable in the UK for offences committed abroad and for 
which criminal property is derived, without having any effect on the UK.929 
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The Court of Appeal in R v Rogers930 confirmed the extraterritorial effect of POCA 
2002. Rogers was convicted of converting criminal property, which is an offence under 
POCA section 327(1)(c).931 He appealed against his conviction on three grounds, one of 
which is that the judge wrongly ruled that the Crown Court had jurisdiction to deal with 
the amended count where all the activities alleged were undertaken in Spain by a non-
resident of the UK in relation to a Spanish bank account.932 
The Court of Appeal held, dismissing the appeal, that, having regard to section 327 and 
340(11)(d) of the POCA 2002, it was clear that Parliament had intended to confer 
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the courts of England and Wales in respect of offences 
contrary to section 327 of the 2002 Act; therefore, the court had jurisdiction in respect 
of a charge of converting criminal property, contrary to section 327(1)(c) of the 2002 
Act, where a defendant living and working abroad had merely permitted money to be 
paid into and then withdrawn from his foreign bank account.933 
Section 327(1)(e) taken together with section 327(1)(c) strongly suggest extraterritorial 
application of the AML statute. 934  While section 327(1)(e) stipulates that criminal 
property must be removed from England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, no such 
geographical limitation is placed on the other methods of committing the offence, 
including section 327(1)(c), which is committed through the conversion of criminal 
property.935  
Section 327(2A) taken together with section 340(2)(b) also gives a strong indication 
that a defendant’s ML activity abroad is potentially within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                
930 [2015] 1 W.L.R. 1017 
931 ibid 1018 
932 ibid 
933 ibid 1017 
934 ibid 1018 
935 ibid 
  181 
English courts. Similarly, the definition of criminal property in section 340(3) taken 
together with the provision of section 340(9) that ‘Property is all property wherever 
situated...’936 is a further indication of the extra-territorial reach intended by Parliament. 
Furthermore, in R v Rogers their Lordship reasoned that the specific provision of 
section 340(11)(d) that ML is an act which would constitute an offence (including one 
under section 327) if done in the UK, appears to admit of no other construction than that 
Parliament intended extra-territorial effect to this legislation.937  
In their submission, the defence argued that any extra-territorial effect relates only to the 
criminal property element, and unlike CJA 1993, the language of POCA did not indicate 
any clear intention of Parliament to confer extraterritorial jurisdiction. Their Lordships, 
however, rejected that argument as unsustainable given that section 327(2A), section 
340(2) and section 340(11) clearly relate to the “conduct” element of the offence rather 
than the “criminal property” element.938  
Their Lordships concluded that the offence of ML is par excellence an offence which is 
no respecter of national boundaries and it would be surprising indeed if Parliament had 
not intended the AML statute to have extra-territorial effect.939 Although it is section 
327 that is at issue in Rogers, this judgment also applies to sections 328 and 329.940 
The extra-territoriality of POCA is crucial in disrupting ML. As ML is transnational in 
nature,941 the POCA AML law would have been even less effective had the Parliament 
restricted the violation of sections 327, 328, and 329 to conduct that wholly took place 
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in the UK. A person, who knows that UK AML can be violated without any physical 
presence in the UK, would be careful not to conduct his financial affairs in a way that 
would breach the UK AML law. As that would render him criminally liable and upon 
indictment he could be extradited to the UK.942   
In conclusion, discussions under this section centred on the primary and secondary ML 
offences. It shows how the AML provisions evolved and continue to evolve even after 
POCA 2002, which harmonises the AML provisions of DTA 1994 and CJA 1988. This 
section also reveals the deficiencies inherent in the UK AML law. These deficiencies 
signal the inefficiencies of the UK AML law in disrupting ML. Having achieved this, 
the next section discusses the subsidiary UK AML law. 
3.4 THE SUBSIDIARY AML LAW 
MLR serves as the regulatory AML law in the UK. The MLR consists of set of 
obligations that require regulated persons in the UK to take certain AML measures to 
prevent being used to launder proceeds of crime or to fund terrorism. This thesis has 
already discussed the evolution of this regulatory regime. Thus, that discussion will not 
be repeated here. Rather, this section will mainly focus on MLR 2007,943 being the most 
current regulation at the time of writing this thesis.944 
While POCA created both primary and secondary ML criminal offences, MLR 2007 
placed certain obligations on relevant persons (as defined in reg. 3) to take various steps 
to detect and prevent ML and TF.945 In other words, MLRs form the basis of the AML 
                                                
942 The extradition and conviction of James Ibori illustrates the extra-territorial effect of POCA; see R v 
Ibori (Onanafe James) Unreported April 17, 2012 (Southwark Crown Court) 
943 MLR 2007 (SI 2007/2157) 
944 New MLR is expected on 26th June 2017 to give effect to Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 (The Fourth AML Directive). Although the new MLR will 
not repeal MLR 2007, changes are expected. Until then provisions of MLR 2007 remain the law 
945 MLR 2007 (SI 2007/2157), reg 1 (Annotation) 
  183 
compliance regime in the UK. MLR 2007 consists of six parts (which in total consist of 
51 Regulations) and six schedules. The 2007 Regulations form the main thrust of the 
UK AML regulatory regime. What follows below is the discussion on the AML 
provisions of the MLR 2007. 
3.4.1 BUSINESSES TO WHICH THE REGULATIONS APPLY 
Subject to regulation 4, regulation 3 determines to whom MLR 2007 applies. It applies 
to credit institutions, FI, auditors, insolvency practitioners, external accountants and tax 
advisers, independent legal professionals, trust or company service providers, estate 
agents, high value dealers, and casinos. Regulation 3(3)-(13) provides a legal definition 
of the above-listed businesses. MLR 2007 differs from the previous regulations. For 
example, for MLR 2003 to apply to a person, that person must be engaged in “relevant 
business”. In contrast, MLR 2007 uses business, profession or commercial activity to 
determine whether a person falls within the scope of the 2007 Regulations.946  
3.4.2 CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE 
Part 2 of MLR 2007 sets out in more detail than the previous Regulations the 
requirements for CDD. 947  Regulation 5 requires regulated person to apply CCD 
measures to identify and verify the identity of a customer and any beneficial owner, and 
to obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. 
Regulation 6 provides a definition of the term ‘beneficial owner’. While for a body 
corporate or partnership a beneficial owner is one who controls more than 25 per cent of 
the stake, for a trust vehicle it is anyone who is entitled to at least 25 per cent.948 
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A regulated person is required to carry out CDD on new and existing customers. This he 
does in certain cercumstances, such as when establishing a business relationship with 
new customer, when carrying out an occasional transaction, when he suspects MLor TF, 
where there are doubts as to the veracity or adequacy of documents, or data, or 
information previously obtained for the purposes of identification or verification.949 The 
CDD should not be a one-off activity performed at the time when the relationship is to 
be established. Rather it should be a continuous task performed whenever situation 
demands, to ensure information about a customer is up-to-date and to keep a vigilant 
eye on the transaction patterns of a customer.950 
Where a regulated person is unable to apply CDD measures in accordance with the 
provisions of section 7, the relevant person must cease transaction with the affected 
customer, and must consider whether he is required to make a disclosure under Part 7 of 
the POCA 2002 or Part 3 of the TACT 2000. 951  However, LPP may prevent the 
operation of this rule (reg. 11(2)). 
It is now a requirement that identity of customers and beneficial owners must be 
verified before a business relationship is established.952 Where this is not practically 
possible, the verification must be completed as soon as practicable after contact is first 
established.953 Rules governing identity checks with respect to casinos are covered by 
regulation 10. Establishing the identity of a customer as part of the CDD can be done 
simply by obtaining documents such as drivers licence, utility bills, international 
passport, national identity card and the like, to ascertain client’s identity by comparing 
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the picture in the photo ID and the person’s face and to ascertain the residential address 
of the customer.954  
However, criminals who are determined to engage in ML may not find it difficult to 
satisfy this requirement by providing fake documents that bear the names they are 
using.955 Moreover, criminals do obtain identification documents in the name of persons 
who have died long ago.956  Thus, mere identification of a customer is not enough. To 
ensure compliance with the CDD requirements the regulated person must verify the 
documents the customer presented to prove he is who he says he is, using data provided 
by reliable and independent sources.957  
A similar level of scrutiny should be applied to trust and legal entities not only to verify 
the identity of beneficial owners but also to understand the ownership and control 
structure of the person, trust or arrangement.958 Compliance with the CDD requirements 
also entails obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business 
relationship.959 The 2007 Regulations makes it possible for a relevant person to apply a 
different level of CDD on different clients.960  
3.4.2.1 OUTSOURCING/RELIANCE 
The process of conducting CDD is expensive and time-consuming. Therefore where 
reasonable, a regulated person may rely on another to verify or confirm the identity of a 
customer to avoid duplication of effort and to also minimise unnecessary friction 
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between regulated persosns and their customers.961 MLR 2007 allows regulated persons 
to rely on another for its CDD function.962 Similarly, regulation 17(4) allows a regulated 
person to outsource its CDD function from another. This innovation can be traced to 
Article 14 of the 2005 Directive. However, because CDD is at the heart of the AML 
measures, this provision appears to be tricky. 
Thus, it is not surprising that reg. 17(4) is not a requirement but rather an option open to 
the regulated persons should they chose to outsource. However, regulated persons must 
be extremely careful to protect their names and to avoid sanction. Should anything go 
wrong, outsourcing will not absolve the regulated person from blame although the 
person on whom reliance was placed can be sued for negligence.963 
3.4.3 RECORD KEEPING  
Once CDD is done, the identity documents obtained must be kept as a record for at least 
five years commencing on the date when the occasional transaction is completed or 
when a business relationship ends.964 Records of supporting documents relating to a 
business relationship or occasional transaction, which are subject to the CDD measures 
or on-going monitoring must be held for five years commencing from the date on which 
the transaction is completed. 965 All other records must be kept for five years 
commencing on the date on which the business relationship ends.966 Moreover, this 
includes situations where a third party relies on the regulated persons.967  
                                                
961 Hyland and Thornhill (n 842) 32-000 
962 MLR 2007, reg 17(1)-(2) 
963 Council Directive (EC) 2005/60  Article 14; also see Alexander (n 956) 
964 MLR 2007, reg 19 
965 ibid reg 19(1) 
966 ibid reg 19(3)(b) 
967 ibid reg 19(4) 
  187 
3.4.4 SYSTEM AND TRAINING 
3.4.4.1 SYSTEM 
MLR 2007 places an obligation on a regulated person to establish and maintain a 
functional AML compliance programme. To prevent the financial system from ML and 
TF, regulated persons are required to establish and maintain appropriate and risk-
sensitive policies and procedures relating to CCD and on-going monitoring, reporting, 
recordkeeping, internal control, risk assessment and management, monitoring and 
management of compliance with, the internal communication of such policies and 
procedures.968  
The responsibility of ensuring that effective business policies and procedures that meet 
the requirements of MLR 2007 are put in place to prevent abuse by launderers, rests on 
senior managers.969  Thus, management control must be put in place to detect any 
attempt to use regulated persons for ML or TF, and to enable the management to take 
appropriate action and file a report to the relevant authorities.970 Such systems must be 
subjected to regular evaluation to ensure their efficiency in managing ML and TF risks 
efficiently, and also to ensure that they are compliant with the Regulations.971 
The system must establish a clear internal reporting channel from staff to an MLRO 
who should in turn report suspicious activity (detected and reported to him by staff) to 
the NCA, and the system should identify and allocate responsibilities to senior 
management staff.972 
3.4.4.2 TRAINING 
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The key component in ensuring success in disrupting ML is the human elements who 
operate AML system. Thus, staff training is vital for the staff to detect and deter ML 
effectively.973 Regulated persons are required to take appropriate measures so that all 
their employees are made aware of the law relating to ML and TF.974 MLR 2007 
requires continuous training on a regular basis for employees to be able to recognise and 
deal with transactions and other activities, which may be related to ML or TF.975 
3.4.5 SUPERVISION AND REGISTRATION 
Regulations 23 and 24 allocate supervisory responsibility and duties to different bodies 
that cover the sectors to which the MLR 2007 applies. 976  Regulation 25 requires 
Customs Commissioners to maintain a register of high-value dealers, MSBs, and trust 
or company service providers. Regulations 26-29 govern the registration process. 
Certain supervisory bodies may maintain their register in accordance with sections 33-
35.977 
3.4.6 ENFORCEMENT 
Regulation 36 designated FCA and HMRC as ML enforcement authorities. 978 
Regulation 37 provides that an officer may, in connection with the exercise of 
designated authority of its function, require a regulated person or the connected person 
to provide specified information, to produce such recorded information as may be so 
specified, or to attend before an officer at a time and place specified in the notice and 
answer questions. 
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Under regulation 38, an officer is empowered to enter and search premises without a 
warrant regarding the exercise of the power conferred on a designated authority. 
Regulation 39 prescribed the procedures for obtaining a search warrant, and a judge 
may issue a warrant under this paragraph if satisfied on information on oath given by an 
officer that the required conditions are satisfied. 
3.4.7 POWER TO IMPOSE CIVIL PENALTIES 
Powers to impose civil penalties are contained in regulations 42-44. Regulation 42 
conferred on a designated authority power to impose a penalty of such amount, as it 
considers appropriate on a regulated person (except an auction platform) who fails to 
comply with any requirement of the regulations specified in section 42(1). However, the 
designated authority must not impose a penalty where there are reasonable grounds for 
it to be satisfied that the person took all reasonable steps and exercised due diligence to 
ensure that the requirement would be complied with.979 
Regulation 42(3) stipulates that, in deciding whether a person has failed to comply with 
a requirement of these Regulations, the designated authority must consider whether the 
person followed any relevant guidance, which was at the time issued by a supervisory 
authority approved by the Treasury.980 The decision of the commissioners made under 
regulations 28,29,30 and 42 is subject to appeal (regs. 43-44). 
3.4.8 CRIMINAL OFFENCE 
Although MLR 2007 is a regulatory law (which place AML obligations on the regulated 
persons), failure to comply with those obligations can be a criminal offence. Regulation 
45 creates an offence triable either way. A person who fails to comply with any 
requirement listed above is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction, to a 
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fine not exceeding the statutory maximum; on conviction on indictment, to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, to a fine or to both (reg. 45(1)). In 
deciding whether a person has committed an offence, the court must consider whether 
he followed any approved guidance, which was at the time issued by a supervisory 
authority, and published in a manner approved by the Treasury (reg. 45(2)). 
A person is not guilty of an offence under this regulation if he took all reasonable steps 
and exercised due diligence to avoid committing the offence.981 Moreover, where a 
person is convicted of an offence under this regulation, he shall not also be liable to a 
civil penalty under reg. 42. 982   HMRC, LWMA, DETI, DPP and DPP-NI are 
empowered to bring criminal proceedings against a regulated person or any person 
liable to prosecution.983 Part 6 of the MLR 2007 contains provisions for Recovery of 
charges and penalties through the court (reg. 48). It also contains obligations on public 
authorities to report suspicion of ML and TF (reg. 49).  
3.4.9 ASSESSING MLR 2007 
These regulations formed the basis for the AML compliance regime in the UK. As 
discussed above, these regulations imposed obligations on regulated persons to prevent 
themselves from being used to launder proceeds of crimes or to fund criminality, 
including terrorism. These obligations can be broadly grouped under the following: 
customer due diligence; record keeping; training and establishing and maintaining 
systems and controls. 
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At least, in theory, this sounds a very good legislative effort aimed at involving 
regulated persons in the government drive to disrupt ML. However, whether in practice 
these regulations have the desired impact on ML, is entirely a different issue.  
Although MLR 2007 had a significant impact on the UK AML regime, the law does not 
have the desired impact because it placed obligations (on the regulated persons), which 
in practice, cannot be met.984 One major loophole inherent in the MLR 2007 is that they 
did not specifically address trade finance such as CLC – the main banking activity.985  
Though technology has enhanced the way CDD is conducted, loopholes still exist that 
renders CDD less effective in disrupting ML. This is because in some cases technology 
based CDD does not and cannot reveal all the information about a client. 986  For 
example, to ascertain the residential address of clients through postcodes in developing 
countries is almost impossible because they do not exist. Also, other means of linking 
the client to where he said he lives (such as electoral register, hospital register or vehicle 
licence cannot be accessed online. In this situation relying on technology to conduct 
CDD may not yield the desired result.  
Although the focus of this chapter is on UK ML regime, some mention should be made 
of the proceeds of crime law, because a successful prosecution of ML offence often 
results in the court issuing a confiscation order. Furthermore, the policy behind ML law 
is to augment the proceeds of crime law.                           
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3.5 PROCEEDS OF CRIME LAW 
Those who profit from crimes must find a way of laundering the proceeds, not just for 
the illicit assets to reappear clean, but also to avoid confiscation in the event that law 
enforcement closes in on them.987  
3.5.1 EVOLUTION OF CONFISCATION REGIME 
Before the passage of the DTOA, two statutes empowered the Courts to confiscate 
proceeds generated from drug trafficking. First, the MDA 1971, if it can be shown that 
the assets relate to an offence for which the defendant has been convicted.988 Secondly, 
the PCCA 1973, if the assets relate to an offence for which the defendant was convicted, 
but provided that the assets have been used or was intended to be used to facilitate or to 
assist in the commission of that offence.989 
Following the unsuccessful attempt by the law enforcement to confiscate assets of those 
convicted of drugs offences in the Operation Julie case,990 Hodgson Committee was set 
up to recommend solutions to the limitation in the then confiscation law. 991  The 
Committee made certain recommendations on, but not limited to, the following: the 
limit of the confiscation power; the objective of the confiscation power; burden of 
proof; and confiscation and imprisonment.992  
Specifically, the Committee recommended that the courts should be empowered to 
confiscate proceeds of criminal offences of which defendants have been convicted.993 
Consequently, Parliament enacted the first confiscation statute into the DTOA 1986.994 
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This intervention was needed because the profits from drug trafficking were so great 
that the lengthy jail term do not deter convicted drug lords who were able to direct their 
illicit businesses from their prison cell.995  
The legislative intervention reflects Parliament’s desire to deprive offenders the fruits of 
their crime, as the confiscation statutes under the two legislations were inadequate for 
that purpose.996 The DTOA allowed the government to confiscate assets associated with 
a convicted offender, not just the ones that represent proceeds of the particular drug 
trafficking offence for which he was convicted.997  
However, the scope of the 1986 Act was limited to drugs proceeds only. Two years after 
the 1986 Act, Parliament passed the CJA 1988. CJA extended the scope of the DTOA 
confiscation regime to cover all indictable offences, together with a small number of 
offences triable only summarily, where the benefit accruing to the defendant were likely 
to be unusually high.998  
This was followed by the Criminal Justice (International Co-oporation) Act 1990, which 
augmented the DTOA confiscation regime by requiring payment of interest on unpaid 
confiscation orders.999 The 1990 Act also empowered the prosecutor to apply to the 
court for confiscation orders to be increased where the further realisable asset was 
identified.1000 The Drug Trafficking Act (DTA) 1994 consolidates the 1986 and 1990 
Acts, and also strengthened the provisions of the 1986 Act by implementing many of 
the recommendations of the Home Office Working Group on Confiscation. 
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Though the enactment of CJA 1988 augmented the proceeds of crime law, enabling law 
enforcement to confiscate proceeds of other crimes, it created a dichotomy. POCA 2002 
now removed the dichotomy. At present POCA 2002 and its related rules of procedure 
provides a comprehensive code governing confiscation law.1001  
A confiscation investigation is aimed at ascertaining whether a person has benefited 
from his criminal conduct and/or the extent or whereabouts of his benefit from criminal 
conduct.1002 In contrast, a civil recovery investigation is aimed at discovering whether 
the property is recoverable, who has possession of the property, or its extent or 
whereabouts.1003  
The SCA 2015 amended POCA 2002 to improve the collection rate dramatically, and to 
ensure restraint and confiscation regime starts to yield the desired result.1004 CFA 2017 
has changed this area of the law, empowering law enforcement to forfeit personal assets 
and money in bank and building society account.1005  
Going into a detailed examination of this vast area of law is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, the three main ways (confiscation, civil forfeiture and taxation) 
through which criminals can be divested of their illicit profits are analysed below. 
3.5.2 MEANS OF RECOVERY 
POCA 2002, as amended by the SOCPA 2005, allows for the recovery of the proceeds 
of crime through either the criminal or civil courts. Recovery can be pursued in three 
distinct ways: (i) confiscation orders may be sought in criminal proceedings by the 
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prosecution upon conviction, but the assets does not have to be the actual proceeds of 
the crime for which the defendant was convicted;1006 (ii) illicit gains can be taxed;1007 
and (iii) use of civil forfeiture, which targets directly the proceeds of crime.1008 Taxing 
the proceeds of crime is discussed under section 3.6. 
3.5.2.1 CRIMINAL CONFISCATION  
Criminal confiscation, i.e. confiscation proceedings upon conviction remain the most 
favoured by the law enforcement as a means of depriving criminals of their unlawful 
criminal proceeds.1009  Only when confiscation may not be possible prosecutors are 
encouraged to pursue proceeds of crime through an alternative means. The Crown CPS, 
asset recovery strategy guidelines for the prosecution, states: 
Prosecutors should consider asset recovery in every case in 
which a defendant has benefited from criminal conduct and 
should instigate confiscation proceedings in appropriate 
cases.  When confiscation is not appropriate and/or cost 
effective, consideration should be given to alternative asset 
recovery outcomes. :1010   
Because of its advantages, a criminal confiscation is a good tool of disrupting ML. Its 
major advantage is that the standard of proof applicable in confiscation proceedings is 
the civil one – prosecution need not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt but on the 
balance of probabilities.1011 Secondly, the “strict”1012 rules of criminal evidence do not 
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apply.1013 Thirdly, the CJA 2003 hearsay regime does not apply directly and strictly but 
may apply by analogy in ensuring the fairness of the proceedings. 1014  Fourthly, 
confiscation proceedings are not penal, 1015  and so do not attract the protection of 
Articles 6.2 and 6.3 of the ECHR,1016 even when the lifestyle rules are triggered.1017  
Though criminal in nature, confiscation order is governed by civil procedure rules.1018 
Confiscation orders are made by the Crown Court against a convicted defendant to pay 
a sum equivalent to the benefit he derived from his criminal activity.1019 A sum is 
assessed on the basis of both the benefit derived from the offence and the ability of the 
defendant to realise sufficient assets to meet the order.  
However, as confiscation order is not in rem but an in personam against the defendant 
himself, it does not divest the defendant the legal title to his properties – though all the 
properties are subject to confiscation but to the extent of the value of the order.1020 In 
fact, whatever amount is available becomes the ‘amount recoverable’.1021 Meanwhile, if 
the defendant can successfully launder his assets to the extent that no property is 
available, then the amount recoverable is a nominal amount.1022 
3.5.2.2 CIVIL RECOVERY 
Civil forfeiture proceedings do not depend on a criminal conviction, as the forfeiture is 
in rem not in personam, and the proceedings take place in the civil and not criminal 
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courts.1023 Once the prosecution reveals that the person was living beyond his means, 
the prosecution then must show probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture, 
for the Court to order the seizure of the asset.1024 It is then for the person from whom the 
property is seized to contest the forfeiture within a limited time by proving innocent 
ownership of the property in question.1025  
The enforcement officer must then prove on the balance of probabilities that property to 
be seized was obtained by criminal conduct.1026 The civil standard applies even though 
the allegation is that a specific criminal conduct generated the property.1027  
Civil forfeiture proceeding may be brought irrespective of an on-going criminal 
proceeding in connection with the property.1028 Civil forfeiture may also be brought 
where, the defendant is acquitted of the offence, or a conviction did not result in a 
confiscation, or the defendant died, or there is insufficient evidence to convict the 
defendant, or the property owner cannot be ascertained; or the defendant is outside the 
jurisdiction.1029  
The civil forfeiture provisions under POCA 2002 Part 5 were designed to enable the 
prosecution to target proceeds of crime in the hands of criminals, where the evidence 
will not allow for a successful conviction in the criminal courts.1030 Under POCA 2002 
law enforcement can recover criminal assets given to another person in the form of a 
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gift, 1031  while any property obtained with inadequate consideration is treated as a 
gift.1032 CFA 2017 has now augumnet this area of law substancially, by introducing 
UWO to support civil recovery process, and also, by introducing administrative 
forfeiture.1033 
Apart from POCA 2002 and MLR 2007, ML can be tackled using alternative means. 
Next is the discussion on these alternatives. 
3.6 THE ALTERNATIVE LAWS 
Besides POCA 2002 and associated legislations, ML can be tackled using the offences 
of handling and tax law. This section discusses these alternative means, and it begins 
with handling. 
3.6.1 HANDLING OFFENCES 
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, significant attempts were made to 
deal with the handling of stolen goods.1034 Initially, ‘assistance’ by way of receiving 
stolen goods was treated as ‘accessory after the fact of larceny’.1035 Later the courts 
adopted a narrow view of the crime of larceny and refused to hold that a person who 
handled stolen goods was guilty as an accessory to larceny unless the principal had been 
convicted.1036 Because high-level criminals need the services of professional handlers to 
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dispose of the large amount they generate from illicit activities,1037 tackling those who 
handle other people’s wealth is one way of disrupting ML.  
Since the nineteenth century, the specific offence of ‘handling’ has been enacted, 
treating handling as a separate and independent crime than being an ‘accessory’ after 
the fact to the offence of ‘theft’. 1038   First, the Larceny Act 1827 1039  recognised 
receiving as an offence in its own right.1040 Criminal Law Act 1967 expanded the scope 
of the handling offence to encompass other forms of assistance.1041 At the moment, The 
statutory offences of handling are contained in the Theft Act 1968 section 22, and in 
Financial Services Act 2012 (section 6(1H)(3)(c)).1042 Statutorily, handling offence is as 
defined in the Theft Act 1968 section 22.1043 
The ML provisions contained in POCA 2002 sections 327, 328, and 329 is a replica of 
FSA 2012 section 6(1H)(3)(c) and Theft Act 1968 section 22. In its ordinary dictionary 
meaning as defined by Cambridge Online Dictionary, “handling” simply means 
“dealing with”. Thus, sections 327-329 laundering offences are nothing but handling or 
dealing with illicit profits but in different ways. Similarly, section 22 handling offence 
is wide ranging, and it creates two offences, which can be committed in many ways.1044  
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1041 ibid 
1042 s 6(1H)(3)(c) referred to money laundering as “handling the proceeds of crime”. This section replaced 
the repealed FSMA 2000 s 6(3) 
1043 s 22(1) 
1044 R v Bloxam [1983] 1 AC 109, 113 where Lord Bridge stated: ‘it is, I think, now well settled that this 
subsection creates two distinct offences, but no more than two. The first is equivalent to the old offence of 
receiving under section 33 of the Larceny Act 1916. The second is a new offence designed to remedy 
defects in the old law and can be committed in any of the various ways indicated by the words from 
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The offence of handling stolen goods is similar to the laundering offence in that they are 
offences of disposal of unlawfully acquired property. 1045  Due to overlaps between 
handling and laundering offences, it has been suggested that the laundering offences are 
little but an updated version of handling.1046 However, the limitation of section 22 as 
compared to sections 327-329 laundering offences, is that section 22 is not all crime ML 
statute.  
For the offence of handling, the prosecution needs to prove the goods were stolen, that 
the defendant handled the goods, and that at the time when the defendant handled the 
goods, he was acting dishonestly and knew or believed that they were stolen.1047 In 
contrast, as discussed above the elements of section 327, 328, and 329 laundering 
offences are different.  
Owing to the similarities between the two offences, the first prosecution of ML case by 
an English court at the time when there was no statutory offence of all crime ML was 
achieved using section 22 of the Theft Act 1986.1048 The maximum penalty for handling 
offences under the Theft Act 1986 is 14 years in prison, which is the same for offences 
of ML under sections 327-329. 1049  The punishment for the handler doubles that 
available for the thief himself, which is seven years imprisonment.1050 Reason being that 
there would not be so many thieves if there were no receivers.1051  
                                                                                                                                          
“undertakes” to the end of the subsection’; in contrast, the Court of Appeal opined that s 22 creates only 
one offence, which can be committed in a number of ways (R v Muriel Willis (1973) 57 Cr. App. R. 1, 
affirming Sloggett [1972] 1 QB 430 and approving Grifffiths v Freeman [1970] 1 WLR 659); Smith 
(1040) 945 and Ormerod and Laird (n 1038) 1111 support R v Muriel Willis line of argument 
1045 Alldridge (n 1034) 210 
1046 HL Deb May 27 2002, cols 1064 - 1065  
1047 s 22(1); see also Smith (1040) 945 
1048 R v Brian Henry Reader (1988) 10 Cr. App. R. (s.) 210 
1049 Theft Act 1968 s 22(2) 
1050 ibid s 7 
1051 R. v William Steven Battams (1979) 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 15, 16 
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3.6.2 TAXATION 
Income tax, in economic terms, is a levy on persons measured by an index of their gains 
and advantages, or ‘control over society’s resources’.1052 While tax evasion is regarded 
as a predicate offence to ML for the purposes of confiscation of the proceeds of crime, 
tax assessment is used to deprive criminals of their illicit gains. 
3.6.2.1 PAYMENT OF TAXES 
People who make gains through criminal activity are required to pay tax on the proceeds 
of thier crime.1053 It has long been established in the UK that illegally acquired gains are 
taxable.1054 The tax authorities need not prove the source of the taxpayer’s gains. All 
that is required is that the taxpayer has made a taxable gain for which he is liable to pay 
the appropriate tax together with any interest and penalties where the taxpayer failed to 
pay in time.1055  
However, for the proceeds of criminal activity to be taxable, the activity must represent 
a trade, profession or vocation, or the provision of services for payment.1056 Although 
trade is the main yardstick in determining whether income is taxable, the tax regime 
does not sustain a trade that is entirely illegal such as theft, robbery, or murder-for-
hire. 1057  The courts have always rejected the argument that the State encourages 
criminal activities by taking a share of the profits of crime through taxing the proceeds 
generated by the crime.1058 
                                                
1052 John Glover, ‘Taxing the Proceeds of Crime’ [1997] 1(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 117 
1053 Anthony Kennedy, ‘An Evaluation of the Recovery of Criminal Proceeds in the United Kingdom’ 
[2007] 10(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 33, 40 
1054 Partridge v Mallandaine (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 276, 278; Lindsay Wood and Hiscox v IRC (1932) 18 TC 
43; R v Poynton (1972) 72 DTC 6329; IRC v Aken (1990) STC 197 
1055 Kennedy (n 1053) 
1056 Mallandaine (n 1054) 278; also see Martyn J Bridges, ‘Taking the Profit out of Crime’ [1997] 1(1) 
Journal Money Laundering Control 26 
1057 JP Harrison (Watford) Ltd v Griffiths (1962) 40 TC 281, 229; also see Bridges (n 1056) 
1058 Mann v Nash [1932] 1 K.B. 752, 758-59 
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As criminals are often not known to the HMRC, the Parliament vested in the NCA the 
power to assess and issue a tax demand where they have reasonable grounds to suspect 
a person of having received income or gains derived from unlawful activity but felt that 
other means of recovering the proceeds of crime are not viable. 1059  With the 
introduction of the UWO, NCA may not necessarily go down this line since there may 
be no need to tax an unexplained wealth that just resurfaced. It is difficult to imagine a 
tax evader admitting to tax evasion when he is confronted with an UWO, knowing that 
he could be liable to tax evasion and ML, while the unexplained wealth could be subject 
to civil recovery.  
The general revenue function that can be exercised by the NCA is spelt out by POCA 
2002 section 323.1060 However, the NCA power with regard to revenue function is 
limited to such functions provided by section 323. For example, the NCA does not have 
the power of making subordinate legislation relating to revenue offence.1061 The purpose 
of the restriction is to clearly demarcate the functions of the two agencies with regard to 
revenue collection.1062 
 While raising the revenue for the crown and associated functions such as formulation 
and enforcement of the revenue regime remain the preserve of HMRC, crime prevention 
through asset forfeiture is for the NCA.1063 To exercise its revenue power, the NCA 
                                                
1059   HC Deb 30 October 2001, vol 373, col 765 (Originally Part 6 of POCA vested this power in the 
director of ARA, and then to SOCA. Since 1st October 2013, CCA 2013 abolished SOCA and transfer 
this function to the NCA)  
1060 s 323(1)(a)-(h) 
1061 s 323(3) 
1062 Ian Smith and others on Asset Recovery, Criminal Confiscation and Civil Recovery (first published 
2003, 2nd edn, OUP 2007) updated 2008 Vol II, IV.2.38 
1063 ibid 
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must reasonably suspect that the person has taxable profits, income or gains arising 
from criminal conduct.1064  
Subject to POCA section 326(2), criminal conduct, is conduct which constitutes an 
offence, or would constitute one if it occurred in the United Kingdom.1065 However, a 
reasonable suspicion that offence of tax evasion has been committed does not entitle 
NCA to assume revenue function.1066 The reasonable suspicion must relate to conduct 
constituting an offence rather than an unlawful conduct. However, there is no express 
requirement for the suspicion to relate to a particular type of unlawful conduct.1067  
Suspicion is to be given its ordinary meaning. 1068  The inclusion of the word 
‘reasonable’ means that ‘suspicion’ must be based on some facts. For example, the issue 
is within the knowledge of the NCA, or at least it was reported to it. Thus, the 
‘suspicion’ must not be capricious but rational and capable of explanation.1069 What 
could amount to ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ is explained in O'Hara Appellant v 
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.1070 
While the test for ‘reasonable ground to suspect’ has objective and subjective 
elements,1071 Lord Steyn postulates certain general propositions about the nature and the 
quality of information, which may lead a constable to form ‘reasonable ground to 
                                                
1064 ibid IV.2.106 
1065 POCA 2002 s 326(1) 
1066 POCA s 326(2); also see Smith and others (n 1062) Vol II, IV.2.11 
1067 Smith and others (n 1062) Vol II, IV.2.12 
1068 Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] A.C. 942, 948 per Devlin LJ 
1069 Smith and others (n 1062) Vol II, IV.2.16 
1070 [1997] A.C. 286, 294 (Lord Steyn explained that, an order to arrest cannot without some further 
information being given to the constable be sufficient to afford the constable reasonable grounds for the 
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1071 [1997] A.C. 286 
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suspect’.1072 Therefore, NCA must have reasonable ground to suspect that income or 
chargeable gains accrued to the taxpayer as a result of his conduct or that of another.1073 
With regard to disruption of ML, taxing the proceeds of crime have certain advantages. 
First, it is faster than the civil recovery process and the evidentiary burden of proof is 
also lower than even that required in civil recovery cases. 1074  Second, taxpayer’s 
liability to tax remains independent of his liability under the confiscation order made 
under a criminal proceeding. 1075  Third, assessment of the proceeds of crime under 
section 29 of Taxes Management Act 1970 with a view to determining the tax payable 
does not violate Article 7 of the ECHR 1950, as Article 7 applies only to criminal 
offences and criminal penalties.1076   
Fourth, article 6 ECHR did not apply to tax assessments made under Part 6 of POCA, 
since tax assessment proceedings relating to Part 6 general Revenue functions do not 
involve criminal charge status.1077 Fifth, taxing the proceeds of crime was held not to 
contravene Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR that guarantees the protection of 
properties of individuals.1078  
Six, even where a defendant cannot stand trial due to ill health, assessment of tax can 
still go on, and that does not amount to a breach of article 6 ECHR.1079 In this regard, a 
living taxpayer’s position is no different from that of the estate of a deceased taxpayer 
in relation to the payment of inheritance tax.1080 Seven, expenses incurred illegally may 
                                                
1072 [1997] A.C. 286, 293; also, please see: Smith and others (n 1062) Vol II, IV.2.17 
1073 Smith and others (n 1062) Vol II, IV.2.18 
1074 Kennedy (n 1053) 
1075 Smith and others (n 1062) Vol II, IV.2.20 
1076 Khan v Director of the Assets Recovery Agency [2006] S.T.C. (S.C.D.) 154 para 47 
1077 ibid para 25-27 
1078 ibid para 44-45 
1079 ibid para 29-30 
1080 ibid para 30 
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not be considered in determining the amount of profit made. Thus, gross receipts of a 
drug dealer may be taxed without allowing a deduction for expenses incurred in 
obtaining the drugs, and in some cases, tax liability might exceed profits generated.1081  
3.6.2.2 CRIMINAL TAX EVASION  
Those involved in economic crimes will naturally evade tax to avoid exposing 
themselves by revealing to the revenue authorities the nature of their commercial 
activities.1082 Tax evasion is another term for tax fraud, which relies on falsehood or on 
ML techniques to hide the tax due to the crown.1083 Statutorily, there is no indictable 
offence of tax evasion.1084  
However, under the common law, tax evasion is an indictable offence known as 
‘cheating the revenue’. 1085  In R v Mulligan, 1086  the court cited with approval the 
following passage from Hawkins ‘Pleas of the Crown’ (28th end, p. 1322): “frauds 
affecting the Crown and public at large are indictable cheats at common law”. This 
principle has been applied in many other tax evasion cases since 1917.1087  
Tax evasion is also prosecuted under the Theft Act 1968 as cheating the revenue1088 or 
false accounting.1089 Section 2 of the 1968 Act, i.e evading liability by deception, used 
                                                
1081 Smith and others (n 1062) Vol II, IV.2.106 
1082 Bridges (n 1056) 
1083 ibid 27; Aileen Barry, ‘Examining Tax Evasion and Money Laundering’ [1999] 2(4) Journal of 
Money Laundering Control 326 
1084 Toby Graham and Taylor Joynson Garrett, ‘Money Laundering and Foreign Tax Evasion’ [2000] 3(4) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 377, 380 
1085 The Court of Appeal defined the common-law offence of cheating the public revenue R v Less Times, 
March 30, 1993 
1086 [1990] STC 220; [1990] Crim LR 427 
1087 R. v Hudson (Alan Harry) [1956] 2 Q.B. 252, (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 1 
1088 s 32 
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to be another means of prosecuting tax evasion.1090 This section has since been repealed 
and replaced by Fraud Act 2006.1091  
Section 1 of the 2006 Act now provides three ways in which fraud can be committed 
which include fraud by false misrepresentation.1092 During the House of Commons’ 
Standing Committee debate on the Fraud Bill, the minister stated that ‘the new offence 
closely follows proposals set out in the 2002 Law Commission report on fraud, which 
concluded that the existing legislation was deficient in a number of respects’.1093  
To convict a defendant of tax fraud, the prosecution needs to prove that the defendant 
omits to hand over revenues lawfully due to the Crown, they need not prove false 
representation, or deception – in fact, conspiracy to defraud is sufficient.1094 Although 
most of the cases of tax evasion dealt with by HMRC are indictable, it does appear that 
very few cases are prosecuted as criminal tax offences.1095 This is because HMRC has 
the discretion to determine whether to proceed with civil settlement if it will be more 
efficient than to proceed with prosecution.1096  
Its predecessors, the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise were given wide-ranging 
powers in dealing with tax offences.1097 Both the ‘Board’ and the ‘Commissioners’ have 
used these powers against those who have cheated the public revenue.1098 Though the 
                                                
1090 Barry (n 1083) 
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1092 Fraud Act 2006 s 1(2)(a) 
1093 HC Deb 20 June 2006, Col 4 
1094 Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1975] AC 819, 840; also see Ben Brandon, ‘Tax Crimes 
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1095 Kennedy (n 1053) 
1096 Barry (n 1083) 327-328 
1097 Taxes Management Act 1970 s 102; Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 s 152 
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HMRC favours civil settlement, still very few cases in the so-called heinous categories 
are considered from the outset as potential prosecutions.1099  
Sections 327-329 created the three-primary ML offences. The common denominator 
among the three offences is the notion of ‘criminal property’.1100 The criminal property 
is defined as ‘a person’s benefit from criminal conduct’, or where it represents such 
benefit (in whole or in part and whether directly or indirectly), and the alleged offender 
knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a benefit.’1101 Thus, proceeds 
derived from tax offences such as cheating the public revenue will represent the 
proceeds of criminal conduct for the purpose of POCA 2002 section 327-329. Also, 
failure to report suspicion of tax evasion will breach section 330-331.  
It was argued that proceeds of tax evasion are fundamentally different from the 
proceeds of conventional crimes such as drugs related crime, and therefore AML 
legislation does not apply to the proceeds of tax evasion.1102 The logic is simply that 
‘proceeds’ generally means funds obtained rather than retained.1103 Also, it was argued 
that tax offence should not be treated as a predicate offence for the purposes of the 
AML regime.1104  
However, POCA 2002 section 327 taken together with section 76(5) seems to defeat the 
above argument because section 76(5) extends the definition of ‘benefit’ to any 
pecuniary advantage derived because of or in connection with the commission of an 
                                                
1099 Andrew Hinsley and Others ‘Fiscal Aspect of Money Laundering’ in Barry AK Rider and Chizu 
Nakajima, Anti Money Laundering Guide (CCH Editions 1999) 54-300 and 400; Barry (n 1083) 328 
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1101 POCA 2002 s 340(3) 
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offence.1105 Thus, obtaining pecuniary advantage by cheating the public revenue will 
amount to ‘criminal property’ within the meaning of section 340(5).1106  
For section 327 to apply, the property needs to be criminal property at the time of the 
transaction, not because of the transaction. 1107  Since a tax evader by his criminal 
conduct derived financial advantage for retaining funds that should be paid as tax, it will 
be an offence to deal with the proceeds of tax evasion in a manner prescribed by 
sections 327-329. It will also be a crime to tip-off a suspected tax evader after a 
disclosure has been made.1108  
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in R v Dermot Dimsey and Brian Roger Allen1109 
provide a clear authority that AML legislation applies to the proceeds of tax evasion. 
Pursuant to section 340(2)(b) of POCA 2002, the UK ML regime also applies to foreign 
tax evasion despite authorities such as Government of India v Taylor,1110 Re Visser1111 
and QRS1 APS v Flemming Frandsen,1112 and despite the opinion expressed by the 
Law Commission on the jurisdiction over offences of fraud and dishonesty with the 
foreign element,1113 all of which sought to limit the Courts’ jurisdiction to tax evasions 
that occurred in the UK.1114  
CFA 2017 part 3 creates offences of corporate failure to prevent the criminal facilitation 
of tax evasion.1115 Section 45 targets people, in Crown dependency or overseas territory 
                                                
1105 Bridges and Green (n 1103) 
1106 R v IK [2007] EWCA Crim 491 
1107 R v Loizou [2005] EWHC Crim 1579; R v Montila [2004] UKHL 50 
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1109 [2000] 1 Cr App R (S.) 497 
1110 [1955] A.C. 491 
1111 [1928] Ch. 877 
1112 [1999] STC 616 
1113 Law Commission’s Report on the Jurisdiction Over Offences of Fraud and Dishonesty with a Foreign 
Element 
1114 Graham and Garrett (n 1084) 377-79 
1115 CFA 2017 s 45 and 46; Please see s 3.2.1 
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or wherever in the world, who advise UK citizens to evade UK tax – it does not matter 
that they have no presence or partners in the UK.1116 On the other hand, section 46 
creates a new offence that will be committed by relevant bodies that fail to prevent 
persons associated with them from criminally facilitating evasion of taxes owed to a 
foreign country.1117 The new overseas tax evasion offence can be committed by relevant 
bodies that are formed or incorporated in the UK, or which are carrying out a business 
activity in the UK, or where the criminal act of facilitation occurs within the UK.1118  
Having reasonable prevention procedures in place serve as a defense to failure to 
facilitate offence.1119 What constitutes “reasonable prevention procedures” is informed 
by six guiding principles, which follow the guiding principles identified in the guidance 
to the Bribery Act.1120 Based on the guiding principles, the prevention measures should 
be bespoke and risk-based.  
Sections 45 and 46 apply extraterritorially. Thus, the offences are committed 
irrespective of geographical location from where they are committed – all what is 
required is facilitating UK tax evasion by any person wherever situated or facilitating 
foreign tax evasion by a UK person from wherever.1121 It will be difficult for a relevant 
body that violates this statute to escape liability because guidance on how to prevent the 
facilitation of tax evasion would be made available by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.1122  
                                                
1116 HC Deb 22 November 2016, vol 617, col 139 
1117 HC Deb 22 November 2016, vol 617, col 143 
1118 HC Deb 22 November 2016, vol 617, col 143 
1119 CFA ss 45(2) and 46(3) 
1120 ‘Criminal Finances Bill: The new corporate offences of failing to prevent the facilitation of tax 
evasion’ (Norton Rose Fulbright,  October 2016) 
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1121 CFA 2017 s 48 
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The offence of failure to prevent mirrors Bribery Act 2010 section 7 – failure to prevent 
corruption. As a result, relevant bodies would be vicariously liable for the wrongdoing 
of their employees or agents. Unlike section 7 of the Bribery Act, it does not matter 
whether benefit has accrued to the facilitator.1123 Thus, senior management must be on 
their toes to prevent their corporate entities from becoming liable for this offence.  
Overall, CFA 2017 part 3 has effectively extended the offence of tax fraud to cover 
practices such as advising persons to evade tax. Businesses which pay large sums to 
consultants, do cross-border business, engage casual or itinerant labour and contractors, 
or handle goods and services where organised fraud is a risk, are at high risk of falling 
foul of the new legislation.1124 
 The new tax offence has generated controversy. As it is broadly drafted, it has the 
potential to criminalise inadvertent facilitation in cases where senior management were 
unaware of and uninvolved in any of their employees criminal conduct, and liability 
could arise even where no benefit has accrued to the company.1125 Whether HMRC 
would have the resources to prosecute cases successfully remains to be seen.1126 
3.7 FATF MUTUAL EVALUATION OF THE UK 
FATF is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the G7 countries in 
response to the growing concern over ML.1127 The objectives of the FATF are to set 
standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational 
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1124 Paul Stainforth, ‘Thoughtful commentary - by tax experts, for tax experts’ [2017] 1352 Tax Journal 2 
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1127 FATF, ‘History of the FATF’ <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/historyofthefatf/> accessed 18 January 
2016 
  211 
measures for combating ML, TF and other related threats to the integrity of the 
international financial system.1128  
As part of its practices, the FATF conducts regular and continuous peer evaluation of 
each Member State to assess levels of compliance with its Recommendations, 
providing an in-depth description and analysis of each country’s system for preventing 
criminal abuse of the financial system.1129 Consequently, FATF had conducted a mutual 
evaluation on the UK’s AML regime to determine the level of compliance with its 
recommendations. The first mutual evaluation was conducted between 1991 and 1995 
to monitor the degree of compliance with the FATF’s Forty Recommendations, and in 
1996 the second round began.1130  
Following the first evaluation report, the United Kingdom effected significant changes 
to its legislation.1131 That was achieved by enacting CJA 1993, which amended CJA 
1988 to create all crime ML. 1132  CJA 1993 also strengthen the confiscation 
legislation.1133 Other AML measures put in place by the UK include the enactment of 
MLR 19931134 and adoption of administrative measures to complement her legislative 
efforts.1135 
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  212 
The third mutual evaluation exercise was conducted at the end of 2006 to test the UK’s 
levels of compliance with the FATF’s 40+9 Recommendations on AML/CFT.1136 The 
evaluation, which was conducted at a time when POCA 2002 was already in place, 
adjudged the UK as having broad and comprehensive legal structure to combat ML and 
TF.1137 
However, failure to have an effective anti-corruption law led FATF to be critical on the 
UK’s commitment to preventing corruption. 1138  This and other reasons led to the 
enactment of the Bribery Act 2010. 1139  Other deficiencies were uncovered during 
FATF’s onsite assessment visits in the UK, and recommendations were made on how to 
address the deficiencies identified, and improve on measures already on the ground.1140  
Having been placed on a regular follow-up process, the UK reported back to the FATF 
Secretariat with a full report on its progress in June 2009 and FATF conducted a paper-
based desk review of the data supplied by the UK.1141 Satisfied with the progress the 
UK made in addressing the issues raised, FATF granted the UK’s application for 
removal from the regular follow-up process.1142  
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The fourth round of mutual evaluation commenced in 2014, and according to the 
assessment calendar, the likely date for assessing the UK will be March/April 2018.1143 
The fourth round of mutual evaluation differs from the previous evaluations because 
FATF has now added a new component to the exercise. In addition to the traditional 
compliance assessment, the effectiveness of the individual countries AML/CFT system 
will now be tested to see how well the system works in achieving the desired result.1144 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
While ML and other crimes posed a serious threat to the UK, countering the threat is not 
an easy task. However, the UK is relentless in its efforts to disrupt ML. AML legislation 
developed incrementally, starting from the DTOA 1986 to POCA 2002 and MLR 2007. 
To complement these two pieces of legislation guidance has been issued to aid proper 
AML best practices. 
This chapter reveals that while the UK AML law is comprehensive, it has its strengths 
and weaknesses. The evolution of AML law in the UK shows that adjusting UK AML 
law to remedy failures or respond to new challenges is an on-going thing. Operation 
Julie Case proved the UK confiscation regime ineffective. Consequently, the 
government established the Hodgson Committee to recommend solutions. Following 
the Hodgson Committee recommendations, the DTO 1986 was enacted to criminalise 
laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking, and to allow for the confiscation of 
proceeds associated with drug trafficking. Moreover, CJA 1988 enabled the 
confiscation of the proceeds of all crimes.  
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gafi.org/calendar/assessmentcalendar/?hf=10&b=0&r=%2Bf%2Ffatf_country_en%2Funited+kingdom&s
=asc(document_lastmodifieddate)&table=1> accessed 19 January 2016 
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Both the DTOA 1986 and the CJA 1988 were amended by the CJA 1993. While the 
CJA 1993 amended CJA 1988 to criminalise all crime ML, a dichotomy was created 
between drug ML and all crime ML. This dichotomy posed challenges to the 
prosecution, as they were always required to prove which criminal conduct generated 
the proceeds. While the CJA 1988 continue to exist after the amendment, DTA 1994 
replaced the DTOA 1986.  
The DTA 1994 and the CJA 1993 were later revoked and replaced by the POCA 2002, 
removing the dichotomy. The POCA 2002 was severally amended to bring its ML 
provisions up to date. MLRs, which have been complimenting UK primary legislations, 
also continue to witness changes to respond to the growing AML threats. Since the 
enactment of the DTOA 1986 body of case law developed which help to clarify 
ambiguities in the law.  
Handling offences under the Theft Act 1968, and tax law, prove to be useful in 
combating ML. Section 22 of the Theft Act 1968 have been used successfully to 
prosecute ML case at a time when there was no AML law existing in the UK statute 
book. However, regarding combating ML and TF, these laws have limited application. 
The conclusion is that the AML law has loopholes that need to be closed. However, one 
good thing is that these laws, especially the substantive AML law are constantly 
undergoing regular amendments to respond to the threat of ML and TF. CFA 2017 
substantially amended POCA 2002 to give law enforcement additional powers to deal 
with the constantly evolving threat of ML, TF and other economic crimes.  
CFA has introduced UWO to attack proceeds of crime, especially the proceeds of 
foreign corruption. It also introduced the offence of corporate failure to prevent tax 
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evasion. Furthermore, CFA substantially amended the way SAR is handled. These are 
by no means the only changes CFA has made to the UK AML landscape. In conclusion, 
CFA is the most important legislation relating to ML the UK has had. 
Having critically appraised the UK AML law in this chapter, and the US AML law in 
the preceding chapter (chapter 2), this thesis now progresses with a critical analysis of 
the practice relating to ML in the US and UK. In other words, this thesis now discusses 
the compliance aspect of the AML regime.  
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CHAPTER 4: PRACTICE RELATING TO MONEY 
LAUNDERING IN UK AND US 
The legal and administrative burdens that have been cast upon 
bankers and other intermediaries are onerous and may well 
involve serious legal and other liabilities for no or deficient 
compliance. 
      Professor Barry A. K. Rider1145 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 2 and 3 critically examined the law relating to ML in the US and the UK 
respectively. The law in both jurisdictions requires certain practical steps to be taken to 
prevent ML and to TF. For example, both BSA 1970 and POCA 2002 require 
individuals and regulated persons to report knowledge or suspicion of ML. Thus, an 
AML compliance system needs to be established and maintained to discharge this and 
other obligations imposed by AML law in both jurisdictions.  
This chapter examines AML compliance in both the US and UK. In other words, this 
chapter appraises practice relating to ML in the US and UK. Cambridge Dictionaries 
online defines compliance as “the act of obeying an order, rule, or request”.1146 ICA 
refers to compliance as “the ability to act according to an order, set of rules or 
request”.1147  
In AML context, compliance refers to administering and maintaining internally 
developed systems and controls to ensure internal compliance with the AML 
                                                
1145 Barry AK Rider, ‘The Practical and Legal Aspects of Interdicting the Flow of Dirty Money’ [1996] 
3(3) Journal of Financial Crime 234 
1146 Cambridge Dictionary < http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/compliance#translations> 
accessed 1 April 2016  
1147  International Compliance Association <http://www.int-comp.org/careers/a-career-in-
compliance/what-is-compliance/> accessed 12 April 2016 
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programme.1148 AML programme is the system designed to assist regulated persons in 
their fight against ML and TF.1149  
Title 31 CFR laid down the requirements for implementing US AML compliance 
programme mandated by Title 31 USC section 5318(h). The requirements cover areas 
such as CDD and CIP.1150 In the UK, these requirements are contained in MLR 2007 
and the FCA Systems and Controls. On the other hand, the JMLSG provides detailed 
guidance specifying how and what steps should be taken to implement UK AML 
compliance programme.  
The JMLSG guidance notes are important, in that, the Court is required to have regard 
to whether a firm has complied with the notes, when determining whether an offence 
has been committed.1151 Other professional organisations, such as the Law Society and 
ICAEW, also issued guidance to their members to help them comply with their AML 
obligation under POCA 2002 and MLR 2007.1152 As the CFA 2017 amended POCA 
2002 substantially, the AML compliance obligations on the regulated persons will 
increase. 
The overall effectiveness of the AML law partly depends on the efficiency of the 
practices through which the law is implemented. To ensure effective AML compliance 
regime all hands must be on deck, each playing its part of the role. While senior 
management bears the responsibility for ensuring effective AML compliance in their 
                                                
1148 Maria A de Dios, ‘The Sixth Pillar of Anti-Money Laundering Compliance: Balancing Effective 
Enforcement with Financial Privacy’ [2016] 10(2) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & 
Commercial Law 495, 505 
1149 ACAMS, AML Glossary of terms < http://www.acams.org/aml-glossary/> accessed 15 July 2016 
1150 Michael F Zeldin and Carlo V di Florio, ‘Strengthening Laws and Financial Institutions to Combat 
Emerging Trends in Money Laundering’ [1999] 2(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 303, 305   
1151 POCA 2002 s 330(8); TACT 2000, MLR 2007 reg 45(2); FCA Handbook SYSC 3.2.6E 
1152 Martyn Bridges, ‘Tax Evasion – A Crime in Itself: The Relationship with Money Laundering’ [1996] 
4(2) Journal of Financial Crime 161, 166 
  218 
organisation, the law enforcement agencies must discharge thier duty to ensure the law 
is enforced to prevent compliance failure.  
On the other hand, gatekeepers have an important role to play in AML compliance, 
because they serve as a gateway to businesses through which proceeds of crime are 
usually laundered. While the AML law in the UK placed compliance obligation on the 
gatekeepers, AML law in the US does not, leaving a big loophole.  
The hallmark of the AML compliance programme is the risk-based approach, which 
allows for discretion on how to discharge AML obligations, taking into account an 
approved guidance.1153 This discretion appears to be vital if the AML laws are to gain 
the needed legitimacy. The law that retains legitimacy from those it regulates is more 
likely to result in enhanced order, stability and effectiveness.1154 
Co-operation between government and the private sector may engender compliance 
culture. Despite enforcement efforts by the regulators and law enforcement, as well as 
the magnitude of fines and other penalties against erring regulated firms for failure of 
compliance, AML compliance breaches are still occurring. While this points towards 
failure in law and practice relating to ML in both jurisdictions, it also underlines the 
need for co-operation to stimulate willing compliance by the regulated firms.  
This chapter comprises of nine sections. Section 2 discusses the regulatory framework 
in the UK and US. Section 3 examines the need for an effective AML compliance 
programme. Section 4 seeks to explore why the law placed compliance obligation on 
the financial intermediaries. Section 5 presents the cost-benefit analysis of the AML 
                                                
1153  Kimberly Anne Summe, ‘The Battle Against Money Laundering: An Examination of US Law, 
International Cooperative Efforts and Corporate Governance Issues’ [2000] 3(3)  Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 236, 241 
1154 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (first published 1991, Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 33-35 
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compliance. Section 6 examines the role of senior management, law enforcement and 
the gatekeepers in ensuring an effective compliance system. Section 7 explores the need 
for co-operation among the stakeholders. Section 8 analyses the tension that normally 
arises due to the conflict between contractual duty to carry out client’s instruction and 
the obligation, not to tip-off the client about impending investigations. Finally, section 9 
concludes this chapter. 
4.2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE AML COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMME 
This section discusses the legal basis for the AML compliance in the US and UK. 
Compliance drives its lawful authority from contract law and employment law.1155 
When parties agreed to the contractual terms they comply with them. Where parties 
breach the agreement, they try to settle out of court using alternative dispute resolution. 
Where the parties settle out of court they still come to agreement which they need to 
comply with. Where parties fail to comply voluntarily then there may be the need for 
enforcement.  
The concept of compliance applies to AML compliance, even though AML compliance 
is not voluntary. The law requires regulated persons to behave in certain ways, and 
failure to do so attracts sanction. For example, FCA SYSC 6.1.1R places obligation on 
firms to pay specific attention to the risk that they may be used for financial crime. 
There are corresponding legal requirements in the US that require AML compliance 
4.2.1 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: US  
BSA 1970 lays the foundation for the AML compliance regime in the US. BSA placed a 
duty on FIs to report their customers’ suspicious transactions and currency transactions 
                                                
1155 For example, parties to contract comply with their obligations under the terms of contract voluntarily 
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above the threshold of USD10,000 and to also keep records of all transactions to serve 
as a paper trail.1156 In the case of cash movement across the borders, BSA also places an 
obligation on individual couriers or travellers to report such movements to the US 
Customs, and failure to do so is a ML offence.  
The Patriot Act 2001 re-enacted these provisions by amending BSA 1970 to require 
each FI to establish AML compliance programme.1157 The Act further amends BSA to 
empower the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a regulation prescribing the minimum 
standards for the AML compliance programmes established under section 352(a)(1).1158  
31 CFR section 1010.100 et seq, require FIs to develop and maintain AML compliance 
programme.1159  
The regulations require organisations to develop (on a risk-based approach) 
policies, procedures and controls based on ML risks that a particular company or 
industry faces.1160 As effective ML deterrence programme is necessary to disrupt the 
laundering of proceeds of crime,1161 the risk-based approach provides entities with 
substantial discretion to design an AML compliance programme capable of 
preventing the entity from being used for financial crimes.1162  
The compliance burden on the regulated person has been expanding with the expansion 
of the scope of the BSA. 1163  The expansion also extended the scope of the BSA 
                                                
1156 31 USC ss 5313, 5314, 5315, 5318(g) 
1157 The Patriot Act 2002 s 352(a)(1) 
1158 The Patriot Act 2001 s 352(a)(2) 
1159 31 CFR s 1010.100 et seq 
1160 Harvey M Silets and Carol R Van Cleef, ‘Compliance Issues in the Wake of the Patriot Act’ [2003] 
10(4) Journal of Financial Crime 392, 394 
1161 Robert E Powis, Bank Secrecy Act Compliance (fifth edn, The McGraw-Hill 1997) 176  
1162 Silets and Van Cleef (n 1160) 
1163 The BSA was amended several times. For example, MLCA 1986 amended BSA to criminalised 
“structuring”; Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act 1992 amended BSA to require FIs to file 
suspicious transactions 
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compliance requirements to bring more institutions, especially non-bank FIs, within the 
framework of the BSA.1164  Furthermore, the Patriot Act 2001 extended significantly the 
scope of the BSA compliance regime to cover many other FIs, such as security brokers 
and dealers and insurance companies, to regulate certain banking and deposit 
relationship which could pose great risk to the regulated person in particular and to 
national security in general.1165  
However, as a result of additional criteria that apply to firms in accordance with their 
nature of operations, size and complexity, the impact of the Patriot Act on the FIs varies 
with firms.1166  Initially, branches of foreign banks in the US were not subject to BSA 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements despite being classified as banks by Title 31 
of the Code of Federal Regulations.1167  That has since changed.1168 Treasury regulation 
now requires foreign banks doing business in the US to implement and maintain AML 
programmes.1169 
4.2.2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: UK 
In the UK, MLR 2007 and FCA rules provide the basis for the AML compliance 
programmes that businesses in the regulated sector and professions must establish and 
maintain.1170 The MLR 2007 and the FCA rules on systems and controls impose parallel 
obligations on regulated person to develop and maintain systems and controls to protect 
                                                
1164 For example, Money Laundering Suppression Act 1994 brought tribal casinos and gaming industry, 
card clubs etc. within the scope of the BSA 
1165 Lucindia A Low and others, ‘Country Report: The US Anti-Money Laundering System’ in Mark 
Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering (Edward Elgar 2004) 346 – 47 
(One of the “great risks” to national security and the FIs themselves is terrorist attack which cost both life 
and properties. The main target of the 9/11 terrorist attack was the world’s financial community - the 
attack did not spare FIs or even the class of FIs the terrorist used in laundering the money with which they 
funded the attack: see ibid p 348 - 49) 
1166 Dennis Cox, Handbook of Anti Money Laundering (John Wiley, 2014) 123 
1167 Low and others (n 1165) 381-83 
1168 The Patriot Act 2001 inserted s 5318(h) into title 31 of United States Codes to empower the Secretary 
of the Treasury to issue Regulations granting federal functional regulator (The Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System), to require foreign banks operating in the US to comply with AML programmes  
1169 12 CFR s 103.120(b) 
1170 Gentle and others (n 1019) 20 
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themselves from being used for financial crime.1171 New obligations are expected when 
the MLR 2017 is enacted later in June. 
In the UK, the lawful authority for AML compliance has its roots in the MiFID. 1172 
FCA implemented MiFID Article 13(2)1173 together with the Article 6 implementing 
Directive1174  through SYSC 6.1.1R. This rule requires firms to establish, implement 
and maintain adequate policies and procedures sufficient to ensure compliance of the 
firm (including its managers, employees and appointed representatives) with its 
obligations under the regulatory system and for countering the risk that the firm might 
be used to further financial crime.1175 
Failure to comply with the 2007 Regulations and the FCA rules constitutes an offence 
distinct from ML offence – irrespective of whether ML has been committed. However, 
sanctions for violation of these two parallel regulatory obligations differ. While non-
compliance with 2007 Regulations is a criminal offence,1176 failure to comply with the 
FCA Rules is a regulatory offence.1177  
On the other hand, the JMLSG1178 also issues guidance notes, which provides practical 
assistance on how to interprete and implement the AML regulatory provisions of the 
                                                
1171 Nichola Padfield, ‘Country Report: Anti-money Laundering Rules in the United Kingdom’ in Mark 
Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, A Comparative Guide to Anti-Money Laundering (Edward Elgar 2004) 273-274 
1172  Barry Rider and others, Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (Butterworth, first published 2002, 
Bloomsbury 2016) 319-337 
1173 Council Directive 2004/39/EC OJL145/1 
1174 Council Directive 2006/73/EC OJL241/26 
1175 Rider and others (n 1172) 323-34 
1176 MLR 2007 reg 45(1) 
1177 For example, FCA imposes penalties on Sonali Bank (UK) Limited and its former money laundering 
reporting officer for serious anti-money laundering system failings see FCA Press Release 12 October 
2016 <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/sonali-bank-uk-limited-2016.pdf> accessed 18 
April 2017 
1178 JMLSG is made up of eighteen trade associations, including the British Bankers’ Association, and it 
has been providing guidance notes since 1990, please see JMLSG website 
<http://www.jmlsg.org.uk/what-is-jmlsg>  
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MLR 2007 and the FCA rules. This, is to encourage the regulated person to adopt best 
practices to disrupt ML.1179  
Though JMLSG Notes are just guidance, there are implications for following or 
disregarding them. For example, the court is required to have regard to whether a person 
has followed JMLSG guidance in determining whether an offence of ML has 
occurred.1180 Similarly, FCA rules made it very clear that in considering whether a 
breach of its rules on systems and controls against ML has occurred, the FCA will 
consider whether a person has followed the JMLSG guidance.1181  
Thus, departures from the guidance and the reason for doing so should be documented, 
and firms must be ready to justify departures before the FCA. 1182  Therefore, it is 
advantageous (particularly when laundering has occurred) for a firm to show that 
guidance has been followed since that evidence could shield the regulated firm from 
criminal liability or administrative sanction. 
Having considered the AML regulatory framework in both jurisdictions, we now 
analyse the need for an effective AML compliance programme in the US and UK. 
4.3 THE AML COMPLIANCE FUNCTION 
An AML compliance programme must operate effectively to disrupt ML. While 
regulated persons establish AML compliance programme to comply with the law, for 
                                                
1179 Billings (n 665) 22-675; Cox (n 1166) 93 
1180 POCA 2002 s 330(8); TACT 2000, MLR 2007 reg 45(2); please also see Stuart Bazley, ‘Compliance 
– the Risk and Obligations’ in Barry Rider, Research Handbook on International Financial Crime 
(Edward Elgar 2015) 290 
1181 FCA Handbook SYSC 3.2.6E 
1182 Preface to JMLSG Guidance Notes para 29 (2014 Version) 
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compliance to be effective in disrupting ML, it needs to acquire certain attributes to 
function properly.1183 
4.3.1 COMPONENTS OF AN AML COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME 
Although different laws govern the AML compliance programmes in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, the components are almost the same, and they are geared 
towards achieving the same purpose, which is maintaining the integrity and stability of 
the financial sector.1184  
In the US, Title 31 CFR part 1010.200 (2012) spelt out what is required of a regulated 
person to comply with 31 USC Section 5318(h) to establish AML compliance 
programme. Regulated persons covered by section 5312 definition are obliged to 
establish and maintain AML compliance programme prescribed by 31 USC section 
5318(h) unless clearly exempted by the Treasury Department.1185  
Similarly, in the UK, MLR 2007 requires a regulated person 1186  to establish and 
maintain appropriate policies and procedures to comply with the AML law.1187 Also, the 
FCA Rules on Systems and Controls 1188  impose similar obligations. The JMLSG 
Guidance Notes supplement both MLR 2007 and the FCA rules to help firms to 
implement AML programmes properly.1189 
 In both jurisdictions, at a minimum the AML compliance programme must include the 
development of internal policies and controls; the designation of a compliance officer; 
                                                
1183  These attributes include permanence; effectiveness; operational independence; monitoring and 
assessment; and providing advice and assistance. Please see Rider and others (n 1172) 325-31 
1184 Angela Veng Mei Leong ‘Anti-money laundering measures in the United Kingdom: a review of 
recent legislation and FSA's risk-based approach’ [2007] Company Lawyer 39 
1185  Michael Ashes and Paula Reid, Anti-Money Laundering: Risks, Compliance and Governance 
(Thomson Reuters 2013) 38; Silets and Van Cleef (n 1160) 393 
1186 For the purpose of compliance programme, “relevant person” is as defined in reg 3 and 4 
1187 Such as Part 7 of POCA 2002 
1188 FCA Handbook 2014 Version, SYSC 3.2.6 R, 3.2.6A R, 6.1.1 R, 6.1.2 R 
1189 Bazley (n 1180) 292 
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training of employees on a regular basis to enable them to understand and know how to 
comply with the law; and impartial and periodic auditing of the programme to 
determine its effectiveness or otherwise.1190  Policies and procedures must be adequate 
to enable firms to comply with their regulatory obligations and prevent themselves from 
being used for financial crime.1191 
An AML compliance programme must specify the procedure for proper recordkeeping, 
and continuous update of the records kept, to serve as an audit trail and to aid 
investigations.1192  These procedures must be incorporated into the AML compliance 
programme as part of policies and controls.1193  Moreover, a proper compliance function 
must be permanent, efficient and operationally independent. 1194  An ideal AML 
compliance programme must specify KYC procedure. This involves CDD programme, 
comprising of appropriate customer identification programme and identity verification 
procedure.1195  
While due diligence applies to clients and products such as foreign correspondent 
accounts, little attention is being given to employee vetting.1196 Some investigations and 
prosecutions reveal how employees connived with criminals to manipulate even the best 
                                                
1190 31 USC s 5318(h) (2011); MLR 2007, reg 20(1) 
1191  Rider and others (n 1172) 324; Warde, (n 80) 170 
1192 31 CFR part 103.22-26; 103.15-21; 103.32-38; please also see Ashes and Reid (n 1218) 38; Silets and 
Van Cleef (n 1160) 395 
1193 Silets and Van Cleef (n 1160) 393 (please see 31 CFR part 103.121 (2011) identification programmes 
for banks etc)  
1194  Discussion on these key attributes of compliance function can be found in Rider and others (n 1172) 
325-27  
1195 Cox (n 1166) 691 
1196 Although it has become a practice by almost all employers to conduct background checks prior to 
employment, there is need to incorporate employee vetting in an AML compliance obligation. Other 
regulators should follow the foot path of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), a US regulator, 
which in June 2005 issued a Guidance on Developing an Effective Pre-Employment Background 
Screening Process  
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compliance programme to launder or assist others to launder proceeds of crime.1197 
Involvement of human elements in the operation of compliance is one of its major 
weaknesses. Consequently, vetting of employees (know your employees) should be 
introduced. This should be emphasised by the senior management, and it should cover 
all staff, including compliance officers. Furthermore, the vetting should be continuous 
to reveal changes in behaviour among staff. 
4.3.2 RISK-BASED APPROACH: TIME TO EXCUSE ACCIDENTAL FAILURE  
In both the US and UK, regulated person are required to design and implement AML 
compliance programmes on a risk-based approach basis.1198  The defunct rule-based 
approach requires compliance with a particular set of rules irrespective of the quantum 
of the risk factors associated with a client.1199 According to JMLSG guidance, the risk-
based approach ‘needs to be part of the firm’s philosophy, reflected in its procedural 
controls and which requires the active support of senior management as well as the co-
operation of the business unit’.1200 
The risk-based approach is the hallmark of the AML compliance programme, because 
hardly will any human endeavour be hundred per cent error proof and perfect. Any 
programme that does not allow for discretion would be too mechanical and less cost 
effective and would undermine innovation, competition and legitimate commercial 
                                                
1197  US v Peter Berlin and Others 99 Cr. 914 (SWK) (Lucy Edwards, a Vice President of the Bank of 
New York, Eastern European Division helped her husband Peter Berlin to launder Russian criminal 
assets)  
1198 MLR 2007 reg 20 (Risk based approach in the UK was initially the initiative of six major UK banks 
and the FSA; please see FSA, Press Release FSA/PN/075/2002 15 July 2002 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2002/075.shtml> accessed 1/1/2017 
1199 Kevin L. Shepherd, ‘Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach 
for Transactional Lawyers’ [2009] 43 Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 607, 625; Stephen 
Revell, ‘The Financial Action Task Force – Lawyers as “Gatekeepers”: Risk-Based Approach Guidance 
for Legal Professionals’ [2009] Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP 10 
1200 JMLSG Guidance note 2014 version n. 4.5  
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success.1201 The aim is to encourage regulated firms to allocate resources to activities 
that are most likely to deter and detect ML.1202  
Under the risk-based approach, regulated persons have substantive discretion to 
establish and maintain a compliance programme that is reasonably designed to prevent 
their entity from being used for ML or TF.1203  The purpose of the discretion is to allow 
regulated persons to adopt a programme appropriate to the unique nature of their 
businesses and products, the size and location of the company, the nature and location 
of the customer.1204  
This means that, while the law imposed certain obligations on the regulated firms, the 
firms retain discretion on how to discharge the obligations taking into account an 
approved guidance. This discretion is essential if the AML law is to be effective in 
disrupting ML, as the flexibility would make AML law more legitimate in the eyes of 
those it regulates. A law that retains legitimacy from those it regulates is more likely to 
result in enhanced order, stability and effectiveness.1205   This is also true of AML 
legislations.1206 
The risk-based approach recognises the diverse nature of threat ML poses to the 
regulated firm due to jurisdictional, product, customer and delivery channel 
differences.1207 However, a risk-based approach is not a zero-failure regime, and the 
                                                
1201 Bazley (n 1180) 289  
1202  AM Whittaker, ‘Better Regulations – Principles v Rules’ [2006] 21(5) Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulations 233, 234 
Silets and Van Cleef (n 1160) 394 
1204  For example, see 31 CFR s 103.125(a)-(b), which governs money service businesses (MSB) 
compliance programme 
1205 Beetham (n 1154) 33-35 
1206 Hyland and Thornhill (n 842) 30-450 
1207 Leong (n 1184) 40 
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FSA has acknowledged that.1208  It means that someday the risk will be misjudged and 
an accident will happen.1209  
This raises a critical question. If failure at some point is the inevitable feature of a risk-
based approach, will the law excuse regulated firms who have designed and 
implemented risk-based AML compliance programme as required by the law? For now, 
the answer appears to be in the negative.1210 Instead, in both UK and US, evidence of 
compliance with the relevant AML laws may only reduce culpability where the risk is 
misjudged and an accident happened.  
Meanwhile, regulated persons bear the enormous cost of implementing an effective 
AML compliance programme.1211  Components of AML compliance costs faced by 
banks and other regulated persons include the direct expenses incurred in establishing 
and maintaining risk management and compliance systems; the prospect of reduced 
income as a result of decisions to forgo certain lines of business; the costs that might be 
associated with the possible diversion of resources from other aspects of the bank’s 
work; and the more intangible but yet significant costs of inconvenience to 
customers.1212   
The US Treasury Department claims that the flexibility and discretion inherent in risk-
based approach is sufficient to reduce the financial burden of AML compliance on 
                                                
1208 FSA, The Regulator of the New Millennium [2002] paragraph 6 (FCA replaced FSA) 
1209 Stuart Bazley, ‘The Financial Services Authority, risk-based regulation, principles based rules and 
accountability’ [2008] 23(8) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 422,430 
1210 Ernest L Simons IV, ‘Anti-Money Laundering Compliance: Only Mega Banks Need Apply’ [2013] 
17 North Carolina Banking Institute 249, 266 
1211 Jackie Harvey, ‘Compliance and Reporting Issues Arising for Financial Institutions from Money 
Laundering Regulations: A Preliminary Cost Benefit Study’ [2004] 4 Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 333,335-336 
1212 R Barry Johnston and Ian Carrington, ‘Protecting the Financial System from Abuse: Challenges to 
Banks in Implementing AML/CFT Standards’ [2006] 9(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 48, 57 
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regulated persons.1213 The FSA has made a similar assertion.1214 However, this claim 
has been debunked as evidence suggests that the AML compliance cost is surging due 
to the uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the risk-based approach.1215  
Given the nature and cost of implementing risk-based AML compliance programme the 
law should excuse a regulated firm that has taken all the necessary measures to prevent 
itself from being used for financial crime, but nevertheless, a breach of compliance 
occurs. 1216  This idea may help government obtain greater co-operation from the 
financial sector. This idea of tolerating an accidental violation of AML law due to the 
nature of the ‘risk-based’ approach may incentivise FIs to redouble their effort to 
complement government’s effort towards disrupting ML.  
However, this idea could be a potential loophole that can be exploited by criminals with 
the active connivance of the regulated persons. Criminals might infiltrate existing 
institution or even create an entity for the purpose of taking advantage of this idea. In 
this situation, the exemption should not apply. Thus, in deciding whether a compliance 
failure is accidental, a thorough investigation must be conducted to ensure there are no 
ulterior motives behind the failure.  
As a disincentive to those who would like to exploit this avenue, causing willful failure 
of compliance programme should be punished heavily. Punishment could include the 
combination of long jail term, criminal fine, and banning individuals involved from 
                                                
1213 Simons IV (n 1210) 
1214 Nicholas Ryder, ‘The Financial Services Authority and money laundering: a game of cat and mouse’ 
[2008] 67(3) Cambridge Law Journal 635, 641 citing Ruth Kelly, (2002) Speech to the Financial Services 
Authority Money Laundering Conference, 11th July, p.3 
1215  Neil Katkov, Trends in Anti-Money Laundering 2011 (Celent, 2011) 
<http://amlcft.com/files/2011/09/Celent-AML-Trends-2011-2013-Report.pdf visited> 22 May 2016 
1216 Jackson Grundy Ltd [2016] UKFTT 0223 (TC) (here the court has taken similar approach) 
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working in any capacity that could give them further opportunity to launder criminal 
assets.  
4.3.3 WHY MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME 
For the regulated firm, compliance can serve as a defence to criminal charges of ML. In 
the UK, evidence that a regulated person has followed the JMLSG Guidance Notes will 
serve as evidence that a regulated person has implemented or has made efforts to 
implement AML compliance programme.1217 Consequently, a regulated person could 
adduce evidence of compliance as a defence, to a charge under POCA 2002 section 330, 
MLR 2007 in so far as the regulated person has implemented risk-based AML 
compliance programme.1218  
A regulated person may also avoid sanction if they can show that adequate policies and 
procedures sufficient to ensure its compliance with its obligations under the regulatory 
system has been established and maintained.1219 Even if a regulated person could not 
escape liability altogether, the level of culpability could be reduced on evidence that 
approved guidelines has been followed in establishing systems and policies to ensure 
compliance. In the US, where ML has occurred, proof of an effective AML compliance 
programme could likely reduce the level of culpability under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.1220 
In the UK, the case of Jackson Grundy Limited v The Commissioners for Her 
Majesty's Revenue and Customs 1221 illustrates the advantage a regulated firm can 
                                                
1217 For example the court is required to have regards to whether a regulated person has followed JMLSG 
Guidance in deciding whether an offence of a failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of ML has 
occurred (POCA 2002 s 330(8) and MLR 2007 reg 45(2)) please also see Bazley (n 1180) 290-93 
1218 This also would apply to a charge under TACT 2000 s 19 
1219 Bazley (n 1180) 293; please also see FCA Rule SYSC 6.1.1R 
1220  Stuart Bazley and Andrew Haynes, Financial Services Authority Regulation and Risk-based 
Compliance (Tottel 2007) 194; Summe (n 1190) 241 
1221 [2016] UKFTT 0223 (TC) 
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drive from having AML compliance programme. In this case, having taken evidence of 
the appellant’s compliance with the relevant AML programme under MLR 2007, the 
First Tier Tribunal reduced the penalty imposed on the appellant by the HMRC.1222  
It is interesting to note that, the Tribunal came to this conclusion even though Jackson 
has conceded to some lapses, and that evidence of compliance was not tendered in a 
documentary form.1223 However, under a risk-based approach, it is imperative for a 
regulated person to keep proper records of its compliance efforts, as that will indicate 
what steps were taken, and what steps were not taken in the implementation of the AML 
compliance programme and why.1224  
In Jackson, as the firm operates mainly in small villages, it knows its clients very well 
and therefore considered it unnecessary to take steps to verify their identities, and the 
firm did not keep proper records of why it took that decision.1225 Had the firm kept 
proper records, they could have avoided any penalty, negative publicity and the 
subsequent loss of business. 
As already observed, CDD is one of the most important aspects of AML compliance 
programme. Meanwhile, at the heart of the CDD itself is the ICP.1226   Benefits a 
regulated person can drive through an effective ICP alone are enormous.1227 
By establishing and maintaining an effective AML compliance programme: suspicious 
activity could easily be spotted and reported. Furthermore, a regulated person could 
                                                
1222 OFT imposed the penalty 4 days before its demise and its AML functions in relation to estate agents 
transferred to the HMRC 
1223 [2016] UKFTT 0223 (TC) 34-37 
1224 Hinterseer (n 1) 314 
1225 [2016] UKFTT 0223 (TC) 3, 34 
1226 FATF recommendation 5 
1227  Susan Galli and Jane Wexton, ‘Anti-Money Laundering Initiative and Compliance – A US 
Perspective’ in Barry Rider and Michael Ash, Money Laundering Control (Sweet and Maxwell 1996) 
375-76 
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avoid expensive and unnecessary civil litigation associated with, for example, knowing 
receipt or dishonest assistance, and could avoid negative publicity.1228 Effective AML 
compliance programme can also help regulated persons avoid consequences which 
otherwise would befall them for non-compliance. 
4.4 COMPLIANCE: WHY THE INTERMEDIARIES? 
One pertinent question here is why the law places the responsibility to detect ML on 
those who handle people’s wealth? Why not the government police the regulated sector 
by itself as it does normal street policing? Various arguments have been adduced to 
support the claim that the regulated sector needs to police itself to guard against being 
used for ML.1229  Of course, by so doing, ML becomes difficult and expensive due to 
fear of detection. Also audit trails could serve as evidence against criminals and their 
accomplices. The ultimate aim is to protect the integrity of the financial system.1230  
Protecting market integrity is vital to the stability and soundness of the financial 
system, 1231  the achievement of which require the involvement of the regulated 
sector.1232  While the need for regulated sector support in combating ML has since been 
recognised,1233 avoiding criminal liability is enough to motivate regulated persons to 
prevent themselves from being used for ML.1234 However, why does the law requires 
regulated persons to be at the forefront of disrupting ML? 
                                                
1228 Hinterseer (n 1) 313 
1229 31 USC s 5318(h)(1) 
1230 Anna Simonova, ‘The Risk-Based Approach to Anti-Money Laundering: Problems and Solutions’ 
[2011] 14(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 346, 347 
1231 Johnston and Carrington (n 1212) 52 
1232 Simonova (n 1230) 
1233  Kern Alexander, ‘The International Anti-Money-Laundering Regime: The Role of the Financial 
Action Task Force’ [2001] 4(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 231, 234 
1234 Jackie Harvey, ‘The Search for Crime Money – Debunking the Myth: Facts Versus the Imagery’ 
[2009] 12(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 97, 98
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4.4.1 AUTHORITIES ARE JUST SEEKING FOR HELP  
Due to their small number, law enforcement cannot be physically present at every crime 
scene at the time the crimes are taking place. Thus, authorities always seek for help 
from the public for any information that will assist in apprehending and bring the 
perpetrators to justice.  
The regulated person is in the best position to detect suspicious activities as almost all 
financial transactions pass through the banks.1235 Thus, it is normal to assume that by 
drafting regulated person into the battle against financial crime, authorities are just 
seeking for help from persons who have information on illegal financial transactions,1236 
as it does when, for example, murder was committed, and the law enforcement has no 
lead on who committed it. 
Ordinarily, criminal law does not punish a person for not volunteering or for declining 
to give information. 1237  However, Police believe that bankers, like other citizens, 
generally have a moral obligation to provide them with any information relevant to the 
prevention and detection of [financial] crime. 1238  AML laws in the UK and US 
criminalise failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of ML.1239 Also, the law requires 
regulated persons to take positive steps to put in place policies, procedures and 
processes, with the overall objective of preventing illegal transactions that occur 
through their entities.1240  
                                                
1235 Alexander (n 1233) 232-34 
1236 Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh (n 14) 54 (authors quoted Levi (1992) as saying “police want the 
assistance of the banks to deter money laundering, and to trace the transfer of criminal assets…so that 
more explicit attention than used to be the case has been given to the matrix of networks that lie behind 
criminal enterprise. Within this matrix, the transfer of money has become a key point in the criminal 
enterprise and therefore in the enforcement chain”) 
1237 Hyland and Thornhill (n 842) 30-275 
1238 Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh (n 14) 54 
1239 Please see POCA 2002 s 330-332 and 31 USC s 5311 et seq. 
1240 Please see 31 CFR s 103.135 and MLR 2007 reg 20(1) 
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4.4.2. AUTHORITIES HAVE FAILED 
Although it is normal to seek help and for the citizens (including corporate citizen) to 
complement government effort, it is rather a sign of failure for the authorities to pass 
their responsibility of fighting financial crime to the regulated person whose mandate is 
to make a profit.1241  Indeed, the intricacies of the financial markets require expertise to 
appropriately and efficiently police the market, resources that government may not have 
sufficient.1242   
However, as the UK and US are capitalist societies, businesses are in the hand of 
individuals and organised private sector. Consequently, almost all commercial 
transactions pass through privately-owned firms. Therefore, authority’s reliance on the 
regulated persons to police the market against ML is not unusual, and it does not 
translate to failure.  
4.4.3 REGULATED SECTOR IS PART OF THE PROBLEM  
The desire to maintain client confidentiality and maximise profit make it difficult for 
regulated persons to place priority on AML compliance, thus, on this note, regulated 
persons can be said to have been part of the problem.1243 While employees facilitate ML 
on behalf of organised crime groups,1244  businesses may be found responsible and 
therefore bear the brunt.  
For example, in the US, Riggs Bank failed to establish and maintain AML compliance 
as required by law. 1245  The Broadway case is another example of how a bank 
                                                
1241 Hyland and Thornhill (n 842) 30-275 (the authors have argued that law enforcement lack the capacity 
to implement AML compliance initiatives)  
1242 Barry Rider and Michael Ashe, Insider Crime: The New Law (Jordan 1986) 79; Hyland and Thornhill 
(n 842) 30-275 
1243 Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh (n 14) 54 - 55 
1244 Rider and others (n 1172)179 
1245 Other incidences of misconduct include: Laundering of hundreds of millions of US dollars by UBS 
Zurich to countries like Iraq, Iran, Libya in violation of the OFAC (US) sanctions on those countries  
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deliberately facilitated ML involving about USD230 million by failing to put in place an 
effective BSA/AML programme and for failure to file SAR, and by assisting the 
customer to structure his transaction to evade BSA reporting requirement.1246  
Similarly, the FSA had in 2001 sanctioned UBS Zurich for poor AML controls.1247 In 
February 2016, FinCEN fined Gibraltar Private Bank and Trust Company of Coral 
Gables, Florida, USD4 million civil money penalty for various willful violations of 
federal AML law.1248 These cases reveal the various levels of involvement of regulated 
persons in financial crimes.  
In this situation, to effectively disrupt ML, authorities must devise a way of preventing 
the convergence of regulated sector and organised crime groups to commit a crime. The 
authorities achieve this by asking regulated sector to report the financial activities of 
criminals.1249 Thus, for being part of the problem, regulated persons must be part of the 
solution.1250 
4.4.4 AN EARLY TRIPWIRE 
From whichever perspective (out of the three discussed above) the issue is looked at, the 
government has a legitimate concern to make the regulated persons get involved in the 
fight against ML. Whether the authorities have failed or they are just seeking for help, 
involving regulated sector in disrupting ML is a good option as almost all transactions 
pass through the sector. Similarly, if regulated person is perceived to be complicit, 
                                                
1246 U.S. v Broadway National Bank (2002) (02 Cr 1507 (TPG)); other cases include: U.S. v Banco 
Popular de Puerto Rico (2003) 
1247 Pasley (n 212) 65-66 
1248 FinCEN Press Release, FinCEN Penalizes Florida’s Gibraltar Private Bank for Wilful Anti-Money 
Laundering Compliance Violations <https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20160225.pdf> accessed 
20 June 2016 
1249 See 31 USC s 5311 et seq; 31 CFR s 1010; POCA 2002 Part 7; and MLR 2007 reg 20(1) 
1250 Alldridge (n 42)19 
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obligating those who handle other people’s wealth to establish AML compliance 
programme is tactical for successful disruption of ML.1251  
While involving the regulated persons is desirable for ML to be disrupted successfully, 
the regulated persons bear compliance cost. Thus, next is the cost benefit analysis of an 
AML compliance programme.  
4.5 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Whatever the rationale behind compliance obligation, placing that obligation on 
regulated persons shifts certain government responsibility to the regulated persons.1252 
Consequently, the shift of responsibility comes with some administrative and financial 
burden. 1253  Financial burden due to AML compliance is huge, and it includes 
components such as the cost of physical infrastructure and human capital development 
needed to ensure the functioning of an efficient compliance programme.1254  
However, it is of concern that the compliance burden especially on regulated persons 
are not worth the cost and do not yield any value in disrupting financial crime or in 
assisting law enforcement. 1255  While it is not an issue for large banks to allocate 
resources for a proper AML compliance function, smaller banks and non-bank FIs 
                                                
1251  Rider and others (n 1172) 179-181 
1252  Harvey (n 1211) 336; Antoinette Verhage, ‘Supply and Demand: Anti-Money Laundering by the 
Compliance Industry’ [2009] 12(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 371, 373; Laurel S Terry, ‘US 
Legal Professional Efforts to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing’ [2015] 59 New York Law 
School Law Review 487, 498 
1253 As CFA 2017 amended the UK AML law significantly, the compliance cost will also increase as FIs 
would no longer be able to rely on what they already do. For example As tax evasion is a money 
laundering predicate crime, with the new corporate offence the current AML procedures are just a starting 
point. Please, also Johnston and Carrington (n 1212) 56-7 
1254   Jackie Harvey, ‘An Evaluation of Money Laundering Policies’ [2005] 8(4) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 339, 341 
1255 Rider and others (n 1172) 202 
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struggle with the cost, which sometimes causes compliance failure or even forces 
businesses to close down.1256  
For example, both FinCEN and OCC fined Zion First National Bank for failure of 
compliance just after it wound up its foreign correspondent relationships. 1257  Zion 
terminated its foreign correspondent relationship because they could not bear the high 
cost of the required compliances technology.1258 
A careful reading of FinCEN Report on Zion also reveals the administrative burden 
AML law imposes on the regulated persons. For example, establishing a compliance 
function, designating a compliance officer, filing SAR, and initiating or supporting on-
going law enforcement investigation are examples of how involving the regulated sector 
in the fight against ML imposes an administrative burden on the bank.1259  
The risk-based approach to compliance placed a burden on regulated persons to identify 
and address the risks facing them.1260  AML compliance can be costly, can reduce 
competitiveness and innovation, and can impede a firm’s commercial growth and 
employees’ success.1261  
On the other hand, non-compliance offers, among other things, competitive advantage 
and huge profits.1262 Notwithstanding the adverse effects of compliance, in the long run 
                                                
1256 Simons IV (n 1210) 259 
1257 FinCEN Release <https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/ZionsAssessment.pdf> accessed on 7 
August 2016 
1258 Simons IV (n 1210) 259 
1259 FinCEN Release < https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/ZionsAssessment.pdf> accessed on 7 
August 2016 (this case is only one out of many that demonstrate the administrative burden on FIs in 
implementing an effective AML compliance programme) 
1260 Rider and others (n 1172) 202 
1261 George P Gilligan, Regulating the Financial Sector in Barry AK Rider, Studies in Comparative and 
Financial Law, Vol 6 (Kluwer Law International 1999) 66 
1262 Stuart Bazley and others, Risk-Based Compliance in Barry AK Rider, Butterworths Compliance 
Series (Butterworth 2001) 2- 
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a regulated person stands to benefit more by establishing and maintaining AML 
compliance programme.1263 
Considering the enormous economic and social cost of crimes against the reputational 
boost compliance brings to regulated persons, and the benefit of an effective compliance 
system to the society in terms of crime reduction and financial stability, there appears to 
be a trade-off between the cost and the benefit associated with an effective AML 
compliance regime. 1264  The evidence tends to suggest that courts and regulatory 
agencies will not hesitate to deprive non-compliant regulated person of any financial 
profits they might make from laundering activities.1265  
The greatest risk to a regulated person for non-compliance with AML regulations or 
association with ML activities is the reputational risk.1266  This is because the firm 
stands to lose a lot through income decline, client withdrawal, legal cost and loss of 
future business opportunity.1267 As “trust” is the basis of banking and other sectors in 
the financial services industry, regulated person risks reputational loss should a 
regulatory authority impose sanction on the person for non-compliance with its AML 
regulatory obligations.1268  
While banks should have an inherent interest in preserving their reputation as being the 
cornerstone of integrity,1269 compliance makes it difficult for criminals to launder their 
                                                
1263 ibid 
1264 Please see Harvey (n 1254); and, Sam Brandon and Richard Price, Home Office Study 217 on the 
analysis of Economic and Social cost of crime in the UK [2002] 
1265 UBS Case 
1266 Hyland and Thornhill (n 842) 30-400 (citing the reputation of the firms and the sector as a whole, and 
the transient nature of laundered assets as the reasons why regulated firms should take keen interest in 
establishing AML compliance programme) 
1267 Harvey (n 1244) 341  
1268 Millind Sathey and Jesmin Islam, ‘Adopting a Risk-based Approach to AMLCFT Compliance: the 
Australia Case’ [2011] 18(2) Journal of Financial Crime 169, 171 
1269 Jackie Harvey, ‘The Search for Crime Money – Debunking the Myth: Facts Versus Imagery’ [2009] 
12(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 97,  
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profits and acquire a cloak of respectability.1270 Therefore, a strong, efficient and fully 
implemented AML compliance programme that takes into account the type of risk 
associated with individual businesses, is a way of protecting the integrity of the 
financial sector and shareholder value against the threat of ML.1271 
4.6 ENSURING COMPLIANCE 
Regulated persons need to remain vigilant to detect when they are being or about to be 
used for ML purposes.1272 This, can only be achieved if an effective AML compliance 
programme is established and maintained. Despite the involvement of those who 
handles other people’s wealth in the effort to disrupt ML, the finding of the PSI reveals 
non-compliance culture by banks and deficient oversight by the regulators.1273  
While senior management must institute compliance culture within their firms, law 
enforcement must do their part to ensure AML compliance. Similarly, gatekeepers must 
not be exempted from AML compliance obligations. 
4.6.1 INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY VERSUS CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY  
While the law requires regulated persons to establish and maintain AML compliance to 
disrupt ML effectively, it is the senior management and staff who run the day to day 
activities of the company. As the senior management is the brain behind the corporate 
entity, it has the responsibility of ensuring effective compliance culture in a regulated 
firm.1274 Thus, where there is responsibility, there is a liability for failure to discharge 
that responsibility. The question here is: Who should be held responsible for compliance 
                                                
1270 Bridges (n 1152) 167, see also Rider and others (n 1172) 184 
1271 Zeldin and Florio (n 1150) 311 
1272 Galli and Wexton (n 1227) 361 
1273  United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money 
Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History (Report 202/224-9505 and 202/224-
3721) 2012 
1274 Rider and others (n 1172) 180 
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failure? Should the law impose direct personal liability or corporate responsibility on 
the companies?  
Already both the civil and criminal law have placed direct personal liability on 
individual employees, and vicarious liability on corporate entities.1275 Professor Barry 
Rider and others have analysed the issue of corporate responsibility and direct personal 
liability from the angle of civil and criminal law.1276  Given the role of the senior 
management in ensuring compliance, 1277  the efficiency of the AML compliance 
function partly depends on the senior management establishing and supporting a robust 
compliance function and discharging their compliance oversight duties. 1278 
The FCA has made clear the roles of senior management in ensuring compliance 
culture 1279  In the US, SEA 1934 section 20 requires senior management to take 
responsibility for an effective compliance system.1280 Thus, the high-ranking officials 
assume the role of a controlling person referred to in 17 CFR section 230.405.1281 As 
regulated persons are required to take reasonable care to build and maintain effective 
AML compliance system,1282 so does senior management’s responsibility and liability 
                                                
1275 For example, under tort and criminal law  
1276 Rider and others (n 1172) Chapter 14 and 15 
1277 Rider and others (n 1172) 348 
1278 Please see Christopher Stears, ‘Control Liability and Compliance: Tools for Controlling Financial 
Crime’ in Barry Rider, Research Handbook on International Financial Crime (Edward Elgar 2015) 625 -
57 for analysis on the role of senior management in ensuring compliance  
1279 FCA Handbook SYSC 2.1.1R 
1280  s 20(a) states: “Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any 
provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with 
and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable 
(including to the Commission in any action brought under paragraph (1) or (3) of section 21(d)), unless 
the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts 
constituting the violation or cause of action” 
1281 Barry A K Rider, ‘Facilitators Beware’ [2017] 38(2) Company Lawyer 37; (17 CFR s 230.405 refers 
to senior management as a person or body who ‘possesses, directly or indirectly…the power to direct or 
cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting 
securities, by contract, or otherwise) 
1282 FCA Handbook, SYSC 6.1.1 R, SYSC 6.3 
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increase. The senior management remains the ‘soul’ of their firm although regulated 
persons have a life and personality of their own.1283   
As the directing mind of the company, the board of directors together with the senior 
management have the power to entrench and motivate a culture of compliance.1284 
However, there are indications in some instances that the senior management does not 
inculcate an effective compliance function in their organisations. For example, early 
2016 FinCEN accused Sparks Nugget, a casino in Nevada, of lacking a compliance 
culture. This follows a finding that reveals systematic compliance failure caused by the 
senior management’s negative attitude towards the casino’s compliance function.1285 
Also, the report of the PSI reveals deliberate crippling of compliance function by the top 
management of HSBC (USA).1286  
While there is no clear narrative as to why the senior officials of Sparks Nugget 
disregarded the AML compliance function, a close look at the FinCEN report links the 
adverse attitude of the senior management to their desire to maximise profit and 
minimise cost at the expense of disrupting ML. Similarly, the HSBC (US) case indicates 
that senior management neglected the compliance function to reduce cost.1287 FinCEN 
has advised that interest in revenue should not compromise an effective compliance 
programme.1288 
                                                
1283 Solomon v Solomon [1897] AC 22 
1284 V K Rajah SC, ‘Prosecution of Financial Crimes and its Relationship to a Culture of Compliance’ 
[2016] 37(4) Company Lawyer 122, 128 
1285  FinCEN, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty Against Sparks Nugget 
<https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/Sparks_Nugget_EA.pdf> accessed 8 August 2016  
1286  United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money 
Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History (Report 202/224-9505 and 202/224-
3721)  
1287 ibid 26-27 
1288 FinCEN, Advisory to U.S. Financial Institutions on Promoting a Culture of Compliance, FIN-2004-
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Based on the shortcomings identified during its AML enforcement actions, FinCEN, 
advises that the culture of an organisation be critical to its compliance.1289 Poor AML 
compliance culture undermines the effectiveness of firm’s AML compliance 
programme.1290 Although the law did not criminalise failure to prevent ML, ensuring an 
effective AML compliance is the function of senior management. For the AML 
compliance to be effective, demonstrable support of the leadership is critical.1291 Thus, 
imposing of potential liability on senior management would encourage them to fund and 
support compliance and ensure it’s proper functioning.1292  
At the other end of the spectrum is the issue of imposing liability on the corporate 
entities for the failure of compliance. The US approach of holding corporations and 
senior management liable for the misconduct of their employees has been positive. For 
example, control liability has been playing a very significant role in promoting and 
maintaining integrity in the financial markets.1293 Control liability is critical in ensuring 
compliance because in addition to holding control person personally liable for the 
failure of compliance, the action of the control person can be statutorily attributed to the 
company, being the controlling mind of the company.1294 
In the UK, the Bribery Act 2010 section 7 created an offence of corporate failure to 
prevent corruption. Thus, section 7 placed corporate responsibility on firms to prevent a 
                                                
1289 ibid 1 
1290 ibid 2 
1291 ibid 
1292 Rider and others (n 1172) 365 
1293 Rider and others (n 1172) 365, 380-381 
1294 The Common Law Doctrine of Identification is commonly used to attribute fault to company and hold 
it criminally liable. Under this doctrine, ‘the acts and state of mind’ of those who represent the directing 
mind and will be imputed to the company, Lennards Carrying Co and Asiatic Petroleum [1915] AC 705, 
Bolton Engineering Co v Graham [1957] 1 QB 159 (per Denning LJ) and R v Andrews Weatherfoil 
[1972] 56 Cr App R 31 – please see CPS: Corporate Prosecution). However, this doctrine inhibits holding 
bigger companies to account – it is less difficult to identify the directing mind of the smaller companies 
while, bigger companies avoid prosecution. Please see ICAEW response to the MOJ consultation paper 
on the proposal to create offence of corporate failure to prevent financial crime 
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person associated with it from bribing another person including an official of foreign 
government. In the US, the best way to defend against FCPA exposure is having a pre-
existing compliance programme that is risk tailored and risk-based. The programme 
must include not only mechanisms to prevent and detect violations, but also adequate 
financial and accounting processes to make and keep accurate books and records, and to 
devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls.1295 
Similarly, for a firm to escape liability under Bribery Act 2010 section 7, it must show 
that it has taken adequate measures to prevent persons associated with it from bribing 
another on its behalf.1296 Thus, the defence of “adequate-measures-to-prevent” would 
allow a company to escape liability. CFA 2017 introduces a similar offence of corporate 
failure to prevent the facilitation of domestic and foreign tax evasion.1297 Companies 
must now take positive steps to prevent its officers, employees and agents from 
assisting people to evade tax due to the Crown even if the facilitator is not a UK 
registered company, and even if domiciled outside UK. Also, UK registered companies 
must take steps to avoid facilitating evading tax due to foreign nations. 
There was a proposal to extend this offence to ML, which was not pursued in the 
Criminal Finances Bill. As the idea is not abandoned completely, it is envisaged that the 
offence of corporate failure to prevent ML will soon find its way into the UK statute 
book.1298 Already, the EU is contemplating enacting the corporate failure to prevent ML 
                                                
1295 Deloitte, New FCPA resource guide: Ten things for legal and compliance officers to consider 2013 @ 
p 3 <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance/us-fas-new-fcpa-resource-
guide-printer-friendly-012413.pdf> accessed 16 June 2017 
1296  Bribery Act s 7(2) 
1297 CFA 2017 ss 45 and 46 
1298  The Ministry of Justice consulted with the stakeholders on the issue: 
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liability-for-economic-crime---march-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=0>  
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offence.1299 If the Council issue the proposed Directive before the completion of the 
Brexit negotiations, UK might transpose the Directive into the national law even after 
pulling out. However, when eventually enacted, if the offence of corporate “failure-to-
prevent” ML follows the pattern of section 7 Bribery Act, the defence of “adequate-
measures-to-prevent” might be problematic.1300 
Although pursuing companies could make senior management to take ownership of risk 
that their corporate bodies could be used to launder illicit proceeds, imposing liability 
on companies rather than the senior management has negative consequences. In fact, 
imposing corporate liability will potentially punish innocent shareholders, employees, 
creditors and the society.1301  
Moreover, while imposing liability on FIs could influence the behaviour of smaller 
firms, it may not affect how big firms conduct themselves, as the larger firms could 
systematically pass the fine to customers. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that 
imposing corporate criminal liability on the companies and direct personal liability on 
the senior management is the best approach as that will encourage senior management 
to ensure an efficient use of their institutions to disrupt financial crime.1302  
4.6.2 THE ROLE OF ENFORCEMENT  
While some regulated persons will be willing to comply with the law, others will have 
to be compelled to comply. By the nature of the risk-based approach, compliance failure 
could occur even when a firm has implemented compliance programme commensurate 
                                                
1299 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Directive of The European Parliament and of The 
Council on Countering Money Laundering by Criminal law 2016/0414 (COD) Article 7 
1300 Rider (n 1281) 38 
1301 Rider (n 1172) 339 
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s 2 of Fraud Act 2006 and s 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977, and with unlawful financial assistance 
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with the risk it faces.1303 Thus, there is a need for enforcement where a failure has 
occurred.  
There are some cases where regulatory enforcement actions were taken against erring 
regulated person. In UBS Case, the bank was able to launder US banknotes under ECI, 
a programme managed by the Federal Reserve to facilitate, monitor, and control the 
international distribution of US banknotes.1304 The New York Fed Reserve imposed a 
record-breaking USD100 million civil penalty against UBS for laundering huge amount 
of US banknotes to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya and former Yugoslavia (now Serbia and 
Montenegro) in violation of sanctions imposed on these countries by OFAC.1305   
The USD100 million penalty UBS suffered, is more than the profit (USD87 million) the 
bank made under the scheme and is 20 times the profit (USD5 million) made from 
transactions with those countries. 1306  In addition to the civil penalty, the Federal 
Reserve terminated the ECI Agreement with UBS, as a penalty for breaching the 
Agreement.1307 
Similarly, FinCEN together with the OCC assessed a civil money penalty of USD25 
million against Riggs Bank for failure to comply with all the four elements of the BSA 
compliance programme.1308 Due to the failure, Riggs could not detect or investigate 
suspicious transactions and could not file SAR as required under the law.1309  Riggs 
allowed several transactions involving governments of Saudi Arabia, Equatorial Guinea 
                                                
1303  Carol R Van Cleef and others, ‘Does the Punishment Fits the Crime’ [2004] 12(1) Journal of 
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1305 ibid 63-65 
1306 ibid 65 
1307 ibid 
1308 ibid 68-77 
1309Johnston and Carrington (n 1212) 51 
  246 
and former Chilean President, Augusto Pinochet, to go through in total disregard to its 
AML obligations.1310 
Similarly, on April 5, 2016, FinCEN announced in a press release a USD1 million 
penalty against Sparks Nugget, a Nevada Casino, for wilful violation of AML provision 
of the BSA. 1311  According to Jennifer Shasky Calvery, the outgoing Director of 
FinCEN, Sparks Nugget had a systemic breakdown in its compliance programme 
despite warning from its compliance officer. 1312  Violation includes: relegating its 
compliance officer and transferring his function to a management committee; 
recordkeeping violations; failure to file CTR; and failure to file SAR despite being 
alerted by its compliance officer.1313 
In the UK, the defunct FSA fined RBS £750,000 for ML control failings.1314 In 2004 
FSA again fined RBS £1.25 million for failure to keep customer identification records 
to the required standard.1315 In 2010, FSA imposed a financial penalty of £140,000 on 
Alpari (UK) Ltd (Alpari), and £14,000 on its former MLRO for failing to have in place 
an adequate AML compliance function.1316 FSA and its successor, the FCA has brought 
many other enforcement actions against violators.1317  
                                                
1310 Pasley (n 121) 68-77 
1311 FinCEN News release 5/4/2016 <https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/nr/pdf/20160405.pdf> accessed 
15 April 2016  
1312 ibid 
1313 ibid 
1314 FSA, Press Release FSA/PN/123/2002 17 Dec 2002 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2002/123.shtml> accessed 1 January 2017 
1315 FSA, Press Release FSA/PN/001/200415 Jan 2004 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2004/001.shtml> accessed 1 January 2017  
1316 FSA Press Release, FSA/PN/077/2010 May 2010 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2010/077.shtml> accessed 11 January 2017 
1317 FSA/FCA have brought actions against other various covered institutions MLROs for various AML 
failings including, Turkish Bank (UK) Ltd (£294,000); Habib Bank AG Zurich (£525,000) and its MLRO 
(£17,500); Coutts (£8.75m); Bank of Ireland (£375,000); Raiffeisen Zentralbank sterreich (150,000); 
Bank of Scotland Plc £1.25m); Northern Bank (£1.25 million) Standard Bank PLC (£7.6m); Guaranty 
Trust Bank (UK) Ltd (£525,000); and EFG Private Bank (£4.2m) please see FSA/FCA press release 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr> accessed 1st January 2017 
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The FSA/FCA is also empowered to bring criminal action against AML violators. In R 
v Collins,1318 the defendants challenged the power of the FSA to prosecute ML offences 
under POCA 2002.  The court concluded that the FSA have the authority to prosecute 
offences beyond those referred to in sections 401 and 402 of FSMA 2000 and it has the 
power to prosecute the offences contrary to sections 327 and 328 of POCA 2002.1319  
AML compliance programme must be implemented to the fullest if a firm is to escape 
liability. 1320  In extreme cases, the very existence of the regulated person could be 
threatened due to heavy loss and diminished customer confidence.1321 Following Riggs’ 
scandal in the US, its UK subsidiary was in 2005 taken over by PNC Financial Services, 
which rebranded the bank completely, and Riggs Bank in the UK became history.1322 
In the US, the case of US v Broadway National Bank1323 cannot escape mention. In 
Broadway, the bank pleaded guilty to three criminal charges for failure to establish and 
maintain BSA AML compliance programme, failure to file SARs, and aiding its 
customers to structure currency transaction to avoid BSA reporting requirements.1324  
In one instance Broadway allowed its clients, Alfred Dauber to make 250 deposits 
totalling USD46 million in a typical laundering fashion despite complaints made to the 
senior management.1325 Dauber claimed that he was into electronic business, and that 
his office was blocks away from the bank, but the bank neither attempted to verify such 
                                                
1318 [2009] EWCA Crim 1941  
1319 [2009] EWCA Crim 1941; [2010] Bus. L.R. 734, 745 
1320 FSA, Press Release FSA/PN/001/200415 Jan 2004 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2004/001.shtml> accessed 1 January 2017 
1321 Loss could be as a result of fraud, civil penalty, criminal fine, forfeiture, etc 
1322 Robert J Souster, Financial Crime and money Laundering (2nd edn Global Professional Publishing 
2013) 
1323 (2002) (02 Cr. 1507 (TPG) 
1324 ibid 
1325 ibid 18-21 
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claims nor inspected Dauber’s business premises.1326 Apart from the Dauber Incident, 
within the same period, Broadway aided many of its customers to structure thousands of 
transactions involving about USD76 million.1327 Following the guilty plea, Broadway 
agreed to and paid a USD4 million criminal fine.1328  
As recent cases indicate, a regulated person may suffer a much heavier financial loss for 
not implementing an effective AML compliance programme. 1329  In 2012, having 
admitted to failure to implement AML control programme, which facilitated the 
laundering of at least USD881 million of drug money, HSBC agreed to pay USD1.256 
billion in a DPA with the prosecutors in the US.1330 The USD1.256 billion payment 
exceeded the USD881 million laundered and whatever profits HSBC had made. 
Similarly, JP Morgan Chase in 2014 agreed to pay USD1.7 billion for failure to 
maintain an effective AML programme and failure to file SAR and its role in facilitating 
Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.1331  
While some firms will be willing to comply with the AML laws, for various reasons 
others will not, leaving a window for criminals to operate. In view of this, there is the 
need for the regulators and law enforcement to act against erring firms. However, 
whether enforcement actions against defaulting firms helps in entrenching a culture of 
compliance is not entirely clear. Incidences of compliance failure support the notion that 
no matter the level of enforcement efforts, some firms will not keep to their compliance 
obligations.  
                                                
1326 Pasley (n 212) 68-77 
1327 ibid 
1328 ibid 80 
1329 Rajah SC (n 1318) 123 
1330 Case 1:12-cr-00763-ILG Document 3-2 Filed 12/11/12  
1331 Rajah SC (n 1318)123; (please see “US v JPMorgan Chase – Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
Packet” <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/JPMC%20DPA%20Packet%20(Fully%20Executed%20w%20Exhibits).pdf> 
accessed 18 April 2016 
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However, compliance failure does not suggest that enforcement action is not effective in 
influencing firms to ensure compliance. One major factor that can affect enforcement 
effort is a significant number of regulators. 1332  Although each regulator has its 
jurisdiction, overlap in their function and sphere of authority is inevitable. This can lead 
to competitive enforcement among the regulators and harsh sanction against the erring 
FIs.1333 
One enforcement option that is available to prosecutors is the DPA. CCA 2013 schedule 
17 paragraph 1 defines DPA as ‘an agreement between a designated prosecutor and a 
person (“P”) whom the prosecutor is considering prosecuting for an offence specified in 
Part 2 (the “Alleged offences)’. The agreement normally requires the defendant to act in 
a particular way including refraining from further violation, payment of fine and 
disgorgement in return of deferring or forgoing prosecution.1334  
While DPA has been in use in the US since 1992, it was introduced in the UK in 2014 
by the CCA 2013. While the DPA in the two jurisdictions are similar, they differ in 
some respect. For example, the role of the US courts in the DPA process is less 
compared to the role the UK courts play.1335 Similarly, whereas in the UK, DPA may be 
                                                
1332 Due the large number (27) of AML supervisorhe UK’s supervisory system for AML compliance is 
regarded as not “fit for purpose”, and therefore needs to be consolidated to make the system more 
coherent and consistent – please see Transparency International UK, HM Treasury’s Call for Information 
on the UK’s Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Supervisory Regime:	 Submission from Transparency 
International UK <http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/hm-treasurys-call-for-information-on-
the-uks-anti-money-laundering-aml-supervisory-regime/> accessed 14 June 2017. Also, in the US, for 
example due to their numbers the area of responsibility of federal functional regulators may overlap  
1333 Van Cleef and others (n 1303) 56 
1334 Please see SFO and CPS Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice 2014 for the guidance on 
DPA in the UK 
1335  Asheesh Goel and others, ‘Comparing Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the U.K. and U.S.’ 
(Bloomberg law, 2014)  <https://www.bna.com/comparing-deferred-prosecution-n17179890589/> 
accessed 19 June 2017 
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available only for corporate crimes, in the US, they may be available where both 
companies and individuals are the defendants.1336  
Schedule 17 Paragraph 3 of CCA designated the DPP and SFO as the prosecutors 
empowered to use DPA to settle corporate criminal cases.1337   In the US it is the 
Department of Justice USAM (ss9-22.000)) and SEC (Enforcement Manual (s6.23)) 
that operate the DPA regime. The DPA is available for a range of offences. Unlike in 
the UK where offences, including ML, are listed as crimes eligible for DPA, in the US 
the Department of Justice narrowly defines conduct for which DPA is not available.1338 
However, one thing is clear – DPA is not the right of the defendant, and as such he 
cannot demand it. 
Given the length of time the DPA is in use in the US, many DPAs were reached. The 
decline by 29 per cent in the prosecution of corporate crimes in the US between 2004 
and 2014 is attributable to the use of DPA to dispose of corporate criminal cases.1339 In 
the UK, despite its small budget, the SFO has been very aggressive in pursuing financial 
crimes resulting in reaching DPAs with large enterprises such as the Rolls-Royce.1340  
                                                
1336 ibid 
1337 However, the government can allow other bodies that have power to prosecute, such as the FCA,  to 
use DPA where the need arises 
1338  CCA 2013 Schedule 17 paragraph 17-28; Emma Radmore and Stephen L Hill Jr., Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements: the US experience and the UK potential [2014] Denton 
1339  TracReports Inc, Justice Department Data Reveal 29 Percent Drop in Criminal Prosecutions of 
Corporations [2015] available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/ accessed 18 June 2017 
1340  SFO: Budget <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/#ourfundingandbudget>; Serious Fraud Office v 
Rolls-Royce Plc Rolls-Royce Energy Systems Inc [2017] Case No: U20170036; SFO v Standard Charted 
Bank [2015] Case No: U20150854 
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Although DPA was useful as a means of obtaining the co-operation of the corporate 
bodies and alternative ways of disposing of criminal cases, they were not a general 
solution to financial crimes as they are tied to a specific incident.1341  
Despite the success SFO recorded in prosecuting financial crimes, there is a proposal to 
merge SFO with the NCA.1342 This has already generated controversy with politicians, 
academicians and city lawyers voicing their concern.1343  The message is obvious – 
subsuming the SFO into the NCA will spell doom to UK’s practical ability to combat 
financial crimes. Given the current political situation in the UK, whether this plan will 
receive the backing of parliament remains to be seen.1344 
                                                
1341 David Fitzpatrick, ‘The Traditional Criminal Justice System: its efficacy in Dealing with Financial 
and Economically Motivated Crime’ in Barry Rider, Research Handbook on International Financial 
Crime (Edward Elgar 2015) 561 
1342 2017 Conservative Manifesto @ 44 
1343 For example, see Jane Croft, ‘Lawyers warn May against scrapping Serious Fraud Office’ (Financial 
Times, 30 May 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/e0eb1214-4543-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996> accessed 
7 June 2017;  
Caroline Binham and Jane Croft, ‘Conservatives pledge to scrap Serious Fraud Office’ ((Financial Times, 
18 May 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/7be30e90-3bc4-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec> accessed 7 June 
2017;  
Alan Tovey, ‘Tory plan to fold Serious Fraud Office into National Crime Agency comes under attack’ 
(The Telegraph, 18 May 2017) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/05/18/tory-plan-merge-sfo-
national-crime-agency-comes-attack/> accessed 7 June 2017;  
Claire Shaw, ‘Serious Fraud Office merger into National Crime Agency announced in Conservative 
Manifesto’ (Keystone Law, 19 May 2017) <http://www.keystonelaw.co.uk/keynotes/serious-fraud-office-
sfo-merger-into-national-crime-agency-nca-announced-in-conservative-manifesto> accessed 7 June 2017;  
Mark Taylor, ‘UK Lawyers Warn Nixing Fraud Squad Will Hurt Enforcement’ (Law 360, 18 May 2017) 
<https://www.law360.com/articles/925586/uk-lawyers-warn-nixing-fraud-squad-will-hurt-enforcement> 
accessed 7 June 2017 
1344 Sue Hawley and Paul Holden, ‘Theresa May has been trying to bring corruption investigations under 
her control for years – but the election may have just ruined her plans’ (Independent, 15 June 2017) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/serious-fraud-office-national-crime-agency-theresa-may-
government-control-corruption-a7791696.html> accessed 7 June 2017;  
London Evening Standard, ‘Senior Tories Urge May to Drop Manifesto plan to Axe Serious Fraud 
Office’ (London Evening Standard, 13 June 2017) <https://www.pressreader.com/uk/london-evening-
standard-west-end-final-b/20170613/281672549926528> accessed 7 June 2017;  
Labour Press, ‘Thomas-Symonds MP, Labour’s Shadow Solicitor General, backing senior Tories on the 
SFO’ (Labor Press, 14 June 2017) <http://press.labour.org.uk/post/161814100964/this-is-yet-more-
evidence-of-the-chaos-at-the> accessed 7 June 2017 
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4.6.3 THE ROLE OF GATEKEEPERS 
As regulated persons establish and maintain AML compliance, the risk of detecting ML 
scheme through the banking system becomes greater. Thus, launderers engage the 
services of specialised professionals known as gatekeepers to help facilitate their illegal 
financial operation.1345  
Gatekeepers are, essentially, individuals that protect the gates to the financial system 
through which potential users of the system, including launderers, pass. 1346  The 
American Bar Association explained that the underlying theory behind the “gatekeeper” 
idea is that the lawyer can monitor and control, or at least influence, the conduct of his 
or her clients and prospective clients to deter wrongdoing.1347 
The term encompasses professionals, such as lawyers, notaries, accountants, investment 
advisors, and trust and company service providers who assist in transactions involving 
the movement of money, and are deemed to have a particular role in identifying, 
preventing and reporting ML.1348 As they are a gateway to the financial sector, those 
gatekeepers occupy a strategic position in the ML disruption chain. They either help in 
disrupting ML or assist criminals to circumvent AML controls.1349 Thus, this subsection 
is dedicated to analysing the obligations of the gatekeepers to establish and maintain an 
effective AML compliance programme.  
                                                
1345  Ping He, ‘Lawyers, notaries, accountants and money laundering’ [2006] 9(1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 62, 64; FATF, ‘Report on Money Laundering Typologies’ [2004] 24 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2003_2004_ML_Typologies_ENG.pdf> accessed 
7 January 2017 
1346  FATF, ‘Report: Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption’ 2011 19 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Laundering%20the%20Proceeds%20of%20Corruption.pdf> 
accessed 7 January 2017 
1347 ABA Formal Opinion 463 (2013) 1 
1348 Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS) <http://www.acams.org/aml-
glossary/index-g/> accessed 7 January 2017; also see International Bar Association, ‘A Lawyer’s Guide 
to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering’ [2014] 5 
1349 Gatekeepers are likely to be affect the most by the CFA 2017 ss 45 and 46. Thus, gatekeepers must 
put in place reasonable measures to prevent people associated with them from facilitating tax evasion 
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Like any other regulated person, gatekeepers, such as lawyers, notaries and accountants 
in the UK and US are subject to the AML law that prohibit anyone from engaging in 
ML.1350 Regarding other obligations, approaches in the UK and US differ. In the UK, in 
addition to being prohibited from engaging in ML, gatekeepers are also required to 
make disclosure of the knowledge or suspicion that their client is engaging in ML.1351 
Also, they are obliged to desist from tipping off their clients that a disclosure has been 
made or that they are being investigated.1352  
As they fall under the definition of relevant persons, gatekeepers are also subject to the 
MLR 2007.1353 Thus, lawyers, accountants, auditors and other professionals are required 
to establish and maintain a functional risk-based compliance programme. 1354  The 
compliance programme is to enable the gatekeepers to comply with AML obligations.  
As part of compliance effort, lawyers and other professionals in the UK are required to 
carry out CDD on both new and existing customers.1355 It means that gatekeepers are to 
properly identify and verify the client’s identity to ensure he is who he says he is, and 
also, to ascertain the identity of the beneficial owner if different from the client, or 
where the client is a corporate entity. 1356  Gatekeepers must also monitor client’s 
transactions on an on-going basis. 1357  All records arising from CDD and on-going 
                                                
1350 Pursuant to 18 USC ss 1956 and 1957, and POCA 2002 ss 327, 328, and 329, gatekeepers, like any 
other person, are prohibited from engaging in ML 
1351  POCA ss 330, 331 and 332 (MLR 2007 reg 20(1)(b) requires regulated persons to establish 
compliance programme to enable them report suspicion of ML) 
1352 POCA ss 333 and 333A 
1353 MLR 2007 reg 3 
1354 ibid reg 20 
1355 ibid reg 7 
1356 ibid reg 5 (beneficial owner is as defined in regulation 6) 
1357 ibid reg 8 
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monitoring must be kept, as such records, may be useful for an investigation that may 
arise in the future.1358 
Where suspicion arises, the law requires lawyers and other professionals to file SAR to 
the NCA.1359 However, the obligation on gatekeepers to file SAR may not sit well with 
the LPP that guarantees the confidentiality of the client-attorney correspondence. Where 
information is communicated to the attorney in the course of litigation and not with the 
intention to further criminal activity, LPP operates to protect attorneys from liability.1360  
In practical terms, lawyers should take AML compliance seriously (irrespective of 
whether they engage in corporate, transactional, or trust activities) because they can 
never tell when an existing customer may require those services.1361 The Law Society 
issues AML Practice Note to help solicitors comply with their AML obligations under 
POCA 2002, TACT 2000, and MLR 2007.1362 
However, the situation, especially with regards to AML compliance obligation on 
lawyers, is different in the US. Lawyers are not subject to compliance obligations 
imposed by 31 USC section 5318(h) and 31 CFR 1010.100.1363 Thus AML compliance 
is a matter of self-regulation.1364   For example, although US lawyers would carry out 
CDD when taking in a new client, they do so by reference to the “Voluntary Good 
                                                
1358 ibid reg 19 
1359 POCA 2002 s 330-332   
1360  Bowman v Fels [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3083; also see John A. Kelley, ‘International Anti-Money 
Laundering and Professional Ethics’ [2006] 40 International Law 433, 438 
1361 Terrill II and Breslow (n 837) 439-40 
1362 The Law Society, AML Practice Note 2013 
1363 Terrill II and Breslow (n 837) 435-439 
1364 The main AML guiding template for US lawyers is “Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers 
to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing” (Good Practices Guidance) which 
finds support among the US law enforcement and Judges (see Conference of Chief Justices Resolution 
Supporting the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance and the Risk-Based Approach (2003)) 
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Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing” (Good Practice Guidance), which the ABA issued as a guide.1365  
The CDD carried out by lawyers on their new clients is in most cases not as 
comprehensive as banks would do.1366   But even if lawyers carry out detailed and 
comprehensive CDD, they are not obliged to report their suspicion of ML but are only 
required to decline relationship with a client they suspect of engaging in ML.1367  
Client confidentiality is accorded great importance to the extent that attorney-client 
communications can only be disclosed in very limited circumstances including where it 
is necessary to comply with the requirements of other laws or a court order.1368 AML 
compliance among lawyers is rendered largely voluntary1369 because ABA has been 
resisting any attempt to impose AML compliance requirement on its members.1370 ABA 
opts for voluntary guidance to the legal profession on AML compliance for a number of 
reasons. 
ABA had objected to the mandatory reporting of suspicious transaction on lawyers 
because it felt that such disclosure would compromise client confidence or the attorney-
                                                
1365 FATF has issued lawyer guidance on carrying out CDD on which ABA has significant input. For 
analysis on the substance of the lawyer guidance please see: Nicole M. Healy and others, ‘U.S. and 
International Anti-Money Laundering Developments’ [2009] 43 International Lawyer 795, 798-801 
1366 Shepherd (n 1199) 83 (the author provides a scenario that depicts how lawyers carry out CDD on new 
intake)  
1367  Terrill II and Breslow (n 837) 59 New York Law School Law Review citing Model Code of 
Professional Conduct R. 4.1 (2014) 
1368 Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 1.6 (2014) 
1369 Resolution & Report 116. Also please see Good Practices Guidance @ 3 states: “It is not intended to 
be, nor should it be construed as, a statement of the standard of care governing the activities of lawyers in 
implementing a risk-based approach to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Rather, given 
the vast differences in practices, firms, and lawyers throughout the United States, this paper seeks only to 
serve as a resource that lawyers can use in developing their own voluntary risk-based approaches” 
1370 ABA Formal Opinion 463 (2013) 2 (stating that The Model Rules neither require a lawyer to fulfill a 
gatekeeper role, nor do they permit a lawyer to engage in the reporting that such a role could entail); ABA 
Resolution 300 Opposing Federal Beneficial Ownership Reporting Mandates and Regulation of Lawyers 
in Formation of Business Entities (August 2008)  
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client relationship.1371Also, ABA argued that such a requirement would undermine the 
independence of the bar from the government.1372 Besides resisting mandatory reporting 
requirement, ABA also views the obligation not to tip off client as a direct conflict 
between the duty of loyalty attorneys owe their client and compliance with AML 
laws.1373 
These arguments hinged on legal and public policy.1374 Citing various judicial supports, 
ABA stressed the importance of the independence of the Bar in dispensing justice.1375 
ABA made it clear that lawyers in the US are independent professionals who are in-
between the State and the persons under its jurisdiction, and thus, lawyers are not, and 
cannot be, agents of the government.1376  
ABA further expresses the concern that Imposing AML compliance obligation on 
lawyers would conflict with the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees legal 
representation in criminal proceedings.1377 This, is because lawyers would be seen to be 
acting for the government to the detriment of the client who paid for their services. 
                                                
1371  ABA Resolution 104 Supporting Reasonable and Balanced AML Initiatives consistent with the 
Confidential Lawyer-Client Relationship (February 2003) 7 
1372 ibid 
1373 ibid 
1374 ibid 8-13 
1375 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the importance of the independence of legal 
profession to the administration of justice in the United States (See In Re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 
(1962) (reversing the conviction of an attorney for criminal contempt); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 
1, 39 (1952)); An independent judiciary and a vigorous, independent bar are both indispensable parts of 
our system of justice (see In Re McConnell, 370 U.S. at 236. See also Legal Services Corporation v. 
Velaquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001)); The Court has also observed: “The very independence of the 
lawyer from the government on the one hand and the client on the other is what makes law a profession 
.... It is as crucial to our system of justice as the independence of judges themselves” (See Application of 
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 732 (1973)) 
1376  ABA Resolution 104 Supporting Reasonable and Balanced AML Initiatives Consistent with the 
Confidential Lawyer-Client Relationship (February 2003) 8-9 
1377 United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Circuit 1995); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d 
1485, 1488 (l0th Circuit 1990)  
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Under the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate legal profession is the exclusive 
preserve of the States.1378  
Thus, any attempt by the federal government to regulate lawyers through AML law will 
conflict with the ethical requirements and regulations imposed by state authorities on 
the legal profession.1379 However, judicial decisions have indicated that lawyers can be 
subject to Federal regulations.1380  Thus, if lawyers can be subject to some Federal 
government’s regulation why can they not be subject to AML compliance obligations?  
Apart from legal and policy concerns, ABA also cited practical concerns among which 
are the vague notion of “suspicion” and the large number of SUAs. While the legal and 
policy argument appears to be strong, the practical concerns argument appears to be 
weak. As regulated persons are subject to AML compliance regime, why not lawyers 
who are better equipped to draft, assess and interpret the law. It is not entirely clear 
which difficulty would the lawyers face in complying with the AML regulatory 
requirements on the basis of large number of SUAs. Furthermore, difficulties arising 
from misunderstanding the nature of the SUAs can be resolved through training.1381 
As lawyers handle commercial transactions involving large amount of money on behalf 
of their clients, they may get involve (wittingly or unwittingly) into a laundering 
scheme.1382 Thus, lawyers need to be subject to the same AML compliance obligations 
                                                
1378 Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438,442 (1979) 
1379 Healy and others (n 1365) 797 
1380 For example, the Supreme Court has noted several times that lawyers can fall within the sphere of the 
federal government regulatory control, see: Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Sperry 
v. State of Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963)  
1381 Terry (n 1252) 487 (the author provides a detailed account on the effort being made to educate 
lawyers on practical steps to prevent themselves from being used for money laundering and terrorist 
finances)  
1382 Lawyers were convicted in the US for involvement in money laundering activities; see: In re Blair, 40 
A.3d 883 (D.C. 2012); In re Tezak, 898 A.2d 383 (D.C. 2006); In re Abbell, 814 A.2d 961 (D.C. 2003); 
United States v. Tarkoff, 242 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001) In re Lee, 755 A.2d 1034 (D.C. 2000); In re 
Toussaint, 753 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. 2014); Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Stern, 830 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 
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other regulated persons are subject to (with some exception) as it is the practice in the 
UK, if the US AML law will have a semblance of being effective in disrupting ML.  
Otherwise, a large window is left open for criminals to launder proceeds of crime. As 
pressure from ABA and other groups made FATF agree to a risk-based approach to 
identifying the beneficial ownership behind corporate clients,1383  it is apparent that 
criminals would seek to exploit that avenue to launder the proceeds of crime.1384 As the 
services of lawyers, like other gatekeepers, are vulnerable to being used by criminals to 
launder the proceeds of crime, it is respectfully submitted that ABA’s stance could 
undermine AML compliance.  
Another important way of ensuring effective compliance with AML law but on which 
little attention has been paid is co-operation between the government and the regulated 
sector. It is almost certain that enforcement action alone will not yield the desired result. 
4.7 THE NEED FOR CO-OPERATION 
Whether fines and penalties (despite appearing to be staggering) imposed by the US and 
UK regulators for the failure of compliance serve the purpose is debatable.1385 If fines, 
penalties and criminal prosecution seem not to exert enough influence on regulated 
persons towards compliance, perhaps a better approach is to work towards more co-
operation between the stakeholders.1386  
                                                                                                                                          
2013); also see HC Deb 30 December, 2001, vol 373, col 757 (2001) (where John Denham, the then 
Minister for Police, Courts and Drugs noted that criminals employ bankers, lawyers and accountants to 
help them launder their illicit profit) 
1383 Healy and others (n 1365) 799  
1384 United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Keeping Foreign Corruption out of 
the United States: Four Case Histories (2010) 202/224-9505 
1385 Barry A K Rider, ‘Editorial: Don’t Panic’ [2016] 37(5) Company Lawyer 133 
1386 Please see Christopher Stears, ‘Control Liability and Compliance: Tools for Controlling Financial 
Crime’ in Barry Rider, Research Handbook on International Financial Crime (Edward Elgar 2015) 635 -
36 
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Co-operation between the regulators, whose duty is to ensure that the law are complied 
with, and the regulated whose duty is to comply with the law is vital for the AML law 
and practice to have the desired impact on ML.1387  While the lack of cooperation 
between the government and the financial sector would likely undermine the 
effectiveness of the AML law no matter its quality, co-operation would likely stimulate 
the much-needed willing compliance with the AML law. In this regard, involving 
financial sector at each stage of coming up with compliance strategy is crucial.  Hyland 
and Thornhill suggest that:1388 
Willing compliance is only possible if the financial sector is 
fully consulted from the outset and empowered to operate within 
a strategy that is sympathetic to its own need. 
The fact that legislation alone is not enough to disrupt ML, and the need to obtain the 
cooperation of the regulated sector has been recognised.1389 FIs attach importance to 
banking confidentiality. Thus, anti-secrecy laws are usually viewed as an unnecessary 
intrusion into normal business practice. The constitutionality of the BSA was 
challenged on privacy ground, because the banking community in the US initially 
viewed BSA 1970 as an intrusion into financial privacy.1390 Despite being defeated at 
the Supreme Court, banks were still reluctant to comply – undermining the effectiveness 
of the BSA.1391 
                                                
1387 William Baity, ‘Banking on Secrecy -- The Price for Unfettered Secrecy and Confidentiality in the 
Face of International Organised and Economic Crime’ [2000] 8(1) Journal of Financial Crime 83, 85 
1388 Hyland and Thornhill (n 842) 30-050 
1389 Commonwealth Secretariat, Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A model of Best 
Practice for the Financial Sector, the Professions and Other Designated Businesses (2nd edn, Formora Ltd 
2006) 4 (The Common Wealth senior finance officials in June 1995 recognised the need for collaboration 
to effectively combat money laundering) 
1390 United States v Miller, [1976] 425 US 441-443; California Bankers Association v. Schultz 416 U.S. 
21 (1974) 
1391 Villa (n 104) 493 
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To some corporate entities failure to conform to the law is a fact of business life.1392 
Thus obtaining the cooperation of the regulated persons remains vital in disrupting ML. 
A financial sector that has not been consulted and which believes that AML law is 
either onerous or impracticable in their delivery, or are an unnecessary intrusion into the 
client’s privacy, can frustrate the law no matter how good it is, and can also frustrate 
investigation while still complying strictly with the law.1393 
Historically, in the US, there has been close co-operation between banks and the 
regulators and law enforcement agencies. However, this co-operation was nearly 
jeopardised when section 1957 of the MLCA 1986 was enacted because it was riddled 
with ambiguities that present enormous problems for FIs.1394 Co-operation between UK 
government and financial services industry can be traced to the history of the City’s 
financial services industry. Lately, the UK government announced a collaborative 
approach in which: 
…a joined-up partnership approach between government, law 
enforcement and regulatory bodies are essential to maintain and 
strengthen the element of self-regulation, flexibility and 
discretion in providing specific guidance on how objectives and 
framework set by the Government should be interpreted and 
implemented by the industry. 1395 
The simpler the AML law is, the easier for the financial sector to put in place 
programmes to comply with these laws. The 2016 UK Action Plan for Anti-money 
Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing depicts an AML regime that is deficient. 
Complex laws and bureaucratic bottlenecks are identified among the factors that hinder 
compliance.1396 For effective compliance, AML law must be made clear and simple.1397 
                                                
1392 Gilligan (n 1261) 67 
1393 Michael Hyland and Sue Thornhill (n 842) 30-225 
1394 Villa (n 104) 500 
1395 HM Treasury, Anti-Money Laundering Strategy (HMSO, London, October 2004) 
1396 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) para 1.4; Annex B 
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Law that is vague may impede commerce and may also undermine investigation and 
prosecution.1398 Owing to the high cost of complying with vague law, regulated person 
may resist complying with the law or may find a way of circumventing them.1399 
In the US, co-operation with the government earns banks a status of “good corporate 
citizens” who have no systemic AML compliance failure and will, therefore, attract 
little or no attention of the law enforcement.1400 Similarly, in the event of compliance 
failure, an established record of cooperation with the government could be taken as an 
evidence of lack of intent to violate AML requirement.1401 Furthermore, co-operation 
with government is one of the deciding factors when considering whether to withdraw 
FI’s operational licence.1402 
However, evidence of a successful implementation of AML compliance programme, 
including filing a SAR on clients’ activities, would not shield regulated persons if they 
facilitate ML.1403 Then one would wonder how would a bank facilitate ML when it has 
established and maintained AML compliance programme.  
Systems and controls may be put in place as required by law, but it is the human 
elements that operate them. While this exposes the weakness of the whole AML 
compliance system, it also stressed the need for co-operation between the government 
and the regulated person. Cooperation would motivate human elements to police the 
market for effective disruption of ML.  
                                                                                                                                          
1397 Rajah SC (n 1318) 127 (laws that are overlay vague, complex and technical hinder compliance due to 
difficulty in interpreting and applying them) 
1398 ibid 
1399 ibid 
1400 Whitney Adams, ‘Effective Strategies for Banks in Avoiding Criminal, Civil, and Forfeiture Liability 
in Money Laundering Cases’ [1992] 44 Alabama Law Review 669, 699 
1401 ibid 
1402 Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, ss 1502-1503, 106 Stat. 3672, 
4045-51 (1992) (to be codified at 12 USC ss 93, 1464, 1752, 1786, 1818)  
1403 Ruce (n 165) 55 
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Disruption of ML is intelligence driven. Thus, sharing of information will would create 
an informal network within the regulated sector. 1404  This approach has since been 
adopted in the US allowing regulated persons to share information with the law 
enforcement, and between regulated person and another regulated person. 1405 A similar 
approach has been introduced into the UK AML landscape by section 11 of the CFA 
2017.  
On the other hand, it is a matter of self-interest for the regulated persons to co-operate 
with the government in its effort to disrupt ML. This, is because ML could affect the 
soundness and stability of financial market.1406 A terrorist organisation that successfully 
laundered money to fund its operations can bring harm directly to regulated sector. 9/11 
attack, which resulted in the loss of lives and properties, is a typical example. For this 
reason, the regulated sector needs to ensure proper compliance with the AML law, 
because proper compliance will not only make the AML regime effective but also 
benefits the financial sector itself.  
4.8 TENSION BETWEEN CONTRACTUAL DUTY AND TIPPING 
OFF  
Where a bank forms a suspicion about client’s transaction, the bank is under a duty to 
disclose its suspicion to the relevant authorities. 1407  As sometimes this results in 
freezing of the client’s account, the bank may come under pressure to explain to the 
client the reason for the delay in executing his mandate.  
                                                
1404 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) Annex B 
1405 13 CFR s1010.500 – 1010.540 
1406 Hyland and Thornhill (n 842) 30-400 
1407 Please see POCA 2002 s 338; 31 USC s 5318(g)(1) (the relevant authorities in the UK are constable, 
Revenue and a Custom office, nominated officer or an authorized NCA officer; and in the US, they 
include FinCEN and nominated officer)  
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While the investigation is still on, disclosing any matter already disclosed to the 
relevant authorities amounts to tipping off if such disclosure is likely to prejudice any 
investigation.1408 A tension could arise where, for example, a client instructs his bank to 
carry out certain transaction but unfortunately due to suspicion the bank couldn’t 
execute the instruction, and the bank is obliged to refrain from tipping off the 
customer.1409  
In Squirrrell Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc, it was held that the combined 
effect of sections 330-331, 338, 335 and 333A of POCA 2002 is to compel NatWest to 
report its suspicion, not to execute its client’s instruction for the maximum of the 7 
working days, plus 31 days moratorium, and to refrain from giving any information to 
anybody which is likely to prejudice any investigation following a section 333 
disclosure.1410 Thus, in the opinion of the court, the course adopted by NatWest was 
unimpeachable as it did what the POCA 2002 intended it to do.1411  
CFA 2017 has provided for the successive extension of the moratorium period of 31 
days (maximum) up to 186 days starting from the day the first 31 days moratorium 
period ends.1412  The intention behind this extension is to allow more time for law 
enforcement to collect evidence as sometimes evidence is located overseas, and to carry 
out proper investigation on the suspected laundering activity.1413  
                                                
1408 POCA s 333A; 31 USC s 5318(g)(2) (these statutes prohibit tipping off); for an in-depth analysis on 
the tension between contractual duty and tipping off please see Rider and others (n 1172) 203; Barry AK 
Rider, Intelligent investigations: the use and misuse of intelligence – a personal perspective [2013] 20(3) 
Journal of Financial Crime 293 
1409 Shah v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Limited [2010]3 All ER 477 CA 
1410 Squirrrell Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [2006] 1 WLR 637 para 18 
1411 ibid para 21 
1412 CFA 2017 s 10 
1413 HC Deb 26 November 2016, vol 617, cols 98-99 
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While Squirrell depicts a typical compliance effort, it also reveals how compliance 
effort impedes commercial activities. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in K Ltd v 
National Westminster Bank Plc,1414 held that, while it is true that to intervene between 
a banker and his customer in the performance of the contract of mandate is a serious 
interference with the free flow of trade, the interference is limited, and that the 
Parliament has considered that a limited interference is to be tolerated in preference to 
allowing the undoubted evil of ML to run rife in the commercial community.1415  
Longmore LJ also held that where the law makes it a criminal offence to honour the 
customer’s mandate in these circumstances, there could be no breach of contract for the 
bank to refuse to honour the mandate.1416 Once a disclosure is made, the tipping off 
provision of the POCA 2002 section 333A comes into effect,1417 and the bank is not 
under any duty to inform its client of the reason why the transaction is declined.1418 
This issue might be complicated in a situation where clients suffered a loss because the 
bank refuses to execute their lawful instructions. In Shah and another v HSBC 
Private Bank (UK) Ltd,1419 the plaintiff claimed breach of contractual duty by HSBC 
for failing to carry out his instruction promptly and for failing to provide an explanation. 
Relying on the provision of POCA 2002 and the decision of Longmore LJ in K Ltd., 
Hamblen J rejected these claims.1420   
                                                
1414 [2007] 1 WLR 311 
1415 K Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [2007] 1 WLR 311 para 22 
1416 [2007] 1 WLR 311 para 10 
1417 [2007] 1 WLR 311 para 18 (in the case of US, 31 USC s 5318(g)(2) 
1418 Shah and another v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd (No 2) [2012] EWHC 1283 
1419 [2009] EWHC 79 (QB) 
1420 [2007] 1 WLR 311 paras 28-  53 and 71-82 
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In an appeal case: Shah and another v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd,1421 Longmore 
LJ upheld these decisions.1422 However, regarding tipping off a customer, his Lordship 
expressed the view that, there might come a time during the investigation when a 
customer is entitled to have more information about the conduct of his affairs because at 
that time the tipping-off might not be relevant anymore. 
In Shah v HSBC1423 Supperstone J found for the defendant bank on the basis of an 
implied term in the contract which permitted the defendant bank to refuse to carry out 
the payment instruction without an appropriate consent under section 335 of POCA 
where it suspected a transaction involves proceeds of crime. It was also held that an 
implied term exists in the contract that permitted the bank to refuse to provide the 
customer with information that would lead to tipping off contrary to section 333 of 
POCA 2002. Whether the court will imply a term into a contract will depend on judicial 
discretion and the fact of each case.1424 However, in what could be described as a shift 
in position, in Parvizi v Barclays Bank Plc the court accepted that a claim by a 
customer that its bank has failed to carry out instruction will be usually a strong claim in 
contract.1425 
These cases highlight the dilemma faced by the regulated firms in their AML 
compliance efforts. As it is no longer secret to customers that FIs are required to file 
                                                
1421 [2010] 3 All ER 477 (CA) 
1422 Please see Squirrell Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [2006] 1 WLR 637 and K Ltd v National 
Westminster Bank Plc 
1423 [2012] EWHC 1283 
1424 Eoin O’Shea and Matthew Stone, ‘Civil Liability Protection for those Making Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SARs)’ [2015] Reed Smith Client Alerts 
1425 [2014] WL 4081295 (Master Bragge stating: I accept that a claim by a customer that its bank has 
failed to carry out instructions will be usually a strong claim in contract. The burden of proof that the 
implied term, which effectively is what is in issue here, operates because a suspicion is on the bank, 
because, as I observed in the course of argument, only the bank can explain its position. I have briefly 
referred to the witness statement evidence that has been presented. This is a fairly recent witness 
statement, 12 February 2014. It is to be observed that this type of material was not available in the Shah v 
HSBC private bank case summary judgment application.  
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SAR in compliance with their AML obligations, clients become alerted to an impending 
investigation whenever their instruction are delayed beyond a certain time.1426  
4.9 CONCLUSION 
Laws are enacted to serve a purpose. However, the purpose can only be achieved if the 
laws are complied with. Thus, compliance is a key element in any legal regime. The 
AML law in both UK and US places obligations on the regulated persons to comply 
with the laws by establishing and maintaining AML compliance programme to prevent 
their entities from being used for financial crimes. 
By doing so, regulated firms serve as detectives helping government to disrupt ML. 
While BSA 1970 and Title 31 Code of Federal Regulations constitute the US AML 
framework; POCA 2002, TACT 2000, MLR 2007, FCA rules and JMLSG Guidance 
notes constitute the UK AML framework. These laws require compliance with the AML 
law and set out the components of the AML compliance programme. As CFA 2017 
amended POCA substantially, expansion of  the AML compliance requirements is 
likely. 
As the law develops incrementally so are the compliance obligations. On the other hand, 
while expansion in the AML law increases compliance burden and thus, the cost,1427 
there is concern that the AML compliance burden is not worth the cost and the regime 
do not do enough to assist law enforcement or to discourage crime.1428  
Regulated firms faced various sanctions for compliance failure despite the enormous 
compliance cost they bear and the fact that risk-based approach does not aim to 
                                                
1426 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) para 2.8 
1427 Harvey (n 1244) 
1428 Rider and others (n 1172) 202 
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eliminate risk completely. Thus, it is respectfully suggested that the law should exempt 
a regulated person from liability for failure of compliance where there is enough 
evidence to show that a regulated firm has taken all necessary measures on a risk-based 
basis to protect itself from being used for ML and other financial crimes. However, 
adequate safeguards need to be in place to ensure that criminals do not exploit this 
avenue to undermine the whole AML regime. 
This together with other reasons already discussed in this chapter may foster the much-
needed co-peration between government and the financial sector in order to influence 
willing compliance with AML law. At the other end of the spectrum, there are 
incentives for regulated firms to comply with the AML law. It has been pointed out that 
both compliance and non-compliance have advantages and disadvantages. While 
compliance with the AML law affords a regulated firm the status of ‘good corporate 
citizen’, a regulated firm faces the risks of various sanctions for non-compliance.  
  268 
CHAPTER 5: EVALUATING THE AML LAW AND 
PRACTICE 
One never knows the extent to which intelligence gleaned from 
these reports, and the follow-up which may take place has 
resulted directly and indirectly in the prevention or reduction of 
crime…Indeed, a number of years ago one very senior police 
officer submitted a report to his superiors and their political 
masters claiming that proceeds of crime laws that in practice 
could not be enforced sufficiently to represent a real risk to 
criminal organisations might well simply result in more and 
more complex money laundering. The Treasury and Home 
Office’s assessment would seem to recognise a current situation, 
not at variance with such a warning.  
     Professor Barry A.K. Rider1429 
                  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the law and practice relating to ML in 
disrupting ML in the UK and US. Chapters 2 and 3 critically examined the US and the 
UK AML law respectively.1430 Both chapters examined how authorities in UK and US 
use criminal law, regulatory law, fiscal law, as well as forfeiture law to tackle ML in 
their respective jurisdictions. The analysis in those chapters reveals loopholes in the law 
relating to ML in the two jurisdictions.  
Chapter 4 focused on the regulatory aspects of the AML law. It examines those 
practices or AML compliance activities that need to be established as required by the 
law in the UK and US for the proper working of the AML law. As the law develops 
incrementally, so are the compliance obligations. On the other hand, while expansion in 
the AML law increases compliance burden and cost,1431 there is concern that the AML 
                                                
1429 Barry Rider, ‘Looking at the Tea Leaves’ [2016] 23(2) Journal of Financial Crime 247 
1430 POCA 2002 has undergone an overehaul to strengthen the AML law – please see section 3.2.1 
1431 Harvey (n 1244) 
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compliance burden is not worth the cost and the regime do not do enough to assist law 
enforcement or to discourage crime.1432  
Despite the lack of data on the actual scale of ML in both jurisdictions to enable us to 
measure the effectiveness of the AML law, this chapter tries to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the law and practice relating to ML in disrupting ML and TF. It 
concludes that the law and practice relating to ML in UK and US is not effective in 
disrupting ML and TF. This conclusion is drawn from the analysis in Chapters 2,3,and 
4, and based on the strength of some available facts as will be discussed in this chapter. 
 Importantly, the UK’s confession regarding the ineffectiveness of its law, and the US 
Treasury’s confession that there exist loopholes in the US AML law that are being 
exploited to launder proceeds of crime, evade tax, and engage in other illicit financial 
activities underpin this conclusion.1433 Finally, views of the reputable AML scholars on 
the effectiveness of the law and practice relating to ML in the two jurisdictions reinforce 
this conclusion. 
This chapter is organised into five sections. Section 2 measures the effectiveness of the 
law and practice relating to ML in disrupting ML and TF. Section 3 analyses AML 
costs. While AML cost is generally high, banks bear the largest chunk. Despite the 
staggering AML costs, the AML regime in both UK and US does little to prevent ML 
and TF. Section 4 then goes on to explore where the problem lies. Section 5 concludes 
this chapter. 
                                                
1432 Rider and others (n 1172) 202 
1433 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) 7 (The UK authorities have confirmed that the AML law is not 
effective); Department of the Treasury, ‘US transparency announcement Secretary Lew Letter to 
Congress’ [2016] 
(The Treasury Department had in a letter to Congress admitted loopholes in the US AML system) 
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5.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE  
As this thesis sought to appraise the law and practice relating to ML in UK and US in 
terms of its disruptive effect on ML and TF, the two key terms – ‘effective’ and 
‘disruption’ – need to be defined. So what do these terms mean? Taking its ordinary 
dictionary meaning, the term ‘effective’ means ‘successful in producing a desired or 
intended result’.1434 On the other hand ‘disruption’ means ‘an interruption in the usual 
way that a system, process, or event works’.1435 According to the NCA, ‘disruption’ is a 
measurement of impact against serious organised crime.1436 So, what impact has the UK 
and US AML law made against ML and TF in their respective jurisdiction?  
Effectiveness of legislation is largely determined by (a) the purpose of the legislation 
(which sets the benchmark for what the legislation aims to achieve); (b) the substantive 
content and legislative expression (which determine how the law will achieve the 
desired results and how this is communicated to its subjects); (c) the overarching 
structure (determines how the new provisions interact with the legal system); and (d) the 
real life results of legislation (indicate what has been achieved).1437  
Effectiveness reflects the relationship between the purpose and the effects of legislation 
and expresses the extent, to which it is capable of influencing the behaviour of target 
population towards the desired direction.1438 The effectiveness of the law and practice 
relating to ML can be determined by critically examining the extent to which the law in 
practical terms performs the functions it is designed for, as well as examining the 
                                                
1434  Oxford Dictionary online <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/effective> accessed 6 
November 2017 
1435  Cambridge Dictionary <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/disruption> accessed 6 
November 2017  
1436 National Crime Agency, ‘National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime’ [2016] 9 
1437 Maria Mousmouti, ‘The “Effectiveness Test” as a Tool for Law Reform’ [2014] 2(1) IALS Student 
Law Review 5 
1438 ibid 4 (citing Helen Xanthaki, ‘On Transferability of Legislative Solutions: The Functionality Test’ in 
Costantin Stefanou and Helen Xantaki (eds) Drafting Legislation: A Modern Approach (Ashgate: 2008) 
17  
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burden the AML regime places on regulated persons.1439 If the law fails practically to 
achieve the purpose for which it is designed, the law is not effective.  
If the law and practice are effective in disrupting ML, then the following scenario is 
likely to play out: First, disruption will lead to a reduction in funds available for 
personal spending and further funding of criminal activity. Secondly, reduction in 
monies available to fund further act of criminality may result in a decline in crime and 
profit.1440 Thirdly, reduction in profit reduces the amount to be laundered.  
Therefore, if this scenario plays out continuously, AML law is said to be effective in 
disrupting ML.1441 It is therefore respectfully submitted that continuous disruption of 
ML may potentially lead to the reduction of ML because there would be less funds 
available to finance and sustain the commission of the predicate crimes.  
5.2.1 DISRUPTING THE LAUNDERING OF THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME  
The need to disrupt the flow of the proceeds of crime gave rise to the law and practice 
relating to ML.1442  Disrupting ML is a way of preventing criminals from enjoying their 
illicit wealth, and of cutting the source of financing further criminal activities like 
terrorism.1443 Understanding the impact, and ability to measure the impact the law and 
practice made against the scale of ML will enable the determination of the effectiveness 
of the law and practice relating to ML. 
                                                
1439 Her Majesty’s Treasury, Anti-money laundering and counter terrorist Finance supervision report 
2014-15 [May 2016] @ p 11 (describing an effective AML/CFT regime as one that focuses resources 
proportionately on the risks, and reduces unnecessary burdens on business that do not effectively prevent 
ML and TF)  
1440 This may not necessarily be true as market forces of demand and supply may help maintain or even 
increase profits. However, what matters most in commerce is not higher price of commodity but the 
turnover. The higher the turnover, the higher may be the overall profit. Therefore, disrupting free flow of 
proceed of crime is likely to have negative impact on profit 
1441 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) 
1442 Alldridge (n 42) 1 
1443 CFA 2017 has introduced certain measures to deprive criminals of their illicit proceeds – please see 
sections 3.2.1 and 6.3 
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To effectively disrupt ML, all aspects of AML law and practice must function properly. 
At this stage of this thesis, it will be helpful to look at the AML law and practice 
through the lens of Professor Reuter and Truman’s two-pillar (prevention and 
enforcement) structure, which depicts the mechanism for disrupting criminal 
finance.1444 Each pillar is subdivided into four elements. The prevention pillar consists 
of: sanctions, regulation and supervision, reporting, and customer due diligence.1445 In 
contrast, the enforcement pillar consists of: confiscation, prosecution and punishment, 
investigation, and predicate crime.  
While, the preventive pillar represents largely the legal requirements and practices that 
are required to be established to disrupt criminals or their professional launderers from 
using regulated person to launder proceeds of crime, the enforcement pillar represents 
legal measures and practices that can be used (where preventive measures have failed) 
to disrupt ML and funding of criminal activities.1446  
In both UK and US, AML law substantially cover these two pillars.1447 The law and 
practice relating to ML have been covered in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Although these 
jurisdictions are not in short of AML law, the concern is growing that the AML regime 
is not effective.1448 However, the challenge is how to measure the effectiveness of the 
AML law and practice in disrupting the free flow of proceeds of crimes.1449  
                                                
1444  Peter Reuter and Edwin Truman, Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering 
(Institute for International Economics 2004) 45 
1445 CFA 2017 has ameneded the way SAR is being handled – please 3.2.1 
1446 Reuter and Truman (n 1444) 45 
1447 POCA 2002 and TACT 2000 (as amended by CFA 2017), and MLR 2007 in the UK; and BSA 1970 
and associated regulations, MLCA 1986, and the Patriot Act 2001 in the US 
1448  Jason C Sharman, The Money Laundry: Regulating Criminal Finance in the Global Economy 
(Cornell University Press, 2011) 
1449 Harvey (n 1244) 339  
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Due to elusive and secretive nature of ML, the actual global scale of ML remains 
unknown.1450 All that is available is an estimate, like that of the IMF, which puts the 
global figure of ML activities between 2 and 5 per cent of the global GDP. Using the 
IMF estimate, an estimated figure of between £36 and £90 billion is laundered through 
the UK annually,1451 and USD300 billion through the US.1452  
While the actual figure of criminal assets restrained seized and confiscated, as well as 
the actual figures of civil penalties and fines against defendants for AML violations are 
ascertainable, there is no estimated figure of money disrupted due to arrest and 
imprisonment of offenders. Again, this is due to the secretive nature of the predicate 
crimes and the difficulty in calculating how much profit would have been made had the 
criminal activity taken place. 
While difficulty remains in having actual statistics on ML, the general view on the UK 
AML law is that the regime is not working.1453 Indeed the US Department of State has 
for years been categorising the UK among jurisdictions of primary ML concern.1454 
INCSR 2016 Report issued by the US Department of State identified UK as having a 
comprehensive AML regime, and as an active player at the international stage in 
                                                
1450  Fletcher N. Baldwin Jr., ‘Money Laundering and Wire Transfers: When the New Regulations 
Take Effect Will They Help?’ [1996] (14)3 Dickinson Journal of International Law 413, 416 (As most 
crime funds are hard to detect, the global scale of money laundering will remain unknow) 
1451 National Crime Agency, ‘National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime’ [2016] 28 
<http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/731-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-
organised-crime-2016/file> accessed 18 October 2016 
1452  Department of the Treasury, National Money Laundering Risk Assessment [2015] 2 
<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering%20Risk%20Assessment%20–%2006-12-
2015.pdf> accessed 18 October 2016  
1453 Barry A. K. Rider, ‘A bold step - but not quite where no man has gone before!’ [2016] 19(3) Journal 
of Money Laundering Control 222 (there were for many years concern that AML regime is not working 
effectively); Professor Rider has raised this concern as far back 1999 - please see Rider (n 41) 218 
1454 UK has been featuring in the list of countries the US Department of States considers jurisdictions of 
AML primary concern, please see International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) from 2000 to 
2016  
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combating transnational financial crime.1455 Nevertheless, the report indicates that the 
UK remains attractive to money launderers because of the size, sophistication, and 
reputation of its financial markets.1456 Also, the report have been featuring US among 
the countries of ML primary concern.1457  
While this report is a product of an annual review of ML situations in different 
jurisdictions, it is not aimed at measuring the effectiveness of AML law in the 
jurisdictions the report evaluated. However, this report includes an assessment of the 
quantum of the proceeds of serious crime that passes through the financial sector of 
individual countries, the steps taken or not taken to address financial crime and ML and 
the effectiveness with which the government has acted.1458  
Despite this, the report can still support a conclusion about the effectiveness of the 
AML law and practice in the jurisdictions it covers. Indeed, failure by a country to act 
effectively might result in enacting poor AML law and regulations and having poor 
AML practices, making the country vulnerable to ML.  
Similarly, designating a country as a jurisdiction of ML concern because of the large 
volume of a transaction involving proceeds of crime through its financial sector, sounds 
a warning on the effectiveness of the country’s AML regime in disrupting the flow of 
the proceeds of crime.1459 Thus, going by the INCS Report, a big question mark is 
placed on the effectiveness of the UK AML law.  
                                                
1455 please see International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) from 2000 to 2016  
1456  US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2016 
<http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2016/vol2/253438.htm> accessed 11 October 2016 
1457 Please see International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) from 2000 to 2016  
1458 Other areas the report touched on include: each jurisdiction’s vulnerability to ML; the conformance of 
its laws and policies to international standards; the effectiveness with which the government has acted; 
and the government’s political will to take needed actions 
1459 National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime [2014]  p 12 
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As an apparent confirmation of some views, 1460  the UK government itself 
acknowledged that the law and practice relating to ML are not working well.1461 The 
regime does not work because the law does not achieve the purpose it is designed to 
achieve; according to the UK authorities: 
A successful anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance 
regime will result in the relentless disruption of money 
laundering and terrorist finance activities, the prosecution of 
those responsible and the recovery of the proceeds of crime. A 
successful regime will dissuade those seeking to undertake 
money laundering and terrorist finance activities from doing 
so.1462  
The story about the effectiveness of the US AML regime is not much different.1463 
Indeed, the Mossack Fonseca leaks reveal that more needs to be done to make US AML 
law more effective.1464 While authorities in the US have not admitted failure in the 
AML law and practice, the Treasury Department admitted having loopholes in the US 
AML law, and the loopholes are being exploited to launder the proceeds of crime, evade 
tax, and engage in other illicit financial activities.1465  
31 CFR (2011) sets out AML compliance requirements. However, it does not require 
covered FIs to know the identity of the individuals who own or control their corporate 
                                                
1460 Alldridge (n 42) 1-3 
1461 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695)  7 
1462  The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) 9. CFA 2017 has amended POCA susbstantially to address the 
deficiencies of the  POCA AML provisions – please see section 3.2.1 
1463 Christina Parajon Skinner, ‘Executive Liability for Anti-Money Laundering Controls’ [2016] 166 
Columbia Law Review Sidebar 116, 121   
1464  White House, ‘Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Announces Steps to Strengthen Financial 
Transparency, and Combat Money Laundering, Corruption, and Tax Evasion’ (announcing series of 
measures to ensure transparency in ownership and control of companies registered in the United States) 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/05/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announces-
steps-strengthen-financial> accessed 17 October 2016; also, please see Fusion, ‘Meet the U.S. one-
percenter criminals revealed in the Panama Papers’ <http://fusion.net/story/287775/panama-papers-leak-
american-lawsuits/> accessed 17 October 2016 
1465 Department of the Treasury, ‘US transparency announcement: Secretary Lew Letter to Congress’ 
[2016] 
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clients (beneficial owners).1466 Similarly, Title 31 USC did not empower the Secretary 
of the Treasury to require covered FIs to maintain records and file report on the 
beneficial ownership of US entity.1467  
As discussed in chapter 4, lawyers in the US are not obliged to follow the statutory 
AML compliance requirements or to file SAR, even where they suspect their client of 
engaging in ML, but they are only required to withdraw from the relationship.1468 AML 
compliance among the US lawyers is largely voluntary with the Good Practice 
Guidance as the guide on how to carry out a certain aspect of AML compliance such as 
CDD. Provided lawyers are not involved in ML activity, failure to establish AML 
compliance is not an offence.  
Even the ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct (2013), which regulates US 
lawyer’s ethical conduct, neither require a lawyer to fulfil a gatekeeper role nor do they 
permit a lawyer to engage in the reporting that such a role could entail.1469 This is, 
however, one major loophole that casts doubt on the effectiveness of US AML law and 
practice in disrupting ML, as these loopholes allow foreign persons to hide assets in the 
US.1470 
A PSI Report reveals how corrupt leaders used lawyers and other gatekeepers to launder 
proceeds of corruption, because the category of gatekeepers involved was at the time 
                                                
1466 Federal Register, Volume 81 No 91 May 2016 (Rules and Regulations) (FinCEN has now issued final 
rule, to among other things, require CDD on the beneficial ownership of US entity) 
1467 It was after Panama Paper scandal and external pressure especially from small countries that a bill 
seeking to amend Subchapter II of Chapter 53 of Title USC was sent to Congress for enactment. The 
amendment will insert s 5333 to empower the Secretary of the Treasury to require FIs to maintain records 
and file reports on beneficial ownership of US entity 
1468 Please see gatekeeper section in chapter 4; also see United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Keeping Foreign Corruption out of the United States: Four Case Histories, Report 
202/224-950  (2010) 16 
1469 ABA Formal Opinion 463 (2013) 2 
1470 Department of the Treasury, ‘US transparency announcement: Secretary Lew Letter to Congress’ 
[2016] 
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not obliged to have AML compliance programme or to report suspicion of ML or even 
to decline to handle suspect funds involving a PEP.1471 The situation remains unchanged 
for the US lawyers. The report also reveals some laxity on the part of the banks. For 
example, when Wachovia wanted to close a client’s account, the client’s attorney 
convinced the bank to grant the client more time to take the money to another bank1472 
Even the evolution of the law and practice relating to ML in the US suggests that US 
has been expanding its AML law and practice to catch-up with launderers.1473 For 
example, the attempt by law enforcement to prosecute those who circumvent BSA 
reporting statute by structuring their transactions failed because structuring was not a 
criminal offence at that time. 1474  This informed the amendment of BSA 1970 to 
criminalise structuring. 
Similarly, as the culture of AML compliance increased among the bank’s, ML activity 
shifted to the non-bank FIs that were at the time less or not regulated.1475 This exposes 
the weakness of BSA 1970 AML provisions in disrupting ML. Although the law may 
not perform the function it wasn’t designed for, the ability of criminals to circumvent 
                                                
1471 United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Keeping Foreign Corruption out of 
the United States: Four Case Histories, Report 202/224-950  (2010) 15-105 contains a detailed account 
on how Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, a cabinet minister and son of the president of Equatorial 
Guinea, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mbasogo, employs the services of gatekeepers to launder public funds 
for personal use 
1472 United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Keeping Foreign Corruption out of 
the United States: Four Case Histories, Report 202/224-950  (2010) 187 provides an account of how a 
US Lawyer, Edward Weidenfeld convinced Wachovia Bank to allow Ms Jennifer Atiku Abubukar more 
time to open another account at a different bank for the suspect fund to be moved 
1473 For example, to avoid CTR money launderers resort to restructuring. The statute as originally enacted 
had no provision for dealing with that situation. Thus, the Treasury Department issued a regulation that 
require banks to aggregate transactions that fall under the threshold, but were made by or on behalf of one 
person. To remedy this deficit, Congress passed Money Laundering Control Act 1986, which enacted 18 
USC s 5324 into the BSA 1970 to criminalise structuring 
1474 United States v Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 689-90 (9th Circuit 1986); United States v Rigdon, 874 F.2d 
774, 777 (11th Circuit 1989); United States v Schimidt, 947 F.2d 362, 370-71 (9th Circuit 1991) 
1475 United States House of Representative Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Federal 
Government’s Response to Money Laundering, Report 103-40 (1993) 8 
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the law to avoid triggering the reporting statute exposed the inability of the statute to 
achieve its purpose of detecting criminal activities.  
The 2007 FATF mutual evaluation on the US reveals an effective AML system.1476  
However, the purpose of FATF mutual evaluation was to investigate whether the 
country subject to the evaluation has technically complied with the FATF 
recommendations – but not to assess the effectiveness of the domestic AML law. Thus, 
conformity of local AML law with FATF policy requirements does not automatically 
means the law is achieving what it is designed for. 1477  Reported incidences of 
laundering involving major banks in the US casts doubt on the effectiveness of the US 
AML law.1478  Thus, the FATF evaluation in question, which was aimed at finding 
whether US has complied with FATF global AML standards may not be used to gauge 
the effectiveness of the US AML laws. 
In 2013, FATF announced a shift in policy, which will see FATF evaluating (in addition 
to its traditional assessment of technical compliance with the FATF recommendations) 
the effectiveness of the AML regime established in compliance with the FATF 
recommendations. 1479  It is not the aim of this thesis to discuss the FATF 2013 
methodology of evaluating the effectiveness of countries AML law in any detail, but 
rather very briefly. Effectiveness has been defined as “the extent to which the designed 
                                                
1476 FATF, ‘Mutual Evaluation Report: Executive Summary’ [2007] states that: ‘Overall, the U.S. has 
implemented an effective AML/CFT system, although there are remaining concerns…’ 
1477 Harvey (n 1244)339 
1478  United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money 
Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History (Report 202/224-9505 and 202/224-
3721) 2012 (which reveals non-compliance culture by banks among other things) 
1479  Please see FATF, Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems (FATF Methodology) 2013 
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outcomes are achieved”. 1480  The 2013 methodology explained the effectiveness of 
country’s AML/CFT system in the following terms:1481 
…the extent to which financial systems and economies mitigate 
the risks and threats of money laundering, and financing of 
terrorism and proliferation. This could be in relation to the 
intended result of a given (a) policy, law, or enforceable means; 
(b) programme of law enforcement, supervision, or intelligence 
activity; or (c) implementation of a specific set of measures to 
mitigate the money laundering and financing of terrorism risks, 
and combat the financing of proliferation.  
Evaluating the extent, to which financial systems mitigate the risks and threats of ML, 
will potentially indicate the effectiveness or otherwise of the AML law in disrupting 
ML. The fourth mutual evaluation on the US was carried out in 2016 using the 2013 
FATF mutual evaluation methodology. The report described the US AML/CFT 
framework as well developed and robust.  
However, the report reveals gaps in the US AML system.1482 First, the AML regulatory 
framework either does not or only covered gatekeepers minimally.1483 This confirms, as 
discussed above, that lack of AML compliance obligation on gatekeepers – lawyers in 
particular – remains a serious concern. Secondly, the report reveals that there is no 
requirement to identify beneficial ownership and this allows criminals to abuse 
corporate entities to launder illicit proceeds.1484 
It is pertinent to point out that at present the only obligation to identify the beneficial 
ownership is limited to very specific situations, including private banking, to ascertain 
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1482 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report on the United States of America (2016) 3 
1483 ibid 3-4 and 153-161 
1484 ibid 3-4 and 153-161 
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whether a senior foreign PEP is involved.1485 However, AML obligations do not sit well 
with the nature of private banking. While AML law is aimed at reducing the risk of 
firms being used to launder the proceeds of crime, private banking is aimed at providing 
specialised financial services and emphasises loyalty to clients.1486 Thus, instead of 
carrying out CDD to identify the beneficial ownership of a non-US person (which in 
most cases the relationship manager is familiar with), a private banker may either create 
a US person for the client or use other means to conceal the identity of the client.1487 
The US Senate hearing on the use of private banking to launder illicit money reveals 
how powerful individuals use private banking facilities to move and invest stolen public 
funds through UK and US banking systems. 1488  The culture of secrecy and other 
advantages over retail banking, makes private banking more attractive to criminals.1489  
The use of a corporate vehicle to mask the identity of beneficial owners increases the 
chances of circumventing US AML law. 
Early detection of potential launderers and threats to the banking system at the CDD 
stage, as well as detecting and blocking transactions involving proceeds of crime at the 
placement stage is key to disrupting ML.1490 In the US like in many other jurisdictions, 
                                                
1485 31 CFR s 1010.620 (this obligation also applies to correspondent account for foreign FIs, see 31 CFR 
s 1010.610)  
1486  United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Private Banking and Money 
Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities (1999) 876-881 (the following five 
factors: the role of private bankers as client advocates, a powerful clientele, a corporate culture of secrecy, 
a corporate culture of lax controls, and the competitive nature of the industry demand private banker’s 
loyalty to the client) 
1487 ibid 874-75 
1488 as part of the investigation, a case study was conducted on the financial conduct of four PEPs – the 
Abacha sons, Asif Ali Zardari, El Hadj Omar Bongo, and Raul Salinas – at Citibank involving the use of 
private banking  
1489  United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Private Banking and Money 
Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities (1999) 875 and 877 
1490 Rob Gruppetta, ‘Effectiveness of the AML regime in disrupting financial crime’ 2016 (Opening 
comments for a panel discussion at our Financial Crime Conference) 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/effectiveness-aml-regime-disrupting-financial-crime> accessed 
8th January 2017 
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some regulated persons either turn their eyes away from the obvious or facilitate 
ML.1491   
Investigations launched by the PSI into the prolonged AML breach by HSBC revealed 
that AML laws could only be effective to the extent regulated persons comply with 
them and regulators enforce them.1492 A separate PSI’s investigation reveals collusion 
between Riggs bank and its regulators in handling proceeds of corruption involving 
Chile and Equatorial Guinea.1493  The OCC’s Examiner-in-Charge kept on shielding 
OCC from taking action against Riggs Bank for obvious AML failures, and in the end, 
the examiner left OCC to join Riggs.1494 
While the US AML law placed compliance obligation on regulated person, it does not 
in any way governs the behaviour of the regulators. Lack of specific provisions in the 
AML laws that regulate the conduct of the AML regulators in relation to exercise of 
their statutory duty is a gap in the US AML law. The conduct of the OCC’s Examiner-
in-Charge can be partly attributed to this gap, because had there been no such gap, it is 
likely that the examiner would have acted differently.1495 
Forfeiture (or confiscation as it is called in the UK) is one of the strategic weapons that 
are being deployed to disrupt and dismantle the economic infrastructure of criminal 
                                                
1491 In the Matter of Sparks Nugget, Inc. Nevada Number 2016-03 (Spark Nuggets violated 31 USC ss 
5318(a)(2), 5318(g) and 5318(h); 31 CFR. ss 1021.210, 1021.320, and 1021.410; In the Matter of
 
First 
National Community Bank, Dunmore, Pennsylvania Number 2015-03 (violated 31 CFR s 1010.810)  
1492  United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money 
Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History (Report 202/224-9505 and 202/224-
3721)  
1493 United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Money Laundering and Foreign 
Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act – Case Study Involving Riggs Bank, Report 
108-633 (2004) 
1494 ibid 3-4 
1495 For a summary of how the Examiner handled the Riggs affair see ibid 3-4 r 
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organisations.1496 Imprisonment of criminals alone was never substantially disruptive to 
many criminal organisations as any vacant position is promptly filled, and thus, an 
attack against their criminal assets is necessary.1497 Confiscation denies an offender the 
opportunity to benefit from his crime or to commit further offences in the future.1498  
In the UK for example, only 26 pence out of each £100 of proceeds of crime was 
confiscated in 2012/2013 fiscal year.1499 In percentage term, the amount of recovery is 
just 0.26 per cent.1500 Using these statistics to judge the effectiveness of UK AML law 
in terms of disrupting ML will reveal not just an ineffective, but also a failed law. It is 
estimated that USD300 billion proceeds of crime are laundered annually in the US.1501 
The fact that this estimate remains static (assuming this is a true estimate), shows that 
ML persists. This shows that AML law does little to disrupt ML. 
The foregoing analysis is in line with the position of the major AML scholars. The 
foremost scholar who pioneer research in ML and related crimes, Professor Barry Rider, 
has this to say about the effectiveness of the AML regime: 
There has been concern, not least expressed in the pages of this 
journal over many years, as to the apparent lack of effectiveness 
of the anti-money laundering and proceeds of crime regime. The 
amounts of money that are actually permanently taken out of the 
                                                
1496 Please see 18 USC s 981 (civil forfeiture), 18 USC s 982 (criminal forfeiture), and POCA 2002 Part 2. 
During the debate on the Proceeds of Crime Bill, John Denham said: “the Bill is about taking the profit 
out of crime. The proceeds of crime have a corrosive effect on society and our economy…The proceeds 
of crime also provide the working capital for future criminal enterprise. Recovering the money is 
therefore essential for crime reduction” (HC Deb 30 October 2001, Vol 373, Col 757) 
1497  Andrew Haynes, ‘Money Laundering and Changes in International Banking Regulation’ [1993] 
Journal of International Banking Law 454 citing Nicholas Dorn and others, Traffickers: Drug Markets 
and Law Enforcement (Routledge, 1992) at 69 (a practical example of how organised criminal groups fill 
vacuum very quickly is demonstrated by how Ismael ‘El Mayo’ Zambada replaced the Mexican drug 
lord, Joaquin 'El Chapo' Guzman, following the latter’s arrest): Daily Mail Online  
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3393581/Is-farmer-man-step-replace-El-Chapo-Ismael-El-
Mayo-Zambada-68-tipped-leader-Sinaloa-drugs-cartel.html> accessed 20th January, 2017)) 
1498 Alexander (n 1017)  
1499 National Audit Office, Confiscation Orders (HL 738, 2013-2014) p5 
1500 The rate of recovery of the proceeds of crime is likely to improve courtesy of the UWO introduced by 
the CFA 2017 
1501 The Treasury, ‘US National Money Laundering Risk Assessment’ [2015] 2 
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criminal pipeline are miniscule, and there have been few 
successful prosecutions against professional money launderers. 
While the situation is not different in most other jurisdictions, 
there is a perception, which is probably near the truth, that the 
UK has remained a key international Centre for money 
laundering and the investment of suspected wealth. 1502  
In his study, which concentrates mainly on the US AML law, Professor Mariano-
Florentino Cuellar found that there is a weak link between the fight against ML and 
disruption of ML and the underlying predicate crimes, and he concludes that: 
Whatever one thinks of the enterprise of disrupting financial 
activity related to crime, there is a tenuous relationship between 
the draconian aggressive prosecutorial efforts to punish money 
laundering and the larger project of using criminal penalties, 
regulation, and detection strategies to disrupt criminal finance. 
The relationship is tenuous primarily because of limitations in 
what sort of suspicious activity the system can detect, a 
limitation that becomes obvious once the system is viewed as a 
product of statutes, rules, and detection strategies.1503 
Professor J. C. Sharman whose research focused on mostly the UK and US (among the 
developed countries), and developing countries, used an indirect and direct test of 
effectiveness to find out whether AML law is effective in disrupting the flow of 
proceeds of crime. Both tests reveal that little evidence shows that UK and US AML 
policy does work and a good deal indicate that it does not.1504 Professor Jackie Harvey 
was sceptical on the impact of UK AML law on ML and organised crime, she said: 
It is difficult to establish for the UK whether the diligent 
application and enforcement of rules and regulations will have 
had any appreciable impact on money laundering activity. 
Despite its particularly assiduous application of anti-money 
laundering systems and procedures, the UK still appears on the 
list of countries in which money laundering is taking place.1505  
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 In a study on the US and UK Professor Levi and Professor Reuter concluded that 
‘available data weekly suggest that the AML regime has not had major effects in 
suppressing crime and that the proceeds of crime confiscated is very small compared 
with income or even profits from crime’.1506 In a separate study, Professor Reuter and 
Truman concluded that: 
…there was no empirical base to assess the effectiveness of the 
current AML regime in terms of suppressing money laundering 
and the predicate crimes that generate it…the regime has made 
progress in the general area of prevention, but without much 
effect on the incidence of underlying crimes. Critics argued that 
the regime has done little more than force money launderers to 
change their methods. Felons’ lives are a bit more difficult and 
few more are caught, but there is little change in the extent and 
character of either laundering or crime. Critics may well be 
right.1507 
The recent work of Professor Peter Alldridge questioned the empirical foundation upon 
which the AML movement was established, and of the narrative underpinning the AML 
industry.1508 In the second part of the book, the author questioned the rationale behind 
criminalising ML, pointing to the lack of clarity and the artificial nature of the term 
“laundering”. One major argument that kept on recurring throughout the book was that 
AML law is just an alternative to already existing laws in the UK which can effectively 
deal with whatever predicate crimes the AML law can deal with. He concluded by 
making some suggestion on how to control the growth of AML in the UK, and far more 
controversial of all is that AML regime rein can be abandoned altogether.1509  
These arguments are valid. While abandoning AML regime may sound a good idea, at 
this point, it is not the best idea. Let us assume that AML law is just a toothless bulldog. 
Still, it serves a purpose no matter how little. Here, an anology is drawn with the 
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presence of a single unarmed police officer patrolling a street in the night. His presence 
alone may deter petty criminals; may cause middle-level criminals to devise a way of 
avoiding him. Only hardened and well-armed criminals may confront the officer. Even 
among the hardened criminals, the ‘rational’ ones may chose to avoid having contact 
with the officer. Otherwise, the officer will raise alarm on detecting criminal activity. 
Furthermore, the fear of leaving a trail may make a rational criminal to avoid any 
confrontation with the officer.  
AML law works in a similar way.1510 It is the lack of a reliable estimate of the scale of 
ML, even from FATF,1511 that makes a determination of the disruptive effects of the 
AML law almost impossible. The existence of AML law in the law books may steer 
many people away from crime; may exclude criminals from the financial sector; may 
help detect ML; may cause displacement, 1512  or cause criminal to adopt different 
tactics,1513 increasing chances of detection. Only a determined criminal may take the 
gamble. To sum it all, Guy Halfteck has argued that the threat of legislation rather than 
the legislation itself plays a remarkable role in controlling behaviour, in creating and 
setting incentives, and in maintaining social order.1514 
Practically, when charged with ML in addition to other charges, criminals tend to plead 
quilty to charges related to predicate crime in return for the prosecution dropping the 
                                                
1510 Cuellar (n 118) 
1511 John Walker, ‘How big is Money Laundering?’ [1999] 3(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 25 
1512 Moving from high risk methods to less risk methods of laundering 
1513  For example, criminals resorted to structuring transactions below the threshold to avoid BSA 
reporting requirements 
1514 Guy Halfteck, ‘Legislative Threats’ [2009] 61 Stanford Law Review 629, 635 (The author analysed 
how threat of legislation influence the behaviour of the targeted population towards behaving in a 
particular way. The author used ten case studies, including a case study on ML (652-53), to demonstrate 
how the threat of enacting legislation influenced various sectors of the economy in the US and elsewhere 
(645-656). This theory can also be used to demonstrate the influence of enacted legislation on the targeted 
population. Please also see Mousmouti (n 1437) 
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ML charges.1515 The mere threat of ML charges and the possibilities of receiving a 
harsh sentence is enough incentive for many defendants on their own to seek for a plea 
bargain.1516 United States v. McNab1517 demonstrates how devastating ML charge can 
be. Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that abandoning AML system altogether 
will not be desirable.1518 
5.2.2 DISRUPTING TERRORIST FINANCING 
Up to this point, the focus of this thesis is on ML.1519 However, for the purpose of 
appraising the law and practice relating to ML in both UK and US, it is relevant to look 
at whether the law and practice do disrupt TF, which since 9/11 is being viewed 
together with ML, though the two are significantly different.1520  Discussion in the 
preceding chapters focused on ML, thus, at this stage, we only need to refer to ML for 
comparison purposes. 
TF has been described as reverse ML.1521 Reverse ML is a process of conducting 
financial transactions with clean money for the purpose of concealing or disguising the 
future use of that money to commit a criminal act such as terrorism.1522 TF can be 
classified as reverse ML because the property with which to finance terrorism may not 
necessarily involve proceeds of crime, as part of terrorist funding comes from legitimate 
                                                
1515 Reuter and Truman (n 1444) 112 
1516 Eric J Gouvin Are There Any Checks and Balances on the Government's Power to Check Our 
Balances – The Fate of Financial Privacy in the War on Terrorism’ [2005] 14 Temple Political & Civil 
Rights Law Review 517, 534-35 
1517 United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 122S, 1234 (l1th Cir. 2003) 
1518 It is expected that the dramatic changes CFA 2017 made to the UK AML landscape would strengthen 
the law and practice relating to ML 
1519 Due to limitation of space I have omitted to discuss TF, which involves a range of wholy different 
issues. But for the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of the AML law the two are often treated as 
one and the same. However, as we shall see TF can be quite opposite to ML  
1520 Rider (n 3) 13-4  
1521 Cassella (n 3) 92 
1522 ibid 92-93 
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sources, such as legitimate contracts, fundraising in the name of promoting a good 
course, and donations.1523 
In contrast to ML where the criminal activity that generates the proceeds comes before 
laundering scheme, in TF the intended criminal act is in the future. The focus is not on 
the proceeds of crime that have already been generated, but the purpose for which the 
resources – licit or illicit – are going to be deployed. The definition of TF points to this 
fact. For example, the Third Money Laundering Directive defines TF as: 
…the provision or collection of funds, by any means, directly or 
indirectly, with the intention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to 
carry out any of the offences [defined as terrorism].1524 
  
In the UK, TACT 2000 criminalised TF. It is a criminal offence to raise fund for 
terrorist activities;1525 to use or possess money to fund terrorism;1526 to enter or become 
concerned in funding arrangement of terrorist activities, or to engage in terrorist finance 
ML.1527 These offences mirror ML provisions in section 327, 328, and 329 of POCA 
2002. Like the ML offences under POCA 2002, TF offences under TACT 2000 carry 14 
years imprisonment.1528  
Unlike ML offences under POCA 2002, the defendant bears the burden of proving that 
he did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the arrangement related to 
                                                
1523 For example, Osama bin Laden made his fortune through legitimate contracts but deployed them for 
terrorism purposes, see HC Deb 30 October 2001, vol 373, col 802 
1524 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, article 1(4) 
1525 TACT 2000 s 15 
1526 ibid s 16 
1527 ibid s 18(1) 
1528 ibid s  22(a) 
  288 
the terrorist property.1529 Like POCA 2002, TA 2000 also contains provisions such as 
duty of disclosure and non-tipping-off obligation.1530  
A very logical argument has been made that the two offences should be dealt with under 
one and the same legislation.1531 Although the two offences are not yet married together, 
MLR 2007 imposed an obligation on regulated person in the UK to police the regulated 
sector against both ML and TF. In the US, the Patriot Act substantially amended BSA 
1970, to among other things, conjoin the fight against ML and TF, requiring FIs to use 
the existing AML regulatory regime to disrupt TF.1532 Due to the large amount of funds 
terrorist organisations, such as Islamic States in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Al Qaeda 
control, would need to deploy the conventional ML to move money around for their 
operations or to launder their illicit proceeds.1533  Hence, the need to deal with ML and 
TF under the same legislations. 
As discussed above the AML law proved to be ineffective in disrupting ML. But would 
AML law that proved to be ineffective in disrupting ML be effective in disrupting TF 
given that ML and TF are not the same, though terrorism is sometimes funded from the 
proceeds of crime. 1534  With very few exceptions, the AML law looks backwards 
focusing on the proceeds of crime that have been committed,1535 while CFT is forward 
looking. 
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Moreover, the AML compliance is aimed at detecting convoluted transactions aimed at 
concealing or disguising the source of the money, or its ownership, or its destination; or 
at converting a criminal asset into a different one or converting local into foreign 
currency, etc.1536 While the proceeds of crime involve tainted assets capable of drawing 
the attention of regulated person and law enforcement, TF mostly involves relatively 
small amount of money usually deposited or withdrawn in smaller transactions which 
may not attract the attention of the regulated firm and law enforcement.1537 
It is pertinent to state that AML compliance obligations were designed to focus 
specifically on transactions and to a certain extent on persons through the conduct of 
CDD – and the mission is to trace the proceeds of crime.1538 As the intended terrorist 
activity comes after financing, AML compliance may not be able to uncover future 
terrorist plots since the transactions in relation to TF does not indicate the purpose for 
which it is intended.  
While the use of forfeiture law is an attempt to deprive criminals the fruit of their illicit 
labour and to restrain ML, and the use of money to further criminal activity such as TF, 
the dynamic nature of terrorist could limit the efficacy of such measures. 1539  For 
example, while the blacklisting of terrorist organisations and freezing their assets may 
disrupt TF, that may affect only the large and known organisations – and probably 
temporarily.1540 Since terrorists operate in cells and their operation does not usually 
involve large amount of money, they may not have the need of conducting their 
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businesses through banks.1541 They can easily use alternative means of remittance such 
as the hawala, to move funds around.  
Thus, neither the AML compliance measures nor asset forfeiture could on their own 
effectively disrupt TF. Consequently, intelligence is key to the disruption of TF. In this 
regard, information sharing within the financial sector and between the financial sector 
and the law enforcement and intelligence agencies would be helpful in disrupting not 
only TF, but also ML.1542 
5.3 AML COST 
In evaluating the effectiveness of AML law in disrupting ML/TF, it is pertinent to 
weigh the AML cost against the impact of AML law and practice on ML/TF.1543 For the 
purpose of this research, this thesis defines the term AML cost as the cost of complying 
with the AML law (including opportunity cost), and cost incurred as a punishment for 
non-compliance, including compliance remediation cost.  
AML cost can be classified as direct (incurred as a result of complying with the law, 
rules and regulations) and indirect (such as the opportunuity cost). 1544  Although 
government may incur costs in establishing and administering the AML regime,1545 this 
thesis focuses on the cost incurred by the private sector in complying with the AML 
regime and for failure of compliance. The reason is, under the current AML regime in 
                                                
1541 Sinha (n 1537) 149 
1542 The Patriot ACT 2001 and CFA 2017 s 11 allow for the sharing of information among FIs 
1543 Due to space and time constrain this thesis does not attempt to conduct research on AML costs. 
Rather, it leverages on the research findings on the subject such as that of the Corporation of London, 
CCP Research Foundation, Conduct Cost Project Report (CCP Report) [2016]; CELENT (n 1215) 
1544 Johnston and Carrington (n 1212) 57 
1545 Reuter and Truman (n 1444) 93 
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both US and UK, it is the regulated persons that the law saddles with the responsibility 
of policing the market to help detect and prevent or disrupt ML and TF.1546  
Compliance cost include cost related to personnel recruitment, training, customer due 
diligence, ongoing monitoring, analysis, recordkeeping, and filing report.1547  Regulated 
persons also incur the cost of acquiring technology such as costs of purchasing and 
maintaining AML software, which accounts for 23 per cent of AML compliance 
costs. 1548  Then, opportunity costs – of forgoing lucrative businesses for AML 
compliance in an overregulated business environment. 
Separate from these costs, regulated persons incur cost due to regulatory sanctions and 
enforcement actions for breach of AML regulations. They also incur cost in remedying  
compliance system. The cost regulated persons incur due to AML misconduct is huge. 
For example, a 2016 Report reveals that the 20 major banks incurred £4.12billion in 
connection with ML related issues from 2011-2015.1549  
An estimate of AML cost to regulated persons in the UK and US as at 2004 stood at 
£253 million and £1.2 billion respectively.1550 Against these estimates, is the UK and 
US estimated GDP of £964 billion and £5,850 billion respectively.1551 In percentage 
terms, AML cost to the regulated persons stood at 0.026 and 0.021 per cent of the GDP 
of the UK and US respectively.  
                                                
1546 Please see 31 CFR s 1010.100 et seq; MLR 2007 
1547 Celent (n 1215) 11 
1548 ibid 
1549 CCP Research Foundation (n 1543) 16 
1550 The Corporation of London, Anti-Money Laundering Requirements: Costs, Benefits and Perceptions 
[2005] City Research Series No. Six (City Research Series) 24 (relying on HM Treasury for the UK 
figures, Reuter & Truman for the USA figures, and cross validating with other sources including Celent 
(a leading AML software supplier)) 
1551 City Research Series 2005 (n 1550) 33 
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It is alarming that the AML spending trends indicate that the AML cost is on the 
increase and will continue to rise.1552 As the law develops incrementally, so are the 
compliance obligations. As banks are hit by huge fines,1553 they recruit more staff into 
their compliance departments, while they also increase spending for AML controls.1554 
The British Bankers’ Association (BBA) estimates that its members are collectively 
spending at least £5 billion annually on core financial crime compliance, including 
enhanced systems and controls and recruitment of staff.1555  
Although the figures presented above were estimates, they show that the AML regime 
imposed a heavy burden on regulated persons. The figures also show that regulated 
persons in the UK incur more AML cost as a proportion of national GDP than their 
counterparts in the US. The higher AML cost in the UK can be attributed to the UK’s 
approach to AML regulations.1556 While the AML related cost is perceived to be higher 
in the UK than in other jurisdictions, banks are perceived to incur more AML-related 
cost than other regulated persons, due to their large number of customers, which means 
carrying out more AML activities such as KYC, and ongoing account monitoring.1557  
                                                
1552 Celent  (n 1215) 9 (stating that AML compliance cost is expected to rise by about 5-10 per cent) 
1553 Jason Demby, ‘More Money Spent on Less Money Laundered: The AML Big Data Story’ (Datameer, 
25 February 2016) <https://www.datameer.com/company/datameer-blog/more-money-spent-on-less-
money-laundered-the-aml-big-data-story/> accessed 17 June 2017 
1554  Are Compliance Cost Breaking Banks? (Trulioo, 25 August 2015) 
<https://www.trulioo.com/blog/are-compliance-costs-hurting-banks-bottom-lines/> accessed 17 June 
2017 
1555 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) 12. An ABA survey indicated banks are adversely affected by the 
growing compliance cost, with small banks being the most affected, please see ABA Survey: Regulatory 
Burden Limiting Bank Products and Services (American Banks Association, 30 July 2015) 
<http://www.aba.com/Press/Pages/073015BankComplianceOfficerSurvey.aspx> accessed 17 June 2017 
1556 City Research Series 2005 (n 1550) 13-15 (It appears that UK do exceeds the minimum requirements 
in terms of implementing international AML obligations, resulting in over-regulating the UK’s financial 
services industry more than those of other jurisdiction including the US) 
1557 City Research Series 2005 (n 1550) 25-6 
  293 
While the AML law keeps on expanding,1558 compliance burden and cost increase.1559 
However, there is concern that the AML compliance burden is not worth the cost and 
the regime do not do enough to assist law enforcement or to discourage crime.1560 Thus, 
while the AML cost is perceived to be high, overall, the AML regime is perceived to be 
less effective in disrupting ML.1561  
On the other hand, despite the UK being perceived as more heavily regulated than other 
major financial centres, UK AML regime is not perceived as being more effective at 
detecting and deterring ML than the AML regimes in other jurisdictions.1562 
5.4 WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH THE AML LAW 
Having concluded in the previous sections that the UK and US AML law do not 
effectively disrupt ML, this section investigates which aspect of the AML regime is not 
functioning properly. As the focus of the fight against ML has now shifted to 
disruption,1563 the UK and US are not in short of AML law – primary and subsidiary 
legislations.1564  
In addition, the AML law is broad in both jurisdiction,1565 while the case law has also 
developed over the years. 1566  In addition, regulators and industry supervisors issue 
                                                
1558 For example,  the CFA 2017 that has just received a Royal Assent has expanded the UK AML 
landscape substantially. Similarly, the UK AML regulatory framework is expected to expand when MLR 
2017 is enacted on 26 June 2017 
1559 Harvey (n 1244) 
1560 Rider and others (n 1172) 202 
1561 City Research Series 2005 (n 1550)  26 
1562 ibid 4 
1563 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) 3 
1564 Rider (n 41) 217 (In the US, a bill seeking to amend Subchapter II of Chapter 53 of Title 31, United 
States Code to empower the Secretary of the Treasury to require FIs to maintain records and file reports 
on beneficial ownership of US entity has been sent to Congress) 
1565 The US ML criminal statutes –Title 18 USC ss 1956 and 1957 – are very broad, in that knowledge 
that the asset involved is a proceed of a SUA is enough to satisfy the mens rea requirement of s 1957, 
while there are more than 150 predicate crimes which can give rise to ML charges. POCA 2002 AML 
provisions are also wide in that the ss 327, 328 and 329 captured any form of dealing with proceeds of 
crime  
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guidance to help regulated persons comply with the law.1567  The criminal aspect of the 
AML law appears to be wide-ranging in both jurisdictions,1568 though there may be 
some difficulty in securing a conviction.1569 Parallel to the criminal law is the regulatory 
law.  
With the vast array of AML law in both UK and US, the question here is, what is the 
problem with the AML law? Professor Richard K. Gordon took a radical view on the 
measures taken to prevent ML and concluded that the preventive measures cannot work 
and that they need to be rethought.1570  His view re-echoed an earlier view on the 
preventive strategy, albeit in a radical way.1571 
So, looking back at the two-pillar structure of the AML law, the preventive pillar play a 
significant role in disrupting ML, because the pillar should serve as the obstacle to 
criminals. It is only when laundering has occurred or has been attempted that 
investigation, prosecution and confiscation kick in. The success of the enforcement 
pillar of the AML system partly depends on the efficiency of the preventive pillar.  
                                                                                                                                          
1566 In the US, loads of case law have developed over the years in support of the US AML laws – cases 
such as: Stark v Connally, 347 F. Supp 1246 (ND Cal 1972); California Bankers Association. v. Shultz, 
416 U.S. 21 (1974); United States v St. Michael’s Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 584 (1st Cir 1989); United 
States v Campbell 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992); R v Anwoir [2009] 1 W.L.R. 980 and R v F [2008] 
EWCA Crim 1868; [2008] Crim LR 45 (Where the Court of Appeal held that the prosecution need not to 
point to a particular crime that generated the proceeds, resolving a real difficulty prosecution faced in the 
fast) 
1567 For example, the FCA issued guidance, as part of its Handbook to help regulated persons comply with 
the law; a similar guidance was issued by the JMLSG to help its members comply with the law  
1568 Cuellar (n 118) (…the criminal statutes that govern who gets charged, convicted, and sentenced for 
money laundering give authorities tremendous power to call almost anything that involves money from 
crime, a “money laundering offence”) 
1569 Rachel Ratliff, ‘Third Party Money Laundering: Problem of Proof and Prosecutorial Discretion’ 
[1996] 7 Stanford Law and Policy Review 173, 175; please also see United States v Jewell 32 F.2d 697 
(9th Cir. 1976) 
1570  Richard K Gordon, ‘Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on 
Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing’ [2011] 21 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International law 503, 507 
1571 Cuellar (n 118) 
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While acknowledging that regulated sector is better equipped and positioned to police 
the financial market,1572  the preventive pillar cannot be effective in disrupting ML 
without the full cooperation of those who handle people’s wealth. Is the regulated 
person willing to shoulder the responsibility of disrupting ML? At the very beginning, 
banks were reluctant.1573 The regulated entities did not only refuse to fully comply with 
the recordkeeping and reporting statute but also challenged the record keeping and 
reporting requirements (which is deemed to be part of the useful tool in disrupting ML) 
unsuccessfully.1574  
It was after Bank of Boston was sanctioned that banks in the US started to file 
reports.1575  Even the banking supervisors never wanted to become involved in law 
enforcement as their main concern was about the safety and soundness of the banking 
system.1576  
5.5 CONCLUSION 
Taking various reports cited above together with the informed judgements of different 
scholars, the AML cost, and the analysis of the law and practice relating to ML, this 
thesis concludes that the law and practice relating to ML in UK and US do not 
effectively disrupt ML and TF. The effectiveness of the AML compliance is key to 
ensuring the disruption of ML. Thus, various enforcement actions that were taken 
against regulated persons in both UK and US for the failure of compliance suggest that 
the law and practice in both jurisdictions are defective. 
                                                
1572 ibid 366 
1573 In the US, from the very beginning banks were reluctant because they thought that they were not the 
target of the recordkeeping and reporting statute 
1574 Stark v Connally 347 F. Supp. 1242 (ND Cal 1972); California Banker Association v Shultz 416 U.S. 
21 (1974) 
1575 Rush (n 223) 474 
1576 Reuter and Truman (n 1444) 79-80 
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Once compliance does not work, criminals will have unfettered access to the financial 
system, and hardly would regulated persons detect ML activities. Thus, the system will 
not be able to disrupt ML and TC. In the US, failure to place AML obligation on 
lawyers appears to undermine the US AML law. As lawyers are gatekeepers to the FIs, 
inability to bring them within the ambit of the BSA 1970 undermines the effectiveness 
of the US AML law. Moreover, private banking poses a threat to the US AML law. 
Criminals exploit the secrecy and privacy inherent in private banking to launder 
proceeds of crime. 
As discussed above, there are lapses in the UK’s AML landscape. However, CFA 2017 
has amended   POCA AML provisions substantially. The Act introduced UWO into the 
UK statute book. UWO is meant to strengthen the civil recovery provision of POCA. As 
criminals launder proceeds of crime just for it to resurface clean, UWO will compel 
criminals to explain the provenance of their wealth which appears to be beyond their 
known earnings. 
CFA also overhauls the way SAR is handled. As the consent regime is now reformed, 
law enforcement agencies can now seek the extension of the 31-day moratorium period 
up to six times in succession. This is to enable the law enforcement agencies to conduct 
a thorough investigation and uncover evidence, particularly when evidence is located 
abroad, as it is the case in most foreign corruption cases. Also, the Act allows for 
sharing of information between the law enforcement and regulated persons on the one 
hand, and among the regulated persons on the other. However, it remains to be seen the 
impact this amendment will make to ML and TF and how soon those impact will be 
felt.  
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This thesis has appraised the law and practice relating to ML in the UK and US. 
Consequently, this thesis draws conclusions that the US and UK AML legislation and 
practice do not effectively disrupt ML and TF in both jurisdictions. This thesis now 
explores the factors that undermine the AML law and practice in the UK and US.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION – ENHANCING THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE 
Of course, the application and administration of a legal 
procedure can be tested and found to be efficient or otherwise, 
but the assessment as to what impact it makes on the…activity 
against which it is directed, presupposes an ability to quantify 
the extent of the relevant activity.1577  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis concludes that the law and practice relating to ML in UK and US do not 
effectively disrupt ML/TF. This conclusion, however, does not mean that every aspect 
of the law and practice as they were and are today, are not working and therefore the 
AML law and practice should be abandon altogether. Rather what is needed is what the 
two jurisdictions have been doing and are still doing – continuous review of the law and 
practice relating to ML to close the loopholes and improve their efficiency. 
It has been seen throughout this research that the law and practice relating to ML, as 
they evolve, in the USA and UK had gaps, which criminals have been exploiting to 
breach the law and compromise the practices and procedures established to ensure 
proper AML compliance. While the law undergoes amendments from time to time to 
confront new threats and to remedy defects in the law, the compliance aspect of the 
AML law also keeps expanding to cover many regulated persons that hitherto, either 
were not covered or were partially covered. However, despite being amended the 
existing AML law and practice failed to prevent ML. Rather ML persisted in both 
jurisdictions. 
In this final and concluding chapter, this thesis searches for factors that undermine the 
effectiveness of the law and practice as well as ways to strengthen the law and practice 
                                                
1577 Rider (n 41) 218-219 
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relating to ML. For example, a large volume of CTRs and SARs has been a concern not 
only to those who file them, but also to those who analyse them, as well as the 
authorities – because the many genuine transactions conceal the few suspicious ones.  
Because of the ineffectiveness of the law and practice, certain measures need to be 
taken to enhance the disruptive effect of both AML law and practice. Both new and 
existing law can be useful in this regard. In order not to exceed the word limit, this 
chapter restricts the analysis to two issues. First, this chapter explores factors that 
undermine the law and practice relating to ML. Secondly, it then analyses the two ways 
– UWO and whistleblowing – through which AML law and practice can be 
strengthened. 
6.2 FACTORS AGAINST AML LAW AND PRACTICE IN US AND 
UK 
This section explores factors that undermine AML law and practice in both UK and US. 
These factors are: shifting the responsibility of detecting ML from government 
shoulders to the private sector; emphasis on following the money; the large volume of 
data; collaboration with the insiders, and Shifting focus from predicate crimes to ML. 
6.2.1 SHIFTING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DETECTING ML FROM 
GOVERNMENT’S SHOULDERS TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
A major factor that makes AML law ineffective is shifting government’s responsibility 
of disrupting criminal activities to the financial sector and at no cost. Since 1970, 
regulated persons (banks in particular) were placed under a duty to report their 
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customers’ financial activities.1578 With the birth of FATF placing responsibility on the 
financial sector to police criminals became a norm.1579  
Obligation is placed on the regulated persons to establish and maintain a compliance 
programme to prevent themselves from being used as ML conduit. 1580  Failure to 
perform the tasks required under an AML compliance programme attracts various 
sanctions.1581 Under this approach, authorities place a duty on regulated persons to serve 
as detectives for no payment or reward of any kind.1582  
On the other hand, regulated persons get punished for not preventing a third party from 
committing ML offence.1583 Thus, regulated persons must place their customers and 
their transactions on extensive surveillance with a view to disrupting the flow of 
proceeds of crime; doing otherwise attracts various sanctions.  
Traditionally criminal law does not place positive duty to report or prevent crime.1584 
However, corporate reporting exists long before the AML law imposes a duty on 
regulated person to report financial activities of their customers.1585 The imposition of 
duty on regulated persons to report suspicion of ML is justifiable on the basis of the 
social cost of crime, the benefits of incorporation, and corporate social 
                                                
1578  BSA 1970, being the starting point of the US AML regime, mandated banks to file currency 
transaction reports. While in the UK, it was DTOA 1986 s 24(3)(a) that first placed duty – albeit 
indirectly – on the banks to report suspicion of drug ML 
1579 FATF on ML was established by the G-7 Summit that was held in Paris in 1989 as a response to 
mounting concern over ML; it has since expanded its membership and also a number of FATF style 
regional bodies have been establish by other jurisdiction around the world to combat ML and TF 
1580 FATF 40 Recommendations R5 – 16   
1581 ibid R17 
1582 Alldridge (n 42) 75 
1583 Rider and others (n 1172) 339  
1584 Hall (n 172) 645-49 (the author provides a detailed analysis on the imposition of duty to report 
criminal activity)  
1585 In the US for example, it is a requirement for corporations, while making public offer, to make a full 
disclosure of material information regarding the securities they are offering (Securities Exchange Act 
1933 s 5, 15 USC s 77 (1994)); it is an offence to make material misrepresentations relating to the trading 
of securities (Securities Exchange Act 1934 s 10(b), 15 USC s 78 (1994)) 
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responsibility. 1586  It is more justifiable on the premise that, since banks and other 
regulated persons serve as conduits through which proceeds of crime flow, one of the 
most effective ways of disrupting the flow of those proceeds is for the banks to intercept 
them.1587 
While the imposition of this duty comes with costs, there is concern that the burdens 
placed on regulated persons are not cost-effective and do not do much in reducing 
crimes or assisting law enforcement.1588  While authorities are very clear about the 
penalties for dereliction of duty, and of course regulators and supervisors provide 
regulated persons with guidance on how to discharge their compliance obligation, little 
guidance is provided on how to differentiate illegal from legal assets.1589 Thus, there is a 
tendency that proceeds of crime may pass undetected since assets do not have any 
specific character. 
One of the reasons given for involving regulated persons in policing is safeguarding the 
stability and integrity of financial system.1590 However, that reason has been disputed, 
as there is no evidence to suggest that any bank (or regulated persons) has collapsed 
because the bank facilitated ML. 1591  Furthermore, while UK and US laws permit 
sharing of recovered proceeds of crime between the State and law enforcement, the dirty 
money has never threatened the existence of either the States or their recovery agencies. 
Then why is dirty money harmful to banks and not to the recovery agencies?  
                                                
1586 Pamela H. Bucy, ‘Epilogue: The Fight against Money Laundering: A New Jurisprudential Direction’ 
[1992] 44 Alabama Law Review 839, 847-50 
1587 ibid 840 
1588 Rider and others (n 1172) 202 
1589 Sharman (n 1448) 8 
1590 Preamble to Fourth Money Laundering Directive (EU) 2015/849 stated that, flows of illicit money 
can damage the integrity, stability and reputation of the financial sector   
1591 Alldridge (n 42)36 
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Once the proceeds of crime have been recovered through the legal process they lose 
their dirty character and become clean – the “dirt” in the money is a mere attribute but 
not physical filth capable of contaminating other clean assets held by the bank. 
Meanwhile, with the advance in technology, there may be no need to move money in 
their physical form. Thus, the difference between legal proceeds and proceeds of crime 
is not based on their physical attributes but legal interpretation. Consequently, in the 
absence of any law that criminalises ML, proceeds of crimes are a good investment that 
increases banks’ (or even nations’) liquidity. 1592  While nations have a legitimate 
concern to prevent corruption and ML, if not for anything but capital flight, banks need 
not worry, provided the assets end up with them.  
Another possible argument that could be advanced in favour of involving regulated 
persons in disrupting the proceeds of crime without any compensation is that the social 
cost of crime may affect their operations and profits. For example, where there are drugs 
there is a crime. Thus, businesses might have to increase their security budget by, for 
example, raising the level of security around their premises and their technical 
infrastructure to protect their investment.  
Regulated persons may have to pay protection money in the form of insurance cover or 
any other form to criminals to guard against theft, armed robbery or even arson.1593 In 
this situation, there is a clear need for the regulated persons to assume the role of public 
authorities of policing to protect their businesses, personnel and assets; and to also bring 
down cost and increase profits.  
                                                
1592 ibid 
1593 Rider (n 10) 108 
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Assuming ML actually threatens the integrity of the financial system, and the authorities 
have failed to protect regulated persons against the threat, then it is expected that 
regulated persons will have the incentive to protect themselves.1594  However, as it 
stands now in the US and UK, regulated persons do not fit into this situation. 
Consequently, placing a duty on regulated persons to disrupt ML created a costly 
unfunded mandate. 1595  While the unfunded mandate increases the cost of doing 
business, it also reduces the profits.1596 
Although regulated persons may be influenced by the force of law to become involved 
in disrupting the crime of others without compensation,1597 the decision to take up the 
unfunded mandate of policing the financial market is likely to be influenced partly by 
the cost and benefit of discharging the mandate. Regulated persons may also weigh the 
consequences of non-compliance with the mandate against the possible benefits of 
going against the mandate. If the benefits of going against the unfunded mandate 
outweigh the consequences, some regulated persons are likely to launder or allow others 
to use their facilities to launder other people’s dirty money and face regulatory sanctions 
when they are caught.1598 
                                                
1594 Gordon (n 1570) 529-30 (citing many scholar at footnote 120 the author stated: “In the Anglo-Saxon 
world enforcement of the criminal law was almost entirely private up until the first half of the nineteenth 
century, when the state began to take a dominant role in policing, investigating, and prosecuting breaches 
of the criminal law)  
1595 John F Gilsinan and others, ‘The Role of Private Sector Organisations in the Control and Policing of 
Serious Financial Crime and Abuse’ [2008] 15(2) Journal of Financial Crime 111, 122 
1596 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) 12 (The British Bankers’ Association (BBA) estimates that its members 
are collectively spending at least £5 billion annually on core financial crime compliance, including 
enhanced systems and controls and recruitment of staff) 
1597 Gordon (n 1570) 530 
1598 Rider (n 41) 217 (Stating that since the days of Meyer Lansky there have been individuals who are 
prepared, for a fee or part of the action, to provide their services to whoever may wish to have their 
money hidden or laundered)  
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Thus, in this circumstances relying on regulated persons to police the financial system 
may not be the ineffective way of disrupting ML.1599 If the desired result of disrupting 
ML and the underlying predicate crimes is to be achieved, a different approach should 
be adopted to get the commitment of the financial sector.1600  
The report of the US Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation on HSBC reveals that 
effectiveness of AML laws in disrupting criminal finance depends largely on the 
willingness of regulated persons to co-operate genuinely in complying with the AML 
law.1601 While obtaining the co-operation of the financial sector is very vital, placing an 
unfunded mandate on the regulated persons hinders the realisation of such co-operation, 
which is key to ensuring the effectiveness of AML law in disrupting ML. Indeed, 
regulated persons can frustrate the effectiveness of AML laws even where they 
implement them.  
6.2.2 LARGE VOLUME OF DATA 
The large volume of CTR and SAR is among the factors that affect the effectiveness of 
the AML law in disrupting ML. Although CTR and SAR are vital tools for detecting 
crimes, the volume of filings undermines the effort being made to detect and disrupt 
ML.1602 Meanwhile, the number of reports keeps on rising by the year. Statistics reveals 
that 1,276,509 and 1,726,971 SARs were filed in 2013 and 2014 respectively in the 
                                                
1599 Gilsinan and others (n 1595) 112-123  
1600 Gilsinan and others (n 1595) 114-15 (One of such approaches is outsourcing public policing by hiring 
private security firms to protect strategic installations, or private companies to gather data for law 
enforcement purposes. If this can be replicated with banks, it could motivate the banks to genuinely 
embark on a mission to disrupt ML) 
1601  United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money 
Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History (Report 202/224-9505 and 202/224- 
3721). This is in line with the view expressed by Hyland and Thornhill (n 842) 30-450 
1602 The Patriot Act 2001 s 366(a) (where Congress noted that despite the Money Laundering Suppression 
Act 1994, which sought to reduce the number of CTRs, the volume of CTRs is interfering with the 
effectiveness of the enforcement of AML law because some FIS are not utilizing the exemption system, 
or are filing reports even if there is an exemption in effect) 
  305 
US.1603 This shows an increase of 450,462 reports or 35.29 per cent increase in just one 
year. By the middle of the fiscal year 2015, almost a million SAR was filed.1604 On the 
other hand, about 15 million CTRs were filed in 2011.1605  In the UK where the AML 
law does not require regulated persons to file CTR, 4,872 reporters filed 381,882 SARs 
in 2014/15 with the 83.4 per cent of these reports coming from retail banks. 1606  
Given the huge number of these reports, it is a huge task for NCA and FinCEN to 
carefully consider and analyse each of these reports and distill from them meaningful 
intelligence which could lead to actual disruption of ML. Indeed, the huge number of 
these reports suggests defensive reporting on the slightest suspicion to avoid a huge 
penalty for violation of reporting statutes. The case of Shah v HSBC1607 is just one 
example. How many SARs lead to law enforcement action is unknown because both 
NCA and FinCEN SARs statistics did not give any meaningful insight on how these 
reports are utilised.  
Much more problematic is the large volume of CTR filings in the US. Based on the 
FinCEN 25 minutes per report conservative estimate, it was estimated that about 4.5 
million staff hours were required to file the over 15 million CTRs filed in 2006.1608 If it 
takes an employee of a regulated person 25 minutes to file one CTR, then more time is 
needed to analyse that same report by FinCEN staff.  One thing is very clear – large 
numbers of staff at both FinCEN and NCA are required to handle these reports 
                                                
1603 FinCEN, SAR Statistics Issue 2 [2014]. There is a slight decrease in SARs annualy beginning 2012 
(cf n 1603);  
1604 ibid. According to the latest FinCEN SAR statistics, almost 1 million SARs were filed in 2016 
(FinCEN, SAR Issue 3 [March 2017]) 
1605 FinCEN, ‘Fiscal Year Annual Report’ [2011] 
1606 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) 13 
1607 [2010] EWCA Civ 31 
1608 House Committee on Financial Services, Suspicious Activity and Currency Transaction Reports: 
Balancing Law Enforcement Utility and Regulatory Requirements: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations [2007] 110th Congress 84  
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properly.1609 Consequently, with this large number of reports, there is every tendency 
that criminally-tainted transactions can hide under genuine commercial transactions. 
Thus, undermining the effectiveness of the AML laws in disrupting ML. 
6.2.3 EMPHASIS ON FOLLOWING THE MONEY 
Right from the beginning, the fight against ML and the underlying predicate crimes 
places emphasis on following the money through tracing. Audit trails allow law 
enforcement to trace financial transactions to criminals. The legal requirements to create 
audit trails have been discussed in the previous chapters. But still, at this point, it is 
worthy of mention that the importance of keeping records and filing reports of financial 
transaction to regulate ML and seize criminal assets through tracing or paper checks has 
been emphasised.1610  
While involving those who handles other people’s wealth is necessary if this approach 
is to succeed, equally vital is the creation of accurate and accessible records of financial 
transactions because, without them, there will be no trail to follow.1611 The question, 
however, is whether this approach is effective in disrupting ML. The argument has been 
made that creating audit trails of financial transactions and following these trails is the 
only way to combat white-collar crime and one of the few effective ways to combat 
illegal drugs and drug-related crime.1612 While this argument sounds strong, criminals 
do engage in convoluted financial arrangements to complicate paper trails.1613  
Thus, creating paper trails may not necessarily disrupt ML because the use of those 
trails might be useful only when the laundering scheme is completed to help identify the 
                                                
1609 Byrne (n 76) 820 
1610 31 USC s 5311 
1611 Bucy (n 1586) 847 
1612 ibid 
1613 Marco Arnone, ‘International anti-money laundering programs: Empirical assessment and issues in 
criminal regulation’ [2010] 13(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 226, 238 
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criminal and the predicate crime, and also to help uncover the whereabouts of laundered 
assets. And by that time, as Professor Barry Rider has pointed out, the criminal might be 
on Copacabana beach, and the money is in a Liechtenstein Anstalt.1614  
As it is now, regulating ML and seizing of criminal assets through tracing or paper 
checks does not and in fact, cannot work for many reasons. One of these reasons is the 
large volume of data generated through the filing of reports that provides the trail. As 
discussed above, the large number of CTR and SARs filings is enough to frustrate 
timely detection and disruption of ML. Tracing involves connecting the dots in order to 
get to the crime and to prevent it. Because of the large volume of data searching for the 
right dots would be like searching a needle in a haystack.1615 Thus, it is unlikely that 
paper trail alone could flag any suspicion.1616 
Another reason why tracing through the paper trails is never going to work is how 
sophisticated financial transactions have become. Criminals engage in convoluted 
transactions to avoid paper trail altogether.1617 Once proceeds of crime are successfully 
placed into the financial system, it will be difficult to trace those proceeds back to the 
underlying predicate crime. 1618  Layering gives another opportunity for criminals to 
distance the asset further from its criminal source.1619 Complex transactions (sometimes 
through dummy corporations); creating lengthy and ambiguous paper trails;1620 offshore 
                                                
1614 Richard Alexander, ‘Case Comment: Does the Akzo Nobel case spell the end of legal professional 
privilege for in-house lawyers in Europe?’ [2010] 31(10) Company Lawyer 310 
1615 Sinha (n 1537) 149-50 
1616 Amann (n 64) 226 
1617 Sucoff (n 371) 96 
1618 City Research Series 2005 (n 1550) 11 
1619 Keesoony (n 941) 131  
1620 Carwile and Hollis (n 10) 325,  
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banking; and corruption frustrates efforts to use tracing to regulate ML and to seize 
criminal assets.1621 
There is also a problem of evidence.1622 The challenge that criminals face the most is 
how to legitimise their illicit earnings. This makes them to engage in laundering 
activities. At that stage, criminals might leave behind their footprints. The ability to 
follow those trails is key to a successful investigation, prosecution, and confiscation of 
proceeds of crime. Leaders of organised crime groups are difficult to investigate let 
alone prosecute because they distance themselves from the crime. Thus, paper trails can 
provide a useful link for investigation purposes.1623 
However, criminals tend to devise means of confusing the onlooker and confounding 
the inquirer. Bearer shares pose particular problem in this regard, and because they are 
not registered, ownership of a company and control over assets may be deceptive, 
leaving behind an ambiguous paper trail.1624 Similarly, criminals engage in structuring 
to avoid triggering reporting requirements thereby avoiding paper trails – leaving 
behind no evidence.  
Without evidence, law enforcement would find it difficult to prosecute offenders. In the 
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution must resort to circumstantial evidence to 
obtain a conviction and to secure the confiscation of the illicit proceeds. Using 
                                                
1621 Andrew Haynes, ‘The Struggle Against Corruption – A Comparative Analysis’ [2000] 8(2) Journal of 
Financial Crime 123, 
 132 
1622 For an in-depth analysis on this please see Linn (n 67) 407; Kenneth Murray, ‘The uses of irresistible 
inference: Protecting the system from criminal penetration through more effective prosecution of money 
laundering offences’ (2011) 14(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 7; Ratliff (n 1579) 173  
1623  Amann (n 64)207 citing David A. Chaikin, Money Laundering as a Supra-National Crime: An 
Investigatory Perspective, in Principles and Procedures for a new Transnational Criminal Law (Albin 
Eser & Otto Lagodny eds., 1992) 415, 420-21 
1624 Andrew Haynes, ‘The Wolfsberg Principles – An Analysis’ [2004] 7(3) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 207, 209 
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circumstantial evidence to prove AML violations is nothing new.1625 AML violation 
under POCA 2002 can be proven using circumstantial evidence1626 by showing that the 
manner in which the relevant funds or assets were handled gave rise to an “irresistible 
inference” that the money was criminal without the need to identify the nature of the 
predicate crime.1627  
This is a departure from earlier decisions of the court that require the prosecution to 
prove at least the class of offence that constitute the unlawful conduct.1628 However, 
uncertainty still remains as the court in R v. Geary held in relation to ML prosecution 
under POCA 2002 section 328(1) that the arrangement to which this section referred to 
had to be one, which relates to a property of criminal origin at the time when the 
arrangement began to operate on it.1629 It was further held that to say that section 328(1) 
extended to property which was originally legitimate but became criminal only as a 
result of carrying out the arrangement was to stretch the language of the section beyond 
its proper limits.1630  
In the US except in one situation, proving that the funds involved are derived from a 
SUA is necessary to secure a conviction under 18 USC sections 1956 and 1957.1631 
Finding evidence to support ML or TF charges under these statutes could be difficult as 
sometimes the evidence is located in a foreign jurisdiction or is otherwise difficult to 
                                                
1625 For example, see: United States v. Hovind, 305 F. App’x 615, 621 (11th Cir. 2008) (testimony against 
the defendants showed that defendants knew of and complained about reporting requirements); 
MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 193 (stating that s 5324 makes no reference to the reason why a person 
structures); United States v. Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639, 645 (8th Cir. 1992)  
1626 Such as audit trail evidence, lack of legitimate income to account for amounts transferred, obvious 
links to criminality such as drug-contaminated notes, accomplice evidence, etc 
1627 R v. Anwoir & Others, [2008] EWCA Crim 1354; HM Advocate v. Ahmad, [2009] HCJAC 60 
Appeal No XC261/06; for an in-depth analysis on this please see Murray (n 1622) 9-15 
1628 For example, see R v W [2009] 1 W.L.R. 965 
1629 R v Geary [2010] EWCA Crim 1925 
1630 [2010] EWCA Crim 1925 
1631 Except in international transportation of funds to promote SUA 18 USC s 1956(a)(2)(A), all ML 
offenses require prosecution to proof that the funds in fact were derived from SUA 18 USC s 1956(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(B), (a)(3) and 1957  
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extract. 1632  Where there is no direct evidence to prove ML violation, linking the 
proceeds of crime to the predicate crime through tracing may be quite difficult if not 
impossible.1633  
The underground economy is yet another reason why tracing will not work in regulating 
ML and seizure of proceeds of crime.1634 The underground economy is characterised by 
cash transactions outside the formal banking system. Cash is an important means of 
financing crimes, including TF because it is anonymous and nearly undetectable.1635 
Cash transactions have certain advantages. It doesn’t require authorisation or special 
hardware to complete financial transactions; it can stay below the radar of law 
enforcement; it is instant, final and irreversible; and anybody can claim ownership of 
cash.1636  Thus, a cash transaction is a convenient way of concealling the origin of 
proceeds of crime, or the illegal purpose for which the money is intended. 
Because cash transaction hardly leaves traces, it is difficult to regulate ML and seize 
proceeds of crime through paper checks. The solution to this is to substitute cash 
transaction with non-cash transactions. Although developed countries have transformed 
into cashless economies, underground economies poses a challenge to the global fight 
against ML.1637 As cash transactions  are extremely difficult to hunt and bring down, 
ML and TF become difficult to disrupt.1638  
                                                
1632 Linn (n 67) 426 (stating that the US Supreme Court in United States v Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 353-
54 (1998) explained that Congress shaped the penalties for cash smuggling and reporting offenses 
because of “problems of individual proof” of another crime) 
1633 Murray (n 1622) 10 
1634 For analysis on the effect 
1635 Yuliya G. Zabyelina, ‘Reverse money laundering in Russia: clean cash for dirty ends’ [2015] 18(2) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 202 
1636 ibid 
1637 ibid 203 
1638 Sinha (n 1628) 145 
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Corruption, collaboration with insiders, comingling of funds, and bitcoins and 
virtual money also make the disruption of ML and seizure of proceeds of crime 
unrealistic. While these factors and products frustrates the ability to determine 
the source of the money for the purpose of ML prosecution, it also frustrates 
efforts to trace and seize proceeds of crime.1639 states 
6.2.4 COLLABORATION WITH INSIDERS 
As some cases reveal, collaboration with insiders to undermine the effectiveness of 
AML laws in disrupting ML and the underlying predicate crimes is not uncommon. 
There are many cases where an insider or insiders collaborate with criminals to launder 
proceeds of crime.  For example, an MSB operator was convicted of ML and conspiracy 
to launder. The facts of the case reveal how the operator laundered large amounts of 
sterling that were converted into euros, and a wholesale non-compliance with the 
relevant MLR.1640 Other cases reveal similar patterns.1641 In the US, the case of Lucy 
Edwards – a very senior official of the Bank of New York – reveals the extent 
employees go in undermining the effectiveness of AML laws to their own personal 
gain.1642 
While authorities rely on the regulated sector to help in disrupting ML, the effectiveness 
of any AML strategy partly depends on the willingness of the human elements within 
                                                
1639 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment [2015] 52 citing Jennifer Shasky Calvery, ‘Testimony 
before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, February 8, 2012’ (saying: 
“The use of businesses and other legal entities to commingle licit and illicit funds tests a bank’s ability to 
accurately identify sources of funds to determine if transaction activity is suspicious. Even when a bank is 
able to do so, a business mixing licit and illicit proceeds can frustrate a prosecutor’s use of the money 
laundering charge that prohibits the spending of more than USD10,000 of illicit proceeds” (18 USC 
1957)) 
1640 R v Syed Abidi [2016] EWCA Crim 1119 
1641 For example, James Ibori was assisted by his lawyer to launder public funds 
1642 US v Peter Berlin and Others 99 Cr. 914 (SWK) 
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the regulated sector to support the AML system fully.1643 Almost every enforcement 
action against a particular regulated person reveals not just the failure of the system but 
the roles human elements play in undermining the AML law to facilitate ML.1644 
6.3 STRENGTHENING THE LAW AND PRACTICE 
The analysis in the preceding chapters causes this thesis to conclude that the law and 
practice relating to ML in the UK and US do not effectively disrupt ML.1645 The first 
part of this chapter explored some of the factors that undermine the effectiveness of the 
law and practice relating to ML. The concluding part of this thesis presents two 
mechanisms that could help reinforce the law and practice relating to ML in both 
jurisdictions. 
6.3.1 SURFACING OF UNEXPLAINED WEALTH  
As we have seen, ML involves processes aimed at turning dirty assets into clean.1646 As 
criminals would not want to lose the respect they enjoy in their communities, they 
would not want to associate themselves with crime.1647 It is not uncommon in some 
countries to see civil servants and public officials owning properties that are beyond 
their known legitimate earnings. In other countries, people living easy lives, without 
legitimate employment could be seen driving expensive cars.1648 Through ML, proceeds 
of crime reappear in the legitimate economy very clean. The surfacing of unexplained 
wealth raises the suspicion as to the legitimacy of the sources of such wealth.1649 
                                                
1643 Hyland and Thornhill (n 842) 30-450 
1644 FinCEN, In the Matter of JPMorgan Chase Bank Number 2014-1 
1645 Also, the conclusion is the same with regard to terrorist financing 
1646 Rider (n 3) 15 
1647  Rider (n 38) 349 (Professor Barry Rider rightly observed that, criminals no doubt prefer their 
neighbours and admirers to remain in ignorance of their criminal profile) 
1648 Booz Allen Hamilton, Comparative Unexplained Wealth Order: Final Report [2011] 133 
1649 Rider (n 10) 112 
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Concerned about the seriousness of the problems and threats posed by corruption to the 
stability and security of societies, the UN adopted a convention known as UNCAC 
2003.1650 UNCAC urges member states to take action against corruption both in public 
and private sector.1651 Wherever there is corruption there is obviously the need for ML 
services, as the ultimate aim is the enjoyment of the ill-gotten assets.1652 Thus, UNCAC 
also urges member states to put in place measures to combat ML in order to make 
corruption less attractive.1653  
Unless ML is attacked, crimes that generate illict proceeds will continue to flourish 
because there is a symbiotic relationship between ML and corruption.1654 Based on the 
UNCAC Article 20 definition of illicit enrichment, the term “unexplained wealth” can 
be described as a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she 
cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.1655 Prior to UNCAC, a 
number of countries have enacted in their legal codes the offence of illicit 
enrichment.1656  
Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWO) can be described as the legal mechanism through 
which illicit enrichment or the unexplained wealth can be attacked. The process 
normally involves court issuing an order, known as UWO, to a person suspected of 
having accumulated assets worth more than his lawful earnings to explain the source of 
his wealth. Countries that have in place the unexplained wealth regime include Australia 
                                                
1650 For analysis on UNCAC 2003 provisions against corruption and ML the nexus between the two 
please see Indira Carr and Miriam Goldby, ‘Recovering the proceeds of corruption: UNCAC and anti-
Money Laundering standards’ [2011] 2 Journal of Business Law 170 
1651 See UNCAC 2003 articles 7-13 
1652 Carr and Goldby (n 1650) 172 
1653 See UNCAC 2003 articles 14, 23 and 24 
1654 The Action Plan 2016 (n 695) 21 (The UK made it clear that it will introduce the Unexplained Wealth 
Orders to tackle financial crimes such as money laundering and money corruption) 
1655 United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 Article 20 
1656 Jeffrey R. Boles ‘Criminalizing the Problem of Unexplained Wealth: Illicit Enrichment Offenses and 
Human Rights Violations’ [2014] 17 New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 835, 
849-52 
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and Ireland. While the US has not followed suit, UK have enacted the UWOs as part of 
the CFA 2017  
Already UK and US have civil forfeiture regimes in place.1657 However, how does the 
concept of UWO looks like in practice? To understand the concept of UWO we look at 
the Australian and Irish models of the unexplained wealth regime. 
6.3.1.1 AUSTRALIA 
At the federal level, UWO is covered under Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
(Commonwealth). UWO is an order requiring the person to pay an amount equal to so 
much of the person’s total wealth if the person cannot satisfy the court that his wealth is 
not derived from certain offences.1658  
Upon application by law enforcement, a court with “proceeds-jurisdiction” makes a 
preliminary UWO for the purpose of enabling the court to decide whether to make an 
UWO against the person suspected of amassing wealth beyond his lawful means.1659 
The presumption is that wealth has been unlawfully acquired unless the respondent 
proves otherwise on the balance of probabilities.1660 If the court is not satisfied with the 
person’s explanation that whole or part of the person’s wealth is derived from his lawful 
means, the court proceeds to make a final order against the person to pay an amount 
equal to his “unexplained wealth” to the commonwealth.1661 
From the above, it can be understood that the unexplained wealth regime proceeds in 
two basic stages. First, the preliminary UWO (which appears to be an investigatory 
                                                
1657 POCA 2002 part 5; 18 USC s 981 
1658 PoCA 2002 (Cth) s 179(A) 
1659 ibid s 179(B) (preliminary UWO is revocable –s 179(C)  
1660 David Lusty, ‘Civil Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime in Australia’ [2002] 5(4) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 345, 355 
1661 PoCA 2002 (Cth) s 179(E) 
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tool) is issued to enable the court determines whether the person has unjustly enriched 
himself. Secondly, if the respondent could not provide a satisfactory explanation, the 
court issues the actual UWO (a civil recovery mechanism) to order the person to forfeit 
to the federal government of Australia the unexplained wealth he unlawfully 
accumulated.  
As UWO is civil in nature, the burden of proving that the wealth is lawfully obtained is 
on the respondent.1662 This requires the court to assume that the allegations by law 
enforcement regarding unexplained wealth are correct unless the respondent proves 
otherwise on the balance of probabilities.1663  
There are differences and similarities between UWO and civil forfeiture regimes. The 
standard of proof required for both regimes is the civil standard (balance of 
probabilities). With the UWO the burden of proof is on the defendant. Whereas the UK 
and US civil forfeiture/recovery regimes place on the claimant a reversed burden on the 
preponderance of the evidence, but after prosecution discharges his burden by showing 
a ‘probable cause’. Secondly, unlike in traditional in rem forfeiture, in UWO the 
prosecution does not have to prove that the property is the instrument or proceeds of 
crime. Thirdly, civil forfeiture targets the property, while UWO targets the person 
suspected of accumulating unexplained wealth even though no specific allegation of 
wrongdoing needs to be made.  
The targeting of persons in UWO proceedings renders the proceedings more criminal 
than civil in nature.1664 However, in Australia, both regimes have been criticised for 
                                                
1662 ibid s 179(E)(3) 
1663 Anthony Gray, Compatibility of Unexplained Wealth Provisions and ‘Civil’ Forfeiture Regimes with 
Kable [2012] 12(2) Queensland University of Technology Law & Justice Journal 18, 21 
1664 ibid 23-32 
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offending Kable principle – for the civil forfeiture being punitive and for UWO being 
both punitive and for reversing the burden of proof.1665 
6.3.1.2 IRELAND 
Two statutes underpin the UWO regime in Ireland – PoCA 1996 and Criminal CAB Act 
1996. While PoCA provides the legislative framework for making the UWO, the CAB 
Act establishes CAB, which is an institutional framework to help with the PoCA’s 
implementation. CAB is a joint – an elitist type and well-resourced – operational unit, 
with staff from police, prosecutors, tax, and social welfare agencies, each bringing its 
powers to the CAB.  
Unlike in Australia, the Irish version is not specifically referred to as UWO. However, 
both are the same in substance, as both are non-conviction based forfeiture. The UWO 
was introduced in Ireland to attack organised crime which at the time flourished with 
impunity.1666 The Irish UWO proved successful in disrupting and dismantling criminal 
activities in Ireland forcing criminals to flee to countries in Europe and to go 
underground.1667  
While the UWO regime led to the forfeiture of criminal assets, the interlocutory 
provision section made the regime less efficient and swift because  criminal property 
cannot be forfeited to the state before seven years after the interlocutory order is made 
except by agreement of the parties to dispose the asset earlier.1668 However, following 
its initial impact a low success is being recorded probably due to the initial impact 
which makes the organised crime groups to shift base and become wiser at concealing 
                                                
1665 Kable v DPP (NSW) [1996] 189 CLR 51; International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales 
Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319 
see ibid 32-4 
1666 Booz Allen Hamilton (1648) p 122 
1667 ibid 132 
1668 PoCA 1996 s 4 (Ireland) 
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their activities and their illicit proceeds.1669 Nevertheless, overall the Irish UWO is a 
success. In fact, because of its devastating effect on criminals, defence lawyers have 
described it as radical and oppressive. 1670   Thus, its constitutionality has been 
challenged on many grounds, but it has been upheld.1671 
Having provided some background of the Irish UWO, we now look at how it works in 
practice. The first stage. Where CAB suspects a person of having a wealth of a 
suspicious source, the first stage is to apply to the High Court for an ex parte interim 
order to freeze the assets.1672 The order may be granted where it is shown on the balance 
of probabilities to the satisfaction of the court that: (i) a person is in possession or 
control of property, (ii) that property constitutes directly or indirectly the proceeds of 
crime, and (iii) the property’s value is greater than £10,000 or €11,335.44 or 
USD12,699.90.1673  
The order remains in force for 21 days unless an application is made to vary or 
discharge the order.1674 All parties who might be affected by the order will be informed 
of the making of the order and conditions and restrictions thereof. An application for the 
freezing order must be brought within 21 days, but there is no requirement that the 
application be heard in courts during that period.1675 
The second stage in the process is for the CAB to apply for an interlocutory order which 
further restrains and freezes the property for a period of seven years, prohibiting the 
                                                
1669 Booz Allen Hamilton (n 1648) 133 
1670 ibid 122 
1671  Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau [1998] 3 IR 185; Murphy v GMBC HC, 4th June 1999 
(unreported). 
1672 PoCA 1996 s 2 (Ireland) 
1673 ibid s 2(2) (Ireland) the Euro and Dollar value is based on the current exchange rate of the pound 
1674 ibid s 2(3)  
1675 McKv. F and other [2005] IESC 5 (SC) 
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respondent or any person from dealing in the property.1676 For the interlocutory order to 
be made, section 3(1)(a)-(b) must be satisfied by tendering evidence to the court. The 
order may be varied or discharged where the order causes injustice to the respondent.  
While a freezing order or interlocutory order is inforce, or at any stage during section 2 
or 3 proceedings, the court may order the respondent to file an affidavit with the High 
Court to explain the source of his wealth and the income acquired during such period 
not exceeding six years ending the date of the application for the order.1677 There is a 
rebuttable presumption that all property acquired six years before the proceedings 
represents the respondent’s proceeds of crime. 
If the respondent could not satisfy the court that the property does not constitute, or was 
not acquired with, directly or indirectly the proceed of crime, the court may issue a 
disposal order.1678 The effect of the disposal order is to forfeit the property to the State 
divesting the respondent of any right upon the property.1679 
Comparing the two models, the Irish model was more successful than the Australian 
model. Although Australia is the first country in the world to identify its law with name 
unexplained wealth orders, its model was less successful. Compared to Ireland, little 
forfeiture was achieved in Australia. This is partly because of the push back by the 
courts, caution on the part of prosecutors to bring actions under these new laws, 
disagreements between police and prosecutors over how strenuously to use the law, a 
lack of forensic accounting staff, and strict forfeiture laws for drug crimes that in some 
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cases obviate the need for UWOs, downward public support, and the absence of a CAB- 
like agency.1680  
Another major factor is that property owners can meet their evidential burden simply by 
stating that the funds in question were an inheritance or gambling winning. Since in 
Australia such income does not have to be reported to tax officials, there is no record 
that prosecutors can use to contradict the respondent’s claim, and in the absence of 
paper trail it is difficult for the government to disprove the property owner’s claims.1681 
In contrast, the Irish UWO proved successful. The two major factors that contributed to 
the success of Ireland’s UWO is the institutional framework – CAB – put in place to 
implement and support PoCA. Also, Irish UWO enjoys judicial support, as the Irish 
High Court appoints a judge, assisted by a special registrar, to work solely on forfeiture 
cases for a period of at least two years. Therefore, this should be a lesson for the UK 
having just enacted UWO into its statute book. 
6.3.1.3 US AND UK 
Having learned how the UWO works in practice from both the Australian and Irish 
models, the thesis now turns on the US and UK. Although US does not have UWO in its 
strict sense, civil asset forfeiture laws can be found in more than one hundred federal 
statutes.  
They include RICO Act 1970 section 1968, which can be compared with Australian 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002(Cth) section 179(B). Like section 179(B), 18 USC section 
1968 is an investigatory tool that allows the Attorney General to cause civil 
investigative demand to require a person to produce documents relevant to racketeering 
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investigation in his possession.1682 What the US does not have, is the equivalent to 
Australian POCA 2002 (Cth) section 179(E).  
However, the Department of Justice has funded a research, which studied different 
models of UWO in some jurisdictions including Australia and Ireland, to consider 
whether US should adopt UWO into its legal system in addition to its many existing 
forfeiture statutes.1683 Although the research team concluded that UWO could be useful 
if used appropriately and judiciously, the team cautioned that introducing UWO 
applicable to all offences in the US in addition to the already existing forfeiture laws 
would be overambitious and ineffective.1684  
While introducing UWO could be duplication and could also lead to increase in public 
spending, there appears to be some wisdom in the use of UWO in disrupting ML, 
because ML makes tracing and recovery of proceeds of crime very difficult (if not 
impossible). When laundered criminal asset resurfaces clean, though explaining their 
sources satisfactorily may be difficult. Thus, UWO would be useful as an investigatory 
tool to assist in forfeiting those illicit assets.1685 
The AML landscape in the UK received a significant boost following the enactment of 
CFA 2017, which amended the POCA 2002 substantially. One of the major changes the 
Act brought about is the introduction of UWO into the UK legal system. The UK UWO 
resembles the Australian preliminary UWO (POCA 2002 (Cth) section 179B), in that, it 
is an investigatory tool to assist in civil recovery.   
                                                
1682 18 USC s 1968(a) 
1683 Booz Allen Hamilton (n 1648) 
1684 ibid 165; Boles (n 1656) 835 (critises UWO/illicit enrichment statutes for they offend presumption of 
innocence, and encroach upon the right to silence) 
1685 Rider (n 3) 14 and 25 
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CFA 2017 defines UWO as an order requiring the respondent to provide a statement: (a) 
setting out the nature and extent of the respondent’s interest in the property in respect of 
which the order is made, (b) explaining how the respondent obtained the property 
(including how any costs incurred in obtaining it were met), (c) where the property is 
held by the trustees of a settlement, setting out such details of the settlement as may be 
specified in the order, and (d) setting out such other information regarding the property 
as may be so specified.1686  
The UWO procedure allows the law enforcement1687 to apply to the High Court for an 
order to compel the respondent to explain the nature and extent of his interest in the 
property in respect of which the order is made, and how he obtained the property 
including how the cost is met.1688  The respondent could be the owner or someone 
having possession of the property.  
Before the court issues the order, law enforcement must prove that there is reasonable 
ground for suspecting that the wealth is disproportionate to known income, respondent 
is a PEP, he (or an associate) is involved in a serious crime, the property is more than 
£50,000, and finally, the respondent holds the property.1689  
If the order is issued the respondent must respond within the time specified in the order, 
otherwise failure to comply within the specified time triggers the presumption that the 
property is recoverable. 1690  Where the respondent could not give a satisfactory 
explanation as to the provenance of the property, or where the respondent fails to 
                                                
1686 CFA 2017 s 1 inserts s 362A(3) into POCA 2002 
1687 The law enforcement agencies are: NCA, HMRC, FCA, DPP and SFO (CFA 2017 s 362A(7) 
1688 CFA 2017 s 1 inserts s 362A into POCA 2002 
1689 CFA 2017 s 1 inserts s 362B into POCA 2002 (property’s worth was reduced from the initial proposal 
of £100,000.00 as a compromise for the bill to pass the Lords swiftly)  
1690 CFA 2017 s 1 inserts s 362C into POCA 2002 
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respond,1691 then the property is presumed to be recoverable. This would allow the law 
enforcement to commence civil recovery action against the property under the existing 
POCA 2002.1692 Thus, UWO is free standing – it does not require a precursor or parallel 
civil or criminal proceedings underway before an application is made.1693 
UWO is intended to have a retrospective effect.1694 This means that the time the illicit 
enrichment took place is irrelevant. What is important is the resurfacing of the property. 
The UWO is to enable the law enforcement to recover property, which otherwise they 
will not be able to recover for lack of evidence. This could be a situation where the 
property is in the UK, but the evidence is located abroad and cannot be obtained easily. 
This could include a situation where assets are successfully laundered, but their 
emergence into the economy give rise to suspicion as to their origin. 
The requirement that the application for UWO must identify the respondent and the 
respondent must explain the provenance of his property before the court makes the 
UWO to look like a criminal indictment. However, according to the Home Office, 
UWO provisions fit into the existing civil recovery scheme under POCA 2002, which 
means that law enforcement agencies needs to prove, only on the balance of 
probabilities, that the property is derived from unlawful conduct – a lower standard of 
proof than would be needed for a criminal offence.1695  
                                                
1691 Jonathan Grimes and Kingsley Napley, ‘Analysis - Unexplained wealth orders: Insight and Analysis’ 
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1693 Jonathan Grimes and Kingsley Napley, ‘Analysis - Unexplained wealth orders: Insight and Analysis’ 
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Again, the presumption that the property targeted by the order amounts to unexplained 
wealth unless the respondent proves otherwise,1696  amounts to a reverse burden of 
proof. The respondent is expected to give a satisfactory answer for the UWO to fail. 
However, this fear is somehow assuaged. The reversed burden of proof is justified on 
the basis that UWO does not create a criminal offence.1697 In fact UWO should be seen 
as an investigatory tool. Because UWO is civil, it does not contravene Article 6 of 
European Convention on Human Rights: right to fair trial.1698 
Whereas UWO is not a criminal indictment, an offence is committed where the 
respondent who purported to comply knowingly gave a misleading statement.1699 On the 
othere hand, a party may be entitled to compensation for a loss suffered due to a serious 
default on the part of the enforcement authority applying for the UWO after an interim 
freezing order is made.1700 
The HMRC, SFO, NCA, DPP and FCA are the authorities that can apply to the High 
Court for UWO. It is my view that UK should learn from the Australian and Irish 
experiences. Although UK’s model of UWO is just an investigatory tool, and therefore 
not the same as the Australian and Irish models, it is respectfully suggested that the 
UWO regime would benefit from having a multi-agency implementation taskforce (like 
the Irish CAB) drawn from the above listed agency to implement the UWO regime. The 
taskforce should also be empowered to pursue civil recovery so that once the court 
determines that the property represents the respondent’s proceeds of crime and is 
recoverable, they can proceed with the civil recovery process.   
                                                
1696 CFA 2017 s 1 inserts s 362C into POCA 2002 
1697 Please see Dominic Thomas-James, ‘Editorial: Unexplained Wealth Orders in the Criminal Finances 
Bill: a suitable measure to tackle unaccountable wealth in the UK?’ [2017] 24(2) Journal of Financial 
Crime 178 for an analysis on the suitability in asset recovery and its consistency with human rights 
1698 Please see Gogitidze and Others v. Georgia [2015] App. No. 36862/05 
1699 CFA 2017 s 1 inserts s 362E into POCA 2002 
1700 CFA 2017 s 1 inserts s 362R into POCA 2002 
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6.3.2 WHISTLEBLOWING 
For the AML law to be effective in disrupting ML, AML violations or possible AML 
violations by regulated persons need to come to the notice of law enforcement in time to 
be disrupted. One way of bringing AML violations to the attention of law enforcement 
is through whistleblowing. 1701  There is no consensus on the definition of 
whistleblowing. 1702  Simply, however, whistleblowing refers to the passing of 
information concerning wrongdoing, which an employee typically (but not necessarily) 
witnessed.1703  
Whistleblowing differs from “leaking” of information, which refers to a situation 
whereby an employee reveals information not necessarily concerning any 
wrongdoing.1704 Indeed there are similarities and differences between the two terms.1705 
It is instructive to note that in both UK and US freedom of expression is guaranteed 
even though a person may suffer consequences for expressing certain opinions.1706  
Senior management of banks and other regulated persons directly or indirectly 
undermine the AML law in both jurisdictions. 1707  Thus, revealing information by 
                                                
1701 FCA encourages and recognizes the intelligence value of  whistling-blowing to prevent ML. Please 
see Financial Conduct Authority, Business Plan 2016/17 @ p 26 
<https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/business-plan-2016-17.pdf> accessed 16 November 
2016 
1702  Transparency International, International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation 2013 @ p 4 
(defined whistleblowing – for guidance only – as “the disclosure of information related to corrupt, illegal, 
fraudulent or hazardous activities being committed in or by public or private sector organisations which 
are of concern to or threaten the public interest – to individuals or entities believed to be able to effect 
action”) 
1703 Department for Business, Innovation and Skill, Whistleblowing Guidance for Employers and Code of 
Practice 2015  
1704 Bjorn Fasterling and David Lewis, ‘Leaks, Legislation and Freedom of Speech: How Can the Law 
Effectively Promote Public-Interest Whistleblowing? [2014] 153(10) International Labor Review 73 
1705 ibid 72-5 
1706 The First Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees freedom of speech by prohibiting abridging 
the freedom of speech among others; in the UK, Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1 Part I article 10 
guarantees freedom of expression 
1707 United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money 
Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History (Report 202/224-9505 and 202/224-
3721); also see FinCEN, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty Against Sparks Nugget 
<https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/Sparks_Nugget_EA.pdf> accessed 8 August 2016; Peter 
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insiders to law enforcement is one way of enhancing the effectiveness of AML law and 
practice. However, fear of reprisals may prevent employees from coming forward with 
information that would assist the law enforcement to nip in the bud the threat of ML. 
Thus, for the whistleblowing law and policy to work well, employees need to be 
protected against such reprisal. Lack of whistle-blower protection would allow senior 
management who have a criminal mind to continue undermining the effectiveness of the 
AML law.  
Whistleblowing is protected in most jurisdictions against the consequences that 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression would not ordinarily protect.1708  In 
the UK, PIDA 1998 amended ERA 1996 to give protection to whistle-blowers.1709 
However, for an employee to qualify for protection under the Act, the disclosure must 
be made in the public interest, 1710  and must also satisfy one or more other 
requirements. 1711  For the purpose of AML violation, once the public interest 
requirement is satisfied, the next step is to show AML violation has been committed, is 
being committed, or is likely to be committed, and/or to show deliberate failings in 
AML compliance.1712  
By amending ERA 1996, it is evident that Parliament intended to prevent the 
reoccurrence of previous disasters (such as the Zeebrugge Ferry Disaster and collapse of 
BCCI) that could have been avoided had there been at that time a legal framework that 
                                                                                                                                          
Yeoh, ‘Enhancing effectiveness of anti-money laundering laws through whistleblowing’ [2014] 17(3) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 327, 334 -36 
1708 In fact, even International Instruments, such as ECHR 1950, Article 10; UNCAC 2003, Article 33 
sought to provide for the protection or whistleblowers 
1709 PIDA 1998 s 1 inserted Part IVA into ERA 1996 
1710 ERA 2013 s 17 inserted into ERA 1996 s 43B: “is made in the public interest and” to prevent public 
interest where in reality the wrong doing was personal to the whistle-blower like in the case of Perkins v 
Sodexho Ltd [2002] IRLR 109 
1711 ERA 1996 s 43B(1) 
1712 ibid s 43B(1)(a)-(b) 
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affords employees necessary protection against retaliation.1713 However, first, the 1996 
Act requires an internal disclosure unless where there are good reasons that such 
concern cannot be raised and resolved internally.1714 Secondly, the disclosure must also 
be made in a reasonable and responsible way.1715 Whether whistle-blower protection 
under ERA 1996 applies depends on whether the whistle-blower is an employee or 
worker within the meaning of ERA 1996 sections 43K and 230.  
For a long time, whistleblowing has been encouraged as a means of exposing fraudulent 
activities in the US. In 1778 Congress urged that:1716 
[It] is the duty of all persons in the service of the United 
States...to give the earliest information to Congress or any other 
proper authority of any misconduct, frauds or misdemeanours 
committed by any officers or persons in the service of these 
states, which may come to their knowledge. 
However, protection for whistle-blowers against reprisal was recent. 1717  The US 
government enacted statutes such as Civil Service Reform Act 1978 (CRSA);1718 False 
Claims Reform Act 1986; 1719  Sox 2002; 1720  Consumer Products and Safety 
Improvement Act 2008; 1721  and Whistleblower protection Act 1998 (WPA). 1722 
                                                
1713 HL Deb May 1998, vol 589, col 889 
1714 ibid  
1715 ibid (Initially, it was a condition that disclosure must be made in good faith (ERA 1996 s 43C, 43E-
43H), that requirement has been removed by Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 s 18) 
1716 Shawn Marie Boyne, ‘Whistleblowing’ [2014] 62 American Journal of Comparative Law 425 citing 
Stephen M. Kohn, Op-Ed., The Whistle-Blowers of 1777, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2011 
1717 Reprisal can be any retaliatory action such as discharge, dismissal, demotion, suspension, threat, 
harassment, or any sort of discrimination against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment 
(18 USC s 1514A(a)) 
1718 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 USC) 
1719 31 USC ss 3729-3733 (1986) 
1720 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 USC & 18 USC) 
1721 15 USC ss 2051-2085 (2006) (CPSIA), (the CPSIA amends the Consumer Product Safety Act of 
1972, 15 USC ss 2051-2089 (1972)) 
1722 Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in scattered sections of 5 USC  
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Although these legislations prima facie protect whistle-blowers against reprisal, the 
protection is not adequate, automatic and absolute.1723  
Besides, there is no specific law dedicated to protecting employees who expose ML 
violation in banks and other regulated persons. 1724  However, since most of the persons 
who handle other people’s wealth are companies that trade stocks on public exchanges 
or that are required to file a report with the SEC,1725 Sox 2002 could protect employees 
who expose ML violation in the organisations they work.1726  
However, there are hurdles to overcome. Under Sox the claimant must show that the 
action taken against him was retaliatory for exposing wrongdoing.1727 As the whistle-
blower anti-retaliation statute of Sox is one of the statutes that OSHA administers under 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, a complaint filed with OSHA cannot be 
anonymous.1728  
Thus in the event that the action taken against an employee whistle-blower was not, in 
fact, retaliatory because his employers had no cause to suspect, and have not suspected 
that the employee was the actual whistle-blower, the OSHA procedure will give him 
away. Although the law in both jurisdictions prohibits and provides relief against 
retaliatory action, employers can still retaliate. Regardless of whether the employee 
obtains a remedy, any form of retaliation is enough to cause distress to a whistle-
blower.  
                                                
1723 Please see Boyne (n 1718) 425 for discussions on the evolutions, operations and limitations of the 
several US legislations that sought to protect whistleblowers 
1724 Most of the legislations are aimed at exposing fraud, market manipulations etc 
1725 18 USC s 1514A 
1726 ibid 1513(e)  
1727  ibid s 1514A(b)(2)(C); 49 USC s 42121(b) 
1728 US Department of Labor, Information about Filing a Whistleblower or Retaliation Complaint with 
OSHA <https://www.osha.gov/whistleblower/WBComplaint.html> accessed 4th March 2017 
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The secretive nature of ML, coupled with the negative attitude of some senior 
management to AML compliance, and collaboration between criminals and some 
regulated persons, underline the need for employees who become aware of ML 
violations by either the senior management or any other staff to expose such violations.  
Employees in the regulated sector, as well as those who advise financial intermediaries, 
have access to information regarding ML and the predicate crimes. Although revealing 
wrongdoing by advisers and employees could be viewed as a breach of loyalty and 
confidentiality, exposing AML violation will not amount to disloyalty or breach of 
confidentiality, 1729  as the importance of disclosure and compliance is vital for the 
healthy functioning of the regulated sector and for the prevention of economically 
motivated crime.1730  In fact, FSMA section 131A encourages internal disclosure of 
knowledge or suspicion of wrongdoing.  
Although the law in both jurisdictions protects whistle-blowers against discrimination, 
whistle-blowers may face some practical difficulties. It is not certain if a whistle-blower 
will ever enjoy working in the same organisation for exposing a wrongdoing, because 
while some of his colleagues may see him as a hero, others may see him as a traitor1731 
Similarly, moving to another organisation within the same industry may not be easy if 
one is known as a whistle-blower. Also, there could be a problem of obtaining a good 
reference from previous employers for the whistle-blower to apply for another job 
elsewhere. 
                                                
1729 ERA 1996 s 43J (Disclosing wrong doing does not breach contractual duty of confidentiality) 
1730 Securities and Exchange Act 1933 ss 3(b)(4), 4A(a)(3) and 4A(b)(1)(G), and 7; FSMA s 80, also see 
POCA 2002 ss 330-331; and 31 USC ss 5313-5317 
1731 Paul Latimer, Reporting Suspicions of Money Laundering and ‘Whistleblowing’: The Legal and 
Other Implications for Intermediaries and Their Advisers [2002] 10(1) Journal of Financial Crime 23, 24 
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In view of the need to expose the violation of AML law at the very early stage, and the 
difficulties an employee might face for exposing the violation of AML law, it is 
respectfully submitted that whistle-blower laws and policies should be strengthened to 
afford more protection against retaliation of any sort. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
The finding of this thesis is that the law and practice relating to ML in UK and US do 
not effectively disrupt ML and TF. However, there are some factors that contribute to 
the failure of the AML law and practice. The factors discussed above: large volume of 
data, emphasis on following the money, collaboration with insiders, placing 
responsibility on the private sector rather than government to guard against ML are by 
no means the only factors. However, in order not to exceed the word count, only these 
four factors were discussed.  
There are so many other ways to strengthen the law and practice relating to ML. But 
again, due to limitation of space this thesis limits itself to discussing UWOs and 
whistleblowing. 
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